Israel and Regional Balance of Power in West Asia by Hasan, Mohd. Naseer
ISRAEL AND REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 
IN WEST ASIA 
ABSTRACT 
T H E S I S 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Sottor of ^liilogoplip 
IN 
STRATEGIC STUDIES 
BY 
MOHD. NASEER HASAN 
THESIS SECTIOW Under the Supervision of 
Dr. Mohammad Gulrez 
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
1996 
ISRAEL AND REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 
IN WEST ASIA 
ABSTRACT 
T H E S I S 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Bottor of pi)tIa£iDpI)p 
IN 
STRATEGIC STUDIES 
BY 
MOHD. NASEER HASAN 
Under the Supervision of 
Dr. Mohammad Gulrez 
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
1996 
A B S T R A C T 
Throughout the post-war p e r i o d , West As ia has been the 
w o r l d ' s p r o m i n e n t a r e a o f c r i s i s . The r e g i o n has 
e x e m p l i f i e d i n a s t a r k form the c o m p l i c a t e d t a n g l e o f 
i n t e r e s t s and r e l a t i onsh ips t ha t run through i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c s : reg iona l c o n f l i c t and the con t i nu ing s t r u g g l e f o r 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and the c o m p e t i t i o n between t h e two 
superpowers. The elements of the West Asian c r i s i s have gone 
t h r o u g h a number o f comb ina t i ons s i n c e the f i r s t A r a b -
I s r a e l i war o f 1948. 
The co l lapse of the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f the 
P a l e s t i n i a n community, the emergence of the Jewish s t a t e , 
and the assumpt ion o f p o l i t i c a l goa ls by s o v e r e i g n Arab 
s t a t e s t r a n s f o r m e d the c h a r a c t e r o f t he c o n f l i c t i n t o an 
i n t e r - s t a t e c o n f l i c t . I t i s worth r e c a l l i n g t h a t the r o l e o f 
the Pa les t i n i ans in the A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t between 1948 
and 1967 was marg ina l . I t was l a rge l y con f ined to sporad ic 
acts o f insurgency against I s r a e l , acts t h a t were t o t a l l y 
c o n t r o l l e d by the hos t Arab s t a t e s t o the d e t r i m e n t o f 
P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l and 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n t h e d i a s p o r a was d e c e n t r a l i z e d 
r e f l e c t i n g g e n e r a l Arab ideas r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e B a ' a t h , 
N a s s e r i t e or Communist p a r t i e s and i d e o l o g i e s . Even t h e 
es tab l ishment of the Pa les t i n i an L i b e r a t i o n Organ iza t i on 
(PLO) in 1964 was not an independent P a l e s t i n i a n e n t e r p r i s e 
b u t was r a t h e r i n i t i a t e d and s u p p o r t e d by E g y p t . The 
p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y b a t t l e over I s r a e l ' s ex i s tence and 
leg i t imacy was between the Jewish s t a t e and the Arab s t a t e s . 
The Arab-Israeli interaction between 1948 and 1967 
reflected the inter-state structure of the conflict. 
Relations were characterized by diplomatic and economic 
boycott and border clashes. In addition, all three wars, 
1948-49, 1956 and 1967, resulted from balance of power 
calculations. In 1948-49, a coalition of five Arab states 
assumed that the newly established Jewish state would not 
pose a serious threat to their combined military power. In 
1956, Israel attacked Egypt because it feared the long-term 
consequences of the sharp increases in Egypt's military 
capabilities. Finally the 1967 war was related to a 
strategic threat that was taking place on Israel's borders. 
The positioning of the Egyptian army along Israel's southern 
borders, the Jordanian - Egyptian agreement permitting non-
Jordanian armies to be positioned in the West Bank, and the 
threat of continued Syrian shelling from the Golan Heights 
were all actions that transformed the strategic balance of 
power.. In order to deter or contain attacks from each 
direction, Israel would have had to maintain a level of 
mobilization that the Israeli economy and society could not 
sustain for any length of time. Moreover, since Israel 
committed itself not to allow such onesided steps, as they 
constituted a challenge to its deterrence credibility, it 
was left with the choice of either accepting the new status 
quo or removing the threat by force. 
Israel's decisive victory in June 1967 terminated the 
pure strategic conflict that characterized the previous 
period. It then became a conflict consisting of two domains, 
an Interstate and an intercommunal one. In the Interstate 
domain the Issues at stake were Israel's legitimacy, and the 
territories which Israel captured from Egypt, Jordan and 
Syria -- the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the 
Golan Heights. Israel's insistence upon peace in exchange 
for withdrawal from the occupied territories was followed by 
two wars designed to push Israel back from the territories, 
the War of Attrition 1968-70 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. 
Israel's acquisition of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip in 1967 changed the status of the Arab Palestinians 
within the territories and in the diaspora. Following the 
defeat of the regular Arab armies in the Six Day War, the 
Palestinians assumed a greater responsibility in the 
struggle against Israel, and the period after 1967 was 
marked by growing Palestinian self assertion. Even though 
their guerrilla tactics against Israel were largely 
unsuccessful, the Palestinians reappeared as an actor on the 
international scene and within the Arab-Israeli conflict 
context. Imstitution-buiIding took place both within the 
territories and the diaspora. But most important from our 
perspective was the fact that a new dimension in the Arab-
Israeli interaction was occurring. Alongside its continued 
conflict interaction with Arab states, Israel as the power 
controlling the West Bank and Gaza Strip was also 
interacting with the Palestinians. It would not be accurate 
to describe this interaction as one between government and 
citizens or merely between occupying power and occupied 
citizens of another state but rather as one between a state 
and a national community. Moreover, the pattern of conflict 
interaction between Jews and Arabs within the occupied 
territories differed from that between Israel and the Arab 
states. It was marked by strikes, demonstrations and other 
hostile activities that are symptomatic of a communal 
conflict rather than an interstate conflict. 
Israel's decisive victory in 1967 resulted not only in 
the restoration of the geo-strategic balance of power but 
also provided Israel with assets with which it anticipated, 
it could demand the transformation of the conflict system. 
Until 1967, Israel's view was that it had no means of 
influencing the Arab states to accept the legitimacy of the 
Jewish state. Similarly, Israeli decision makers did not 
believe that they possessed the means to force the Arabs to 
alter their stance. They saw their own military power as a 
means of deterring the Arab States from initiating war. 
Should deterrence fail, victory in war was designed to 
prevent the Arab goal of destroying the Jewish state. 
However, the acquisition of Arab territory in 1967 was 
perceived by Israeli policy makers as a bargaining card 
permitting an end to the state of war between Israel and its 
neigghbours. 
Israel's military victory in combination with American 
political support changed the existing equilibrium but was 
not sufficient to terminate the conflict system. The Soviet 
Union was unable to restore the status quo ante, but it 
possessed sufficient strength to assist the Arab states in 
resisting a negotiated solution to the conflict. Just as it 
is difficult to assume that Israel would have been able to 
sustain her positions without Washington's support, so too 
Arab hopes for regaining the lost territories without 
recognizing Israel would have been unrealistic without a 
Soviet build up of their arms arsenal. 
The main actors in the new conflict structure were 
states and a national community based in the diaspora, the 
West Bank and the Gaza strip. In the interstate domain, this 
structure was maintained by a new configuration of power. 
It consisted of several factors : 1) Israel enjoyed 
superiority in the existing military balance of power, but 
2) not enough to dictate to the Arab states a negotiated 
peace agreement, 3) the potential military balance seemed 
stable as long as existing levels of arms supply from 
external sources continued to be balanced, 4) Israel enjoyed 
more secure borders in terms of a military threat against 
its existence. On the intercommunal level, what existed was 
a coercive balance. This balance was composed of several 
elements : 1) Israel enjoyed superiority in force and 
economic resources enabling her to maintain order in the 
territories, but 2) Israel lacked sufficient force to 
enforce Palestinian acceptance of the existing structure, 3) 
control of the territories did not imply a physical burden 
on Israel, 4) the emergence of a Palestinian state depended 
now on Israel. In short, there was no incentive for Israel 
to return territories without conflict termination. 
The compound structure of the conflict was reflected in 
various forms of Interaction -. border clashes, raids, a war 
of a attrition in the interstate domain and violent 
demonstrations, strikes, terror, met by a variety of 
governmental countermeasures in the intercommunal domain. 
Ultimately both domains of conflicts were reflected in war, 
the interstate level in 1973 and both levels in 1982. 
The combined attack by Egypt and Syria on October 6, 
1973 appears to have been designed to achieve at least one 
or two goals, and perhaps both •  to undermine Israel's geo-
strategic position, and to impress upon the Western powers 
the dangers of the status quo. In other words, the goal was 
to change the existing distribution of power in the absence 
of a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, even though the 
United States refrained from resupplying Isrel's military 
arsenal during the early stages of the war, the Israeli army 
succeeded in containing the combined Egyptian and Syrian 
assault, and ultimately brought the attacking states to the 
verge of total defeat in the ensuing stages of the war. 
American pressure on Israel not to destroy the Egyptian 3rd 
Army demonstrated to the Arab states that it was the only 
external power which was in a position to regain for the 
Arab states the territories lost in 1967. In exchange, the 
United States would expect progress towards peace 
arrangements with Israel. In effect, both the Soviet Union 
and the Arab states were forced to recognize their inability 
to alter the status quo through military means. 
During the decade of 1980s, Israel destroyed the Iraqi 
reactor, invaded Lebanon, shared complicity in the massacres 
of Sabra and Chatila, continuously violated the human rights 
of the Arab living in the occupied territories and bombed 
the PLO headquarters In Tunisia. Israel's strength lies 
mainly in the military power and Arab disunity. Arab unity 
is a direct threat to Israel that must be prevented, and 
regional instability as well as domestic turmoil serve 
Israel's immediate purposes. The Arab system is probably the 
most penetrated system in the world having largest degree of 
internecine quarrels. The Arab state system is distinctly 
multipolar. Several of the Arab states (Iraq, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia ) are important yet none appears to have the 
potential for exerting widely accepted leadership, let alone 
hegemony. There is no mutual co-operation among Arab 
states, no joint plans, no coordination, no clear and 
precise common views and even no normal diplomatic 
relations. There exist mutual suspicions, competing 
aspirations,, different region types and historical rivalries 
(Damascus versus Baghdad versus Cairo). This competition 
among the Arab countries and their mutual mistrust has 
considerably helped Israeli military strategy. It was, 
however, the courage and devotion of the Israeli forces and 
enhanced Israeli security environment as well, that helped 
to neutralize the effect of greater Arab numbers. 
However, despite disarming the Palestinians, defeating 
the Arabs in the October War and Syria later in the Lebanon 
war as well as also enjoying military superiority over the 
Arabs, Israel's internal and external security has not 
improved beyond a low level. Military might of Israel is 
still insufficient to ensure the security of Israel without 
possessing control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the 
Arab s ide t h e i r borders are s t i l l not f r e e from the I s r a e l i 
t h r e a t s . 
I nd igenous arms p r o d u c t i o n has a l s o no t reduced t h e 
r e g i o n a l powers dependency on the s u p p l i e r . Because t h e 
need f o r l a t e s t weapons system produced only in the s u p p l i e r 
s t a t e s , keeps t h e West A s i a n s t a t e s t i e d w i t h t h e i r 
s u p p l i e r s . I s r a e l ' s example i s noteworthy. I t i s h e a v i l y 
r e l i a n t upon the United States f o r i t s next genera t ion o f 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d a i r c r a f t s l i k e F-15 and F- t6 and AWACS, 
a l t h o u g h i t i s p roduc ing and s e l l i n g the arms known f o r 
t h e i r t e c h n i c a l q u a l i t y , e t c . 
A c q u i s i t i o n o f n u c l e a r arms and a s s i s t a n c e i s an 
impor tan t goal of the West Asian S ta tes ' defense programme, 
a l though most of them are the s i g n a t o r i e s to the NPT. I r a q 
i s a l l se t t o r e s t a r t i t s n u c l e a r programme, damaged by 
I s r a e l i a t t a c k in 1980 and h a l t e d by i t s war w i t h I r a n . 
S ince i t has j o i n e d the NPT g r o u p , Egypt i s p u r s u i n g a 
c l a n d e s t i n e nuclear programme w i th the help of two American 
f i r m s , a French, the 'Framatome', the I t a l i a n f i r m , ' N i r a ' , 
and t he then West German f i r m , ^Krafwark U n i o n ' . U t t e r 
d i s rega rd of the NPT by i t s s i gna to r i es and the s u p p l i e r s o f 
nuc lear ass is tance to West As ia , I s r a e l ' s n u c l e a r i z a t i o n and 
loopholes in the NPT i t s e l f , are the basic causes u n d e r l y i n g 
West A s i a ' s quest f o r n u c l e a r i z a t i o n In v i o l a t i o n o f t h e 
NPT. 
After the end of the Cold War the r eg iona l arms races 
have not diminished, while on the o ther hand, a few more 
ones have, as the l o g i c a l c o r a l l a r y to the post Pers ian Gu l f 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Israel has been involved in six major international 
wars since her establishment. Whether as the initiator or 
as a defender, Israel has never lost a war, although the 
1973 and 1982 conflicts could probably be judged as draws. 
Israel gained substantial territory as a result of two of 
these wars, but this has exacerbated rather than improved 
its security problems and increased regional hostility 
towards the state. Most significantly, none of the wars 
settled the basic conflict between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. 
In an atmosphere of disputes and tensions, the arms 
acquisition by a country is suspected by the other as a 
threat to its security, compelling the latter to go for arms 
too. As a result, there starts the arms race. For example, 
Israel acquired as many F-15 fighters as were given to Saudi 
Arabia in 1978, to create military balance which had got 
disturbed due to Saudi Arabia's massive arms acquisition. 
Similarly, the missile race between Israel and Saudi Arabia, 
and between Israel and Jordan and Iraq, are the aftereffects 
of purchase of CSS-2 missile by Saudi Arabia from China and 
acquisition of foreign assistance by Syria, Jordan and Iraq 
in their bid to enhance the range of their missiles to an 
extent of covering the whole or half of Israel. 
Despite disarming the Palestinians, defeating the Arabs 
in the October 1973 War and Syria later in the Lebanon war 
as well as also enjoying military superiority over the 
Arabs, Israel's internal and external security has not 
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improved beyond a low level. Military might of Israel 
according to the military strategists Is still insufficient 
to ensure the security of Israel without possessing control 
over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the Arab side, 
their borders are still not free from the Israeli threats. 
Working on my M. Phil dissertation entitled "Israel and 
Arms Proliferation" has given me further impetus and has 
created a genuine desire to elaborate the discussion in 
depth and in more comprehensive way. My Ph.D. thesis is 
partly the result of that aspiration. 
The present study, '^ Israel and Regional Balance of 
Power In West Asia', is divided into five chapters including 
conclusions which deal with the security of Israel, its 
concept, structural elements and dimensions of problems 
which are related to its security in the context of the Arab 
states, particularly the border states, and the 
proliferation of arms between them. 
The First Chapter deals with the ^Israeli Security 
Perceptions'. Security for Israel is a military doctrine as 
most Israeli leaders believe that continued existence of 
Israel depends on its military superiority. Therefore, 
Israelis believe that Israel will survive as long as it is 
strong. Since its inception Israel has managed its security 
affairs from a perceived sense of vulnerability. The 
establishment of Israel in 1948 led to the first Arab-
Israeli confrontation, and subsequently there were wars 
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again In 1956, 1967, 1973 and In Lebanon in 1982. All these 
wars further entrenched Israeli power In the region and also 
allowed It to expand 1n the name of security. These 
territorial expansions are enhancing Israel's security by 
increasing Arab insecurity. For example, during the decade 
of 1980s, Israel annexed the Golan Heights, invaded Lebanon, 
shared complicity in the massacres of Sabra and Chatila, 
continuously violated the human rights of the Arabs living 
in the occupied territories and bombed the PLO headquarters 
in Tunisia. Thus, Israel's strength lies mostly in the 
physical military sense of power and Arab disunity because 
Arab unity is a direct threat to Israel that must be 
prevented. But the centrality of security in Israeli life 
remains undiminished despite deployment in the territories, 
attainment of strategic depth and the peace treaty with 
Egypt. 
The Second Chapter "Israel and Key Regional Powers' 
emphasizes Israel's differences and discords with her 
neighbours. One of the most obvious issues Is that of 
establishing specific, fixed boundaries for Israel and for 
the Arab states in the region. Unlike all other countries in 
the world, Israel has never officially indicated what it 
considers to be its legal boundaries, except for its borders 
with Egypt, which was settled as part of the 1979 Egyptian -
Israeli Peace Treaty. Until 1967 the de facto borders of the 
state were the 19^9 armistice lines with Egypt, Lebanon, 
Syria and Jordan. Since 1967 the de facto territory of 
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Israel has included East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the 
Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and until the Camp David 
Accords, all or part of the Sinai Peninsula. These are the 
borders shown on official Israeli maps, with no indication 
of what areas were captured in the June 1967 war. Before a 
peace treaty can be concluded, these de facto boundaries 
will have to be replaced with de Jure, agreed-upon borders 
between Israel and the surrounding states. 
The Third Chapter deals with ^Israel and Regional Arms 
Proliferation' especially between Israel and its bordering 
states. One issue of great concern to the international 
community is the high level of militarization in the West 
Asia. Among Third World States, West Asia is the primary 
arms-importing area. In 1987 nearly 38 percent of all 
weapons transferred from one country to another went to 
Israel, Iran, or one of the Arab states; this pattern has 
existed since the mid-1970s. For the five-year period 1983-
1987, just six West Asian countries-Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria-accounted for over one-third 
of the world's weapons trade. These weapons come primarily 
from the United States and the Soviet Union, although France 
and Britain also provide a significant percentage, and China 
recently sold ballistic missile to Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, Iraq is one of several states in the region 
alleged to have produced chemical weapons, and Israel is 
widely acknowledged to have developed functional nuclear 
weapons. There are a number of explanations for this 
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general situation, including a desire for the prestige major 
weapons systems are thought to provide and the oil revenues 
that have allowed countries such as Saudi Arabia to purchase 
more weapons than would normally be the case. But one of the 
most significant factors is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
: Each state believes that it needs the weapons it imports 
or produces domestically in order to be secure in an 
insecure region. This is the rationale given for Israel's 
recent development of the Jericho II missile, or Iraq's 1988 
purchase of modified Soviet Scud-B missiles. 
Fourth Chapter deals with "Israel and the 
Palestinians'. In a review of the interaction of Israel and 
Palestinian people after 1948 and the implications of their 
conflict for the global system, several themes stand out. 
First is the continuing importance of nationalist identity 
and the search for self-determination on the part of 
Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. The creation of the state 
of Israel provided for this nationalist expression by one 
group of people. Palestinians were denied this basic form of 
political expression, although the same UN resolution that 
called for the establishment of a Jewish state also provided 
for a Palestinian state. This problem was further 
exacerbated with the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, among other terr-i tories, which has led 
to the continuing denial of the right of self-determination 
for the Palestinian people. The loccupation also raised 
crucial Issues for Israel, which had to decide how it would 
- VI -
relate toward the Palestinians in those occupied lands. 
Thus, the problem raised in the first half of the twentieth 
century by competing nationalist claims over the Mandate of 
Palestine were not resolved in the second half of the 
century, they merely took different forms. In addition, the 
chapter also analyses role of the PLO, Jerusalem issue and 
the Palestinian uprising. 
The Fifth Chapter is the 'Conclusions : An Assessment 
of the Israeli Security and Regional Balance of Power'. 
This section brings together the various Issues raised in 
the context of security of Israel and its perception of 
threats. This discussion provides a glimpse into the 
involvement of other state and non state actors in the 
conflict, the surrounding Arab countries and the PLO. It 
examines the arms acquisition by Israel and its neighbouring 
countries and its impact on West Asia. It also evaluates 
the prospects of peace in West Asia even after the signing 
of Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Accord on 13 September 1993 
between Israel and the PLO. 
Chapter -1 
Israeli Security 
Doctrine 
ISRAELI SECURITY DOCTRINE 
National defence and security have been the supreme 
concerns of Israel throughout its existence. Before its 
creation as a sovereign state it had already to fight a 
civil war, and moments after its birth it had to fight 
another regular war with the neighbouring Arab States for 
survival. Israel's concept of security has developed its 
features and dimensions along with the development of 
Israel's interests in the region of West Asia, the Israeli 
strategy of occupation and security concept seem to be two 
faces of the same coin. The Israeli security requirement has 
always insisted on the enforcement of occupation because 
this reduces pressure on greater security arrangements. 
Israel's security concept transformed itself through four 
stages •  From an aggressive nature to a defensive nature to 
protect the Jewish settlers on the Holy Land (Palestine), 
then to the Israel state and finally an expanding entity by 
itself. This is justified by Israel as a means to protect 
its right of existence on the Holy Land and to protect the 
people (the new Jewish settlers). Therefore, the scope of 
Israeli security concept expanded so greatly that it was 
impossible to draw the line limiting it, and the extent of 
its threat remained unknown. In accordance to this concept, 
Israel's occupation became essential not only for the 
protection of the Israeli State but also for the new 
territories which were captured under the pretext of 
security requirements. 
All aspects of life in Israel directly or indirectly 
relate to national survival and security. According to David 
Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, "the 
security of Israel is not a matter of protection, the 
independence territory, borders, or sovereignty but it is a 
matter of survival".^ From 19A8 to 1967, Israel faced the 
security dilemma only abstractly. In fact, its policy was, 
as a popular Hebrew phrase put it, one of EIN BREIRA -- no 
choice Israel had to be strong, and strength held no danger 
of provocation, for the Arab world was already as hostile as 
it could conceivably be. The depth of this hostility had 
several causes, among which was the pull of Pan - Arab 
feeling. Pan - Arabism gave each Arab state and people 
license to judge the others, and this had the effect of 
preventing Arab rulers from considering conciliation with 
Israel. Each ruler went to war against Israel in 1948 partly 
from fear that he would be discredited in the eyes of all 
Arabs if he held back while others conquered Palestine. 
After 1948, none was willing to accept Israel lest he be 
charged with insufficient devotion to the Arab cause. 
With no danger of provocations before 1967, and no hope 
of conciliation, Isralis practiced deterrence. The economy 
was organised to promote independence. Settlement patterns 
were designed to safeguard borders. Unable to maintain a 
large standing army, Israel developed a small one with a 
core of full time professionals and cadres of conscripts 
serving three years tours of duty beginning at age eighteen. 
In war time the ranks were filled out by every able--bodied 
male from the age of twenty one-to fifty. Because Israel's 
soldiers were civilians, however, the country's economy 
could not accept long wars, so Israel's strategists could 
not adopt a defensive posture. Instead, they planned for 
short, decisive wars. Israeli forces were to strike first, 
pierce Arab lines, cause disruption in their ranks, and gain 
swift, conclusive victories. 
The Israeli strategy is built on the necessity to 
penetrate the Arab sub-system. The objective is to create 
inter - state contradictions and increase the role of the 
centrifugal forces in the sub-system. It also tries to reach 
the central regional power in order to ally itself with it 
or replace it. In this regard, Israel has the advantage of 
maintaining a developed set of goals which confronts the 
amorphous, ambiguous Arab goals. Israelis try to make use of 
every available chance to make their security viable. Their 
perception regarding the vulnerability of their state is 
real and hence a part of their collective psyche. On the 
other hand, while Israelis were the most vocal advocates of 
peace in the 1960s, their concept of peace is a peculiar 
one. It aims at establishing societal interactions in the 
social, economic, political and strategic domains before 
conducting any accord. For example, on the one hand Ben 
Gurlon stated that the Israeli concept of peace does not 
mean the signing of an accord on a piece of paper, M t is 
friendship and mutual co-operation'. On the other hand, the 
former Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, mentioned 
that as long as there is power, there is peace, power gives 
opportunity for peace . Conceptually, the Israeli definition 
of peace is equivalent to the Arab concept of co-operation. 
Such conceptual differences were reflected in the 
negotiation process between the Arabs and the Israelis. 
Similarly, Shimon Peres, the former Prime Minister has 
defined security of Isral in these words : "The Security of 
Israel implies immigration, and it means settlements. 
Security includes control of the sea and the air 
Security is the development of scientific research and 
scientific aptitude in all disciplines, physics, chemistry, 
biology and advanced technology. The security of Israel is 
the mobilization of our youth and the involvement of the 
people and its scholars in the pursuit of difficult and 
vital objectives. Settlement, defence and integrations of 
the exiles. Security is not a limited function but a 
multiple effort, it is like a high -- tension cable 
concentrating national energy and using it to reinforce the 
nations ability to survive. It is both existing energy and 
potential energy."^ 
The ruling elites of Israel consider the neighbours 
threat as serious as they think that the goal of Arab 
countries are not to annihilate the state as a political 
entity but they want to destroy the entire Jewish 
population. The Israeli security is estimated on 'a worse 
case analysis', which considers that if Arab countries would 
victorious it would be the destruction of the state of 
Israel. As Ben Gurion has stated -. "Israel may win a 
hundred battles, yet Its problems will not be solved but if 
the Arabs are victorious only once as it will mean our 
end". Israel realized the fact that they could not compete 
their enemy In quantity, thus she wanted to ensure a 
qualitative edge over them. Israel wanted to reduce the 
losses of life and expenditure during the time of war 
because a small state can not afford It. To achieve this 
goal, Israel wanted a short war and the use of advanced 
weapons. 
Further, Israel in response to the Arab threat developed 
a strong army relative to its population, size and 
resources. The airforce of Israel is considered to be the 
most important fighting element. Though less in number 
comparing it to the Arab forces, Israeli airforce is 
indisputably superior since the 1967 war when within few 
hours of combat it destroyed the whole unit of Egyptian 
airforce which changed the position of ground war in Sinai 
Zone. During the War of Attrition 1969-70, air forces of 
Israel played an important role both in air to air combat 
and in its unique function as flying artillery against the 
Egyptian West Bank installations. In 1970 It raided the main 
Egyptian population and commercial centres. 
The ground forces of Israel are the largest and central 
part of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The ground forces are 
expected to play a decisive role in war time against their 
enemies as it did in 1956 and 1967 war. IDF Is expected to 
meet the identified threat and to defend the country from 
enemy. Due to these purposes, Israel acquires military 
weapons in quantity and quality from foreign countries, 
mostly the United States, France, England and West Germany 
and developed the substantial capability of defence 
production. It also captured a good quantity of Soviet arms 
in June 1967 war from the enemy Arab forces . 
Israel has also been providing military and financial 
support to the minority groups of the neighbouring countries 
so that they could remain engaged within the country and 
could not unite against it. For example, Israel was 
supporting the Biafran. revolt in Nigeria, supported the 
Christian forces of Major Haddad in South Lebanon and 
militants in the north. It also supported the Kurds in Iraq 
and Southern Sudanese against the Arab Muslim dominated 
northern based government . 
Israel also followed the retaliation policy for her 
security. It believes that if there is any threat for the 
security of Israel from any country it will not hesitate to 
punish them, Israelis believe that any potential threat to 
the security of Israel should be dealt before it becomes a 
real threat. On 7 July, 1981, the Israeli air forces 
bombarded the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tamuz near Baghdad 
(Operation was named Baby lone). Again, in October 1985, the 
airforces of Israel bombed the PLC Headquarters and the home 
of several PLO officials which was 2000 kms away in Tunis. 
Israel has acquired the nuclear capability which has a 
good deterrent effect and might be used against the Arabs 
when it will feel that the very existence of Israel is in 
danger. A nuclear weapon can destroy a major Arab population 
or resources centres such as Aswan Dam on the Nile, the Suez 
Canal, and cities such as Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus and 
Baghdad. Israeli also believe that possession of nuclear 
weapons by them will stabilize the situation in the region. 
Having the idea that nuclear weapons would give a sufficient 
feeling of security to the Israeli people, the Ministry of 
Defence developed the atomic energy programme within its 
system of ^blanket security' . 
The Incessant tension and strained relationship between 
the Arabs and Israel dominates directly or Indirectly, all 
aspects of Israeli life, and it has prevailed since 1948 
when it declared Its independence. According to Bernard 
Reich, "The holocust, Arab hostility during the mandate 
period, five wars, countless skirmishes and terrorist 
attacks, and Incessant vituperative rhetoric against the 
state have all left their mark on Israelis national psyche 
and perceptions, but have not led to a comprehensive, 
permanent and meaningful peace".° The hardening of Arab 
feelings can be gauged from the fact when they refused to 
join Sadat's peace process and in Arab Summit at Khartoum In 
1967 where they declared "no peace with Israel, no 
recognition of Israel, no negotiation with it and insistence 
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on the rights of Palestinian people". 
For Israel, the combination of its historical 
psychological perspective, anti-semitism, geographic and 
political-military Isolation, and vulnerability to enemy 
attack has conditioned the formulation of its security 
policies. The perceived threat to Israel compel it to 
formulate Its security policies, in a broader sense as 
prevention of threat to its Independence and territorial 
Integrity and a protectorate of persecuted Jews everywhere 
In the world. The Israelis perceive the threat only from the 
side of Arab states which share borders with her plus Iraq 
and not extra regional in nature. However, the entire Arab 
entity is considered in broader conception as the enemy 
because they are participating in taking the decisions 
against Israel in Arab League and propagate anti-Israeli 
feelings and some times participated in wars, terrorist acts 
etc. Before its disintegration, Soviet threat and potential 
was also a matter of concern for Israel but this was to be 
dealt by United States and Western powers not by Israel 
alone. 
Thus, to sum up, we can divide the Israel's security 
concept in the following elements : 
1. Borders. 
2. Occupied Territories. 
3. Population Policy (Immigration) 
4. New Settlements 
5. Military Superiority 
6. Receiving U.S. Assistance. 
1. Borders : 
The position of Israel is affected due to its 
surrounding hostile states and access to its land is only by 
sea and air. This geographical isolation prevented Israel 
for any kind of regional alliance system. In none of the 
five wars it fought between 1948 and 1981, was Israel joined 
in combat by another state -- with the exception of the 
extra regional powers like Britain and France in 1956. 
The vulnerability of Israel Is largely affected by its 
geographical setting. The frontiers which existed before 
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June 1967 war could have been attacked easily by its enemy 
and it was difficult to defend populated areas. The distance 
between Israel's Mediterranean coast and enemy military 
Installations in the West Bank, which included the coastal 
corridor between the main port city of Haifa and the 
commercial centre of Tel Aviv, was often less than ten 
miles. At its widest point near the Negeve town of Dimona, 
Israel's territory was only sixty five miles wide. In most 
locations there were no major natural defence barriers to 
the advance of the enemy forces. Israel's population 
centres, particularly its three major cities of Jerusalem 
(the Jewish sector), Tel Aviv, and Haifa and main air bases 
were within a few hours advance by enemy ground forces, and 
many were within enemy artillery range. This helped to 
generate a perception of vulnerability that has been 
important in shaping Israels view of the significance of the 
occupied territories-that Israel must not return to the 
vulnerability created by the pre-June 1967 war frontiers^^. 
The Israeli leaders have constantly ignored the border 
issue and tried to avoid a definite conclusions about the 
demarcation of their respective territories. The former 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir once stated that "The 
frontier is where the Jews live and not where there Is a 
line on the map"^^. After 1967 the concept of the border 
was added to the Israeli definition of national security. 
The Israelis claimed that a considerable part of the 
armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967 are without 
any topographical security value and of less importance, the 
lines fail to provide Israel with the essential minimum of 
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strategic depth. Therefore, Israel is always looking for a 
border which has topographical and strategic significance 
that would provide it with requisite minimal strategic 
depth. 
2. Occupied Terrlrotles : 
In the course of the June 1967 war, Israel captured 
territory that most Israelis agreed belonged to the Arabs. 
To the north, Israel captured the Golan Heights. To the 
east, it captured the West Bank of the Jordan River. To the 
south, it took the Gaza Strip and Sinai peninsula. These 
captured territories added to Israel's military 
capabilities. They provided natural frontiers. The Suez 
Canal, the Jordan River and the Golan Heights were shorter 
and more easily defended than the cease fire lines of 1949. 
Moreover, and this was particularly important for a small 
country, the territories served as buffer zones between the 
Arab states and Israel's. In case of attack, they made it 
possible for Israel to trade space for the time in which its 
army could mobilize. Infact, that was exactly what happened 
in the war of 1973, demonstrating the value of the 
territories. Had that war begun at the 1967 borders, the 
heart of Israel would have been in Jeopardy. Thus, the 
Israeli leaders believe that the Golan Heights, the West 
Bank and Gaza are of crucial geo-military asset and that no 
political agreements or security arrangements can compensate 
for their loss. 
The control of occupied territories enables Israel to 
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maintain airborne and ground based observation and 
electronic information gathering facilities and surface to 
air missile. The West Bank also provides a major training 
area for Israeli defenses. In addition, control of the West 
Bank is a major asset in dealing with the problem of 
infiltration operations. On July 30, 1980 the Israeli 
parliament arbitrarily proclaimed Jerusalem as its 
^Permanent Capital' in a flagrant challenge to the entire 
world. 
3. Population Policy (Immigration) : 
Israel is unique among the multitude of new states in 
that not only its sovereignty but also its people are new. 
The people are new in the sense that the great bulk of it 
did not live in the territory over which it eventually 
achieved sovereignty until relatively recent times, it was 
constituted by immigrants and their offspring who came to 
Palestine from every nook and cranny of the world, absorbed 
the small native Jewish community and displaced most of the 
native Arab population (See Map 1). A hundred years ago 
there were only 25,000 Jews in all of Palestine living amid 
some 500,000 native Arabs. Twenty eight years ago, when the 
state of Israel was born, there were 650,000 Jews in 
addition to a residue of 150,000 Arabs who remained in the 
territory of the Jewish state. Nowadays, there are more than 
2.9 million Jews and 520,000 Arabs.excluding the population 
of the territories occupied since 1967 except for East 
Jerusalem (the old clty)'^. 
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MAP 1. Population of Palestine by subdistricts, 1931. Source: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed.. 
The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 148. Copyright © 1971 
by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. Reprinted by permission. 
The Immig ra t i on waves o f Jews are known i n Z i o n i s t 
h i s t o r i o g r a p h y as ^ A l i y o t ' , p l u r a l o f the Hebrew te rm 
' A l i y a h ' , denot ing ascent or immigrat ion to the Holy Land. 
Most of the Jews came to I s r a e l from Russia, Poland, Eastern 
Europe and Cent ra l Europe as a r e s u l t o f the Nazis ' r i s e to 
power. For the Z i o n i s t Jewish, immigrat ion was a v i t a l and 
ind ispensable cond i t i on f o r the growth and s t reng then ing of 
Pa les t i ne Jewish community ( the Yishuv) f o r the p r o s p e r i t y 
o f the country and b u i l d i n g o f the Jewish Na t iona l Home. 
Thus , Jewish leaders c l a i m t h a t the Jewish s t a t e s h o u l d 
become t h e home l a n d o f t h e Jews who a r e s c a t t e r e d 
t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . W i t hou t Jewish i m m i g r a t i o n i n f a c t 
I s r a e l has no f u t u r e . So one o f new s t a t e ' s f i r s t laws 
passed in 1950 was the Law of Return. According to which 
every Jew who a r r i v e s in I s r a e l i s au tomat i ca l l y an I s r a e l i 
c i t i z e n . Moshe Dayan quoted Ben Gora ion as f r e q u e n t l y 
sayings : "Our main o b j e c t i v e i s immig ra t ion , we have to do 
e v e r y - t h i n g p o s s i b l e t o i n c r e a s e i t and t o a t t r a c t 
i m m i g r a n t s f r o m w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r . The 
s t r eng th of the Jewish people l i e s in q u a l i t y not q u a n t i t y . 
And only i f we ra i se our q u a l i t y w i l l we be ab le t o stand up 
to our numbersless enemies". . 
Tens ions are now emerg ing between s e c u l a r f o r c e s i n 
I s r a e l , w h i c h w o u l d l i k e t o a t t r a c t as many S o v i e t 
immigrants as poss ib le regard less o f whether or not they are 
100 p e r c e n t Jewish (and which i n f a c t welcome the s e c u l a r 
o r i e n t a t i o n of most of the immigrants) , and a segment o f 
t he r e l i g i o u s movement t h a t f e a r s the impact o f I t s own 
p o l i t i c a l power of a secular t i d a l wave. Meanwhile, the r a t e 
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of immigration is going up, not down. Further, Israel adopts 
a policy of unlimited immigration and it was for this 
purpose that the Law of the Return was enacted. Former 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has sated that "Israel 
must continue to give top priority to attracting Jews from 
all over the world that is the essence of the Zionist 
dream".^^ Israelis believe that, large scale immigration 
and continued access to modern arms from the west were 
essential to their security and they also believe that if 
they have five or six or more million Jews in Israel nothing 
will be able to injure their state or cast doubt on its 
existence. Meanwhile, Israeli leaders feel that a large 
population is vital to their future and they regard the 
increase in their population as a security need, but this 
increase will push them into a war of expansion and this 
expansion will be at the expense of their neighbours. The 
Palestinians consider Jewish immigration the most dangerous 
and tangible threat to their political existence and their 
economic social and religious position. The encouragement to 
Jews to immigrate to Israel and play their part in her life 
and development is one of Israel's major aims. At present, 
the influx of Soviet Jewish immigration into Israel 
threatens to change the geography and demography of the 
occupied territories for ever. 
The immigration wave of 1990 is unmatched in Israel's 40 
years history, which at its core is a history of conquest 
through immigration and settlement. A Jewish Agency 
spokesman referred to it in September 1990 as an 
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"unprecedented exper ience, comparable to the U.S. absorb ing 
60 m i l l i o n f o r e i g n e r s . " " I n i t i a l l y caught by s u r p r i s e , 
I s r a e l i soc ie ty s w i f t l y began to mob i l i ze in 1990 to o b t a i n 
the resources necessary to take in the new immigrants . I n 
January, the government es tab l i shed a committee o f d i r e c t o r s 
t o m o b i l i z e a l l gove rnmen t o f f i c e s and c o o r d i n a t e 
immigrat ion opera t ions . A year e a r l i e r , the government had 
begun to phase out I t s method of p lac ing new immigrants in 
a b s o r p t i o n c e n t r e s i n f a v o u r o f a sys tem o f " d i r e c t 
a b s o r p t i o n " . Th is new method has been p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l 
s u i t e d to accommodated the huge numbers of Sov ie t immigrants 
who are h igh l y educated and tend to a s s i m i l a t e i n t o I s r a e l i 
s o c i e t y . 
To a t t r a c t more and more immigrants, I s r a e l i government 
p r o v i d e s them v a r i o u s k i n d o f a s s i s t a n c e . Under the new 
system, immigrants a r r i v i n g a t the a i r p o r t are g iven a sum 
of money to cover basic l i v i n g expenses d u r i n g . t h e i r f i r s t 
year i n the c o u n t r y . The average f a m i l y o f t h r e e , f o r 
example, receives as the f i r s t i ns ta l lmen t of t h i s s t i p e d , 
or " a b s o r p t i o n b a s k e t " , a check f o r 4,880 New I s r a e l i 
Shekels (NIS) and a cash sum of NIS 750 ($ 1 = NIS 2 ) ^ ^ . In 
a d d i t i o n , they receive ha l f a year of f r ee hea l th insurance 
and generous mortgage b e n e f i t s . While a t the a i r p o r t , they 
a re a l l o w e d to make one f r e e t e l ephone c a l l ab road and 
u n l i m i t e d f r e e c a l l s any where in I s r a e l . They then rece ive 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o wherever they wish t o go. Many j o i n 
r e l a t i v e s or f r i e n d s already l i v i n g in I s r a e l . Once they 
have found temporary accommodat ions, they open a bank 
accoun t t h rough which they r e c e i v e the remainder o f t he 
stipend, for a total of HIS 23,000 for a family of three. 
At this point they can also begin to take out loans, which 
they can use, for example, to pay off their mortgage on 
Housing.^° However, travel outside Israel remains difficult 
because of military service and the obligation to repay 
loans taken out to cover housing and living expenses. 
4. New Settlements -. 
In the Six Day war of June 1967, Israel overran 68, 658 
sq. kms. of Arab territories-over three times of its own 
size. Following the conclusion of the Egypt Israeli peace 
treaty in March 1979, Israel pulled out its troops from the 
Sinai peninsula. But the most populous of the occupied 
territories, namely the West Bank and Gaza together with the 
Golan Heights, still remain under Israeli control. The 
Intention of Israeli governments and leaders since the June 
1967 war have been evident from their statements and 
actions. On the first day of the war when Israel launched 
the so-called pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Prime -
Minister Levi Eshkol had declared that his country did not 
seek any territorial aggrandizement. But soon after the Arab 
military collapse, which enabled Israel to consolidate 
Itself on the Jordan River, Eshkol changed his tune and 
said, with transparent levity and in an obvious reference to 
the land and people of the West Bank •. "Israel 1s pleased 
with the dowry, but not with the bride".'" According to 
one observer, within two months of the June war several 
political parties took definite stands against the return of 
land to the defeated Arabs. Ylgal Allon, Minister of Labour 
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In Mapai-led national coalition, declared that Israel's 
eastern border must be the Jordan River and the half-way 
line through the Dead Sea. This, he asserted, "was a viable 
frontier with Jordan". He went on to argue that "a 
permanent Israeli presence by settlement of this region will 
ensure the nations security". Similarly, Moshe Dayan, 
Defence Minister and a founding father of the Rafi party, 
was equally candid. "All the areas we have taken", he 
proclaimed, "are dear to us". He cited Jewish history and 
Israeli security as reasons for retaining the occupied 
territories. . 
It is obvious, however, that settlements in the West 
Bank and Gaza have a political purpose in that they aim to 
create faits accomplis which would change the demographic 
balance and geographical composition of the territories in 
question. They would also break up the contiguity and 
encircle the densely populated Arab areas situated along the 
West Bank's watershed. The main purpose of these settlements 
is to solidify the option for an Israeli annexation of at 
7 1 least part of the West Bank . Thus, the adherents of the 
demography-security approach support the establishment of a 
large number of Jewish settlements that would be scattered 
throughout the West Bank. Those who are military-security 
oriented oppose the creation of small communities that are 
remote and isolated from one another. They believe in the 
creation of large blocks of mass settlements with relatively 
large numbers of residents and fighting men. Settlements of 
this kind would be better able to hold out against a 
military threat and could b© organized into a regional-
defence district. . Thus, from the security standpoint the 
establishment of settlements in military sensitive area is 
an expression of a general concept or theory of security 
that considers the system of regional defence to be part of 
the nation's military force. In this connection David Ben -
Gurion noted that "our manner of settlement will determine 
the security of the state no less than methods by which we 
build the army. Only dense agricultural settlements along 
the border will serve as a very reliable shield for the 
security of Israel against attacks from the out side.... A 
wall of working and productive human beings in capable of 
watching over the nation's borders". ^ •^  
The geographical spread of the housing estates clearly 
expressed the intention to encircle Arab residential areas, 
restricting their expansion and making their inclusion in 
any future Palestinian entity almost impossible. Although 
most Labour politicians did not envisage this exercise being 
repeated elsewhere on the West Bank, the scale and nature of 
the activities provided an obvious example. By 1977, the 
East Jerusalem housing estates contained more than 40,000 
Israelis, dwarfing the strategic belt colonization (10,000 
settlers in the Golan, the Jordan Rift and the Gaza 
approaches) and apparently provided a more logical method of 
rapid, mass settlement to compete with Arab numbers and 
establish an immovable presence. More than 200 settlements 
and posts have been established since 1967 and more than 60 
percent of the land in the territories has been seized by 
Israeli authorities. Intensive build up of new urban and 
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community settlements around Jerusalam, Hebron, Nablus, 
Jen1n and other Palestinian cities are some of the examples. 
In Jerusalem and Hebron Jewish settlements were established 
inside the cities,^^ (See Table 1). 
Jewish colonization, accompanied by extensive land 
seizure and closure, comprised the most dramatic arm of 
Likud strategy to absorb the West Bank and Gaza, a strategy 
which also Included Judicial changes and economic 
subordination of the Palestinians. The process produced a 
new Israel, where 3,435,000 Jews (63%) dominated 2,000,000 
Palestinian Arabs (37%). Of course the visible apparatus in 
the Occupied Territories represented only the physical tip 
of the Iceberg, the far reach i ng-shift in the Israeli 
political and ideological balance which underlay this 
apparatus cemented Greater Israel more firmly than any 
purely physical index could suggest. 
It is important to note that successive Israeli 
governments, both before and since 1977, have alternatively 
used the security argument and the Biblical plea to support 
the policy of retaining control on and creating Jewish 
settlements in the occupied territories. During the decade 
long Labour rule, settlement policy was governed by the 
Allon Plan. The plan was design to keep 30 per cent of the 
West Bank permanently under Israeli control, leaving two 
Arab enclaves north and south of Jerusalem, one totally 
surrounded by Jewish territory and the other linked to 
Jordan by a narrow corridor of land. The Arab enclaves could 
Juridically belong to Jordan, subject to the condition that 
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Table 1 
Number of the Settlements by Year of 
Establishment and Area of Settlement 
Year City of Jerusalem Northern Southern Jordan Gaza Total 
Jerus- District West West Valley Strip Terri-
alem Bank Bank tories 
1967-70 
1971-73 
1974-76 
1977 
1978-80 
1981-82 
Total 
5 
3 
-
-
3 
-
11 
-
2 
2 
1 
6 
4 
15 
2 
1 
3 
15 
34 
31 
86 
2 
1 
3 
3 
10 
10 
29 
8 
4 
3 
6 
13 
8 
42 
3 
2 
-
1 
8 
7 
21 
20 
13 
11 
26 
74 
60 
204 
Source ; Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank (including 
Jerusalem) : There Nature and Purpose, Part II, United 
Nations, New York, 1984, p. 21. 
they would remain free of Arab forces. At any rate, Israel 
would "protect" the entire West Bank "by ringing It with 
strategically placed military -- agricultural settlements"^"^ 
More than twenty eight years of Israeli presence in the 
Occupied Territories, attended by mushroom growth of Jewish 
settlements, expropriation of Arab land, diversion and 
control of water resources, and political repression, has 
woven a bizarre fabric of interactions which is at once 
annexationist In design, segregationist in spirit and 
exploitative in practice. Thus, the aspects of settlements 
and security have been Inseparable for Israel since the 
first settlers moved into the West Bank in September 1967. 
This has made Israel use the policy of "settlement for 
security and security for settlement". These settlements 
serve Israelis military security interests and since 1973 
settlement defences have been greatly strengthened. Their 
field defences are now quite massive constructions with five 
positions dug into artificial mounds created to improve 
fields of fire and observations and all Israeli settlements 
and towns have air raid shelters and the settlers are 
probably armed with machine guns, mortars and anti-tank 
weapons^ . Many settlements have passive defenses (mines, 
wires etc./) and also maintain substantial stocks of 
Infantry and anti-tank weapons. These defences enable them 
to withstand any assault by modern armored and mechanized 
forces. Israeli agriculture Minister Areil Sharon said : 
"every settlement has its purpose and role in the defence of 
? 7 
Israel". Thus, all Jewish settlements 1n border areas 
play an active role in Israel's defence and can provide a 
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kind of early warning and In war time settlements have a 
role to play in static defence. An Israeli military officer 
has stated that : "these settlements have enabled Israel to 
seal off its borders from Arab attacks and provide Israel 
with up-front units which can be quickly integrated into the 
security plans for area."^° Hence, Jewish settlements 
create at least some potential hindrance to military action 
by the Arabs to regain lost land. They also represent a 
powerful bargaining counter in any peace negotiations as 
well as a very influential lobby inside Israel which cannot 
easily be ignored. 
Here, it is important to note that the Arab World also 
bears a heavy responsibility for the unfortunate state of 
affairs created by the early 1980s, particularly because 
Arab behaviour is the primary reason why the Palestinian 
issue is not taken seriously in the West. One might ask 
what the Arab states have been doing during the twenty eight 
years that Israel has been planting and extending 
settlements in the occupied territories. The answer is an 
extraordinary spectacle of political immaturity, hardly a 
moment has passed in which a multiplicity of regimes has not 
been trying to destroy each other or to use the Palestinians 
against each other. The Arab world has failed to make either 
a serious peace initiative (like Israel) or a serious 
confrontation (unlike Israel). The Arab opportunitity in the 
1970's to use oil power as pressure on Israel via the West 
was wasted. In the 1980s, oil power may be a thing of the 
past. All this encourages the suspicion that the Arabs 
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really do not care about the Palestinians, one might even 
argue that some regimes crave a fundamentalist expanionist 
Israel for their own stability. 
Another burden of responsibility falls on the United 
States, the only factor which counts In the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. While professing opposition to Israeli settlement 
policies and promoting fatuous "peace plans", the United 
States has in fact increasingly supported Jewish 
colonization of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan and 
thereby aided processes which promise future misery for 
Palestinians. Without American government subsidization, 
annually equivalent to C,12% of Israel's GNP, the Israeli 
economy certainly could not support the diversion of $ 300 -
$ 500 million per annum into Likud style settlement 
programmes. American dualism has been based less on the 
influence of a so-called "Jewish lobby" than on a generally 
indulgent American attitude towards Israel, perceived as a 
country resembling and supporting the United States in a 
hostile region, and in the absence of any practical Arab 
capacity to 1 nfluence the United States in a different 
direction. The Western inclination to conceive the occupied 
territories settlements as temporary rural camps rather than 
suburban housing complexes has compounded the problem, 
producing a tendency to see the reversal of the colonization 
as realistic long after this ceased to be the case. One may 
also point to the curious predilection, common to Americans 
and Europeans, for diplomatic schemes and manoeuvres which, 
because they ignore facts of power on the ground, have never 
amounted to more than fraudulent exercises in International 
self-delusion. Even the American- supported peace treaty 
between Israel and Egypt merely served as cover for the 
accelerated Israeli absorption of the West Bank and Gaza. 
5. Military Superiority : 
Israeli military superiority has been perceived by the 
Israelis and the world Jewry as the essential element for 
the survival of the state. For the Israelis, military 
superiority is essential in order to achieve their security 
which is based on the existence of an independent deterrent 
force. Israeli security is built on maintaining strong 
defence forces and effective standing offensive forces. 
Also, the Israeli strategic doctrine is founded on the idea 
that it must fight its wars outside its own territory. 
Qualitative superiority, that is military technology, is 
important also to sabotage any attempt by their adversaries 
to build up their military power. One third of the Israeli 
budget allocated to science and development is dedicated to 
research in military fields. Security for Israel is a 
military doctrine, most Israeli leaders believe that 
continued existence of Israel depends on its military 
superiority." " 
Israel possesses one of the world's most professional 
armies, and Israel's army. Its elite and values, has a high 
status in the Israel's society. Ben Gurion, the first Prime 
Minister of Israel has stated that "the IDF is the only body 
in the nation which is beyond debate which does not have 
divisions and contradictions which is free from the 
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malgnancy of fissures and fragmentation which the nation of 
Israel inherited."^^ He tried to make the army a symbol of 
identification and glorification, a supreme value : "In a 
blameless society the military can be and our army must be 
an educational instrument that improves and invigorates. The 
army can not fulfill its mission in the state of Israel 
neither in the outside world, nor within, if military 
service is not directed to the enhancement of the physical, 
cultural and moral standing of the youth." Because of the 
centrality of security the Ministry of Defence has the 
status of super-ministry and intrudes into activities 
falling within the ambit of other ministries. For example, 
it exerts influence and even direct control over education 
(through its impact on the curricula of institutions for 
vocational training, through deploying female soldiers as 
teachers in development areas through responsibility for the 
Gadana Cops etc.), it is concerned with welfare (in dealing 
with the problems of over 35,000 bereaved families and war 
invalids) and with urban and rural settlement (as the 
decisive factor in defensive settlement in border areas and 
the occupied activity has extended to foreign affairs). It 
serves as a parallel and often a superior instrument for the 
conduct of foreign relations. 
Since the June 1967 war defence ministry assumed the 
responsibility for the administration of the occupied 
territories. Thus the activities of defence ministry became 
wider than those of other ministry. By 1967 the fully 
mobilized army numbered over 250,000 (some 11 to 12 percent 
of the population). This was organized in 21 to 32 field 
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brigades. About sixty percent of Israel's financial 
resources both domestic and foreign were being channeled in 
its security forces. ^ The tax payer pays for 70 percent of 
Israel defence outlays which comes to about 5 billion out of 
7 billion. This porition is considerably higher than the 
percentage that NATO citizens spend on their own defence. 
Some 4 percent of the Jewish population are permanently 
under arms as opposed to 1 percent in the U.S. and 1.4 
percent in the formeir USSR. Israel's ground forces are based 
on the militia principle, that is, the whole nation is the 
army in times of war. Thus Israel is the most militarized 
nation in the world, it spends 30 percent of its gross 
national products on defence. Given this concept of 
security, Israel has become a mobilization state which 
devotes all its resources to war preparation. The Israeli 
believe in the ancient aphorism "who wishes for peace 
prepares for war" which explains why Israel would have to 
maintain large standing army. Israel has a high degree of 
manpower mobilization for national security. This has 
enabled Israel to become an effective regional military 
power. In sum, Israel remains the world's most efficiently 
mobilized society. Its population 4.2 million can deploy an 
army of 600,000 In a few days. From the early fifties the 
number of Israelis serving in the army has consistently 
grown. This was made possible 1n 1967 by raising the age 
limit for service and again in 1974 after the October war of 
1973. (In the October war, Israeli formation took less than 
48 hours to disengage from the Suez front and reinforce at 
the Golan front in an emergency). 
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The a i r f o r c e and armour represen t 80 p e r c e n t o f 
I s rae l ' s m i l i t a r y strength and majority of IDF resources are 
channeled to the a i r and armed forces. The strength of the 
I s rae l i a i r force remains one of the county's most important 
deterrents. Between 1978 and 1982 the a i r force that had 
always been a h igh ly t echn i ca l o rgan i za t i on , became even 
more sophist icated technical ly in a process st imulated by 
the demanding requirements of defence problems . The 
I s r a e l i s t ra tegy was based on a e r i a l at tack as the main 
defence. The a i r fo rce 's primary task was to gain immediate 
a i r s u p e r i o r i t y both to p ro tec t I s r a e l ' s t e r r i t o r y from 
ra id ing Arab a i r c r a f t and to provide an a i r umbrella under 
which I s rae l i ground forces could operate f r e e l y . I s r a e l i 
v i c t o r y in the a i r was the key to the s w i f t v i c t o r y on 
land.^^ 
I s rae l was the f i r s t state to develop a del iberate and 
o f f i c i a l po l i cy of r e t a l i a t i o n . From 1951 the I s r a e l i 
government had ordered r e p r i s a l r a i ds . These a t t a c k s , i n 
p rac t i ce , frequently went beyond the pr inc ip le of an eye fo r 
an eye and sought to i n f l i c t many more casualt ies on the 
Arabs than I s r a e l had o r i g i n a l l y su f fe red . The r e p r i s a l 
operations were taken to be an indicat ion of I s r a e l ' s desire 
fo r expansion and i t s aggressive character. I s rae l alone 
c l a i m s the r i g h t o f p re -emp t i ve r e t a l i a t i o n wh ich 1s 
v i o l a t i v e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I s r a e l be l ieves t h a t the 
doctr ine of pre-emptive r e ta l i a t i on must be maintained as a 
way to p r o t e c t I s r a e l and to demonstrate I s r a e l i 
determination to punish anyone who attempts to I n f l i c t harm 
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upon Israel. Therefore, the Israelis have made it clear that 
they would not hesitate to launch pre-emptive raids against 
any neighbouring state if Israel felt that its security is 
being threatened. From this perspective, I'sraeli leaders 
believe that any potential threat or danger on the Israeli 
security should be destroyed before it becomes a real 
threat. Yossi Ben Ahavon the Director General of the Prime 
Minister's office, has stated "Israel has acquired a 
reputation of not waiting until a potential danger becomes 
an actual danger".^' In sum, for many years Israel's 
military strategy had been based upon making full use of the 
element of surprise, striking the Arabs before they had 
become too unified and powerful and taking the initiative in 
order to achieve a quick victory and concentrate as much 
power as possible. 
On 7 July 1981, the Israeli Air Forces bombarded the 
Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tamuz near Baghdad (operation was 
named Baby lone). This operation was done 1000 kms. inside 
the Arab territory. Again, in October, 1986, the air forces 
of Israel bombed the PLO Headquarters and the home of 
several PLO officials which was 2000 kms. away in Tunis. 
The foregoing description reveals the quality of Israeli 
military power. It became clear since the 1967 war that 
Israel wants to utilize its military forces in order to 
achieve its optimal goals, that is to play an important, if 
not a decisive, political role in the region. A well known 
keystone of Israel's security doctrine prescribes waging a 
short and a decisive war : short because Israel's economy 
26 
and s o c i e t y can n o t a f f o r d a l o n g war w i t h a l l i t s 
percuss ions , dec is ive because I s r a e l can not a f f o r d de fea t 
a t the hands of the Arabs nor i s a draw a des i rab le outcome. 
One o f the major tenets in I s r a e l ' s secu r i t y d o c t r i n e f o r 
ach iev ing these ob jec t i ves has been the prompt t r a n s f e r o f 
t h e b a t t l e t o Arab t e r r i t o r y , t h i s was a c h i e v e d by 
f o s t e r i n g , maneuverab i l i ty and o f f ens i ve c a p a b i l i t i e s . ^ 
The re fo re , I s r a e l ' s o b j e c t i v e in f i g h t i n g a war has been to 
w i n war w i t h t h e minimum l o s s e s among c i v i l i a n s and 
m i l i t a r y , thus s a t i s f y i n g t he u l t i m a t e aim o f I s r a e l ' s 
de fence p o l i c y in s e c u r i n g the s u r v i v a l o f i t s p e o p l e . 
I s r a e l has one of the most developed programmes f o r c i v i l 
defence aga ins t d i f f e r e n t types of war in the f u t u r e . For 
i n s t a n c e , in October, 1987 I s r a e l organized a na t ion wide 
c i v i l defence exerc ise in which school ch i l d ren were shown 
how to use gas masks and take other elementary p recau t ions 
a g a i n s t a chemica l w a r f a r e a t t a c k . Over 600 gas-mask 
d i s t r i b u t i o n centres are c u r r e n t l y being es tab l i shed across 
the count ry^ . In I s r a e l , not only is the army e n t r u s t e d 
w i t h c a r r y i n g o u t s e c u r i t y f u n c t i o n s , t h e r e a r e a l s o 
c i v i l i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s whose f unc t i ons inc lude s e c u r i t y . Ben 
Gurion perceived the term " s e c u r i t y " i n i t s a n a l y t i c ra the r 
than i n i t s s p a t i a l sense , the s e c u r i t y sphere f o r him 
inc lude not only m i l i t a r y o rgan iza t ions but a lso any th ing 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the s u r v i v a l , defence and development o f 
I s r a e l ; "The s e c u r i t y m i s s i o n w o u l d n o t be p e r f o r m e d 
e x c l u s i v e l y by t h e a rmy . W i t h o u t s e t t l e m e n t , w i t h o u t 
i n d u s t r y , w i t h o u t the e d u c a t i o n o f the n a t i o n , w i t h o u t 
sympathy from other nat ions not even the army i t s e l f w i l l 
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secure the peace of the nation. "'^ 0^ 
In the last few years Israel has tried to emphasize its 
ability to play the decisive political role in the area. 
Its raid on Iraqi nuclear reactor, its invasion of Lebanon, 
its military aid to Iran and its growing military 
cooperation with some African countries are just examples of 
what is meant by a political role. Thus, one may argue that 
Camp David Accords (1978) and the peace treaty (1979) 
between Egypt and Israel are a culmination of that role. 
Israeli strategists divide the Arab World into three 
strategic regional circles, the Nile Valley, the Arab 
peninsula and the Fertile Crescent. Its strategy is directed 
towards an alliance with the first strategic circle or at 
least to prevent an alliance between the first and second 
circles. Added to the above is the U.S. strategy to sustain 
Israel's superiority, especially air superiority, against 
all Arab front line states combined. ' 
Israel has adopted a policy of nuclear deterrence for 
its security. Israel's nuclear research programme had 
started in 1959 and is suspected to have developed some sort 
of nuclear weapon. The importance of Israeli nuclear 
programme thus has been expressed by a senior General, "that 
unless the country begins to plan now, Israel may not have a 
deterrence capability when the Middle East goes nuclear, and 
we shall find ourselves in the next war without the ability 
to defend our home front (against nuclear attack) or to win 
the battlefield."^^ The need for the development of 
nuclear weapons was also emphasized by President Katzir in 
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1974 t h a t , " I t has been o u r i n t e n t i o n t o p r o v i d e t h e 
p o t e n t i a l f o r n u c l e a r d e v e l o p m e n t . We now have t h a t 
p o t e n t i a l . We w i l l defend t h i s c o u n t r y w i t h a l l p o s s i b l e 
means a t hand. We have to develop more power fu l and new 
arms to p r o t e c t ou rse l ves . " 
T h i s s e r i o u s and d e v a s t a t i n g s t r a t e g i c d i m e n s i o n 
i n t e n s i f i e d the m i l i t a r y imbalance between the Arabs and 
I s r a e l . One j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r Egypt 's peacefu l se t t l emen t 
w i t h I s r a e l is re la ted to such an imbalance. Mustafa Kha l i 1 , 
the f o rmer Egyp t i an Prime M i n i s t e r , t o l d Y i g a l Yadin and 
Ezer Weizman : "We know tha t you have the atom bomb. Egypt 
does not have a m i l i t a r y a l t e r n a t i v e and we have to seek a 
d i f f e r e n t s o l u t i o n " . In areas l i k e combat a i r c r a f t , j e t 
f i g h t e r s , armoured v e h i c l e s and armed manpower, I s r a e l 
enjoys s u p e r i o r i t y over any of i t s Arab neighbours. I t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t i c e t h a t i n s p i t e o f t h e p e a c e f u l 
s e t t l e m e n t between Egypt and I s r a e l , I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y 
expend i tu re has increased d r a s t i c a l l y from $ 3.3 b i l l i o n 
in 1977 to $ 7.2 b i l l i o n in 1980. Table 2 d i sc loses the 
ex ten t to which the m i l i t a r y imbalance e x i s t s between the 
ne ighbour ing s ta tes and I s r a e l . 
6. Receiving U.S. Assistance : 
I s r a e l m a i n t a i n s s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h t he U n i t e d 
States s ince i t s i n c e p t i o n . This r e l a t i o n i s not based on 
t h e e m o t i o n a l l i n k be tween t h e t w o , b u t t h e i r m u t u a l 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t and t h e i r j o i n t s e c u r i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
These r e l a t i o n s go back to the 1940s when the U.S. worked 
h a r d f o r t h e a d o p t i o n by t h e U .N , o f t h e p a r t i t i o n 
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Tsbl* 2 
miltary Balanc* batiiwn imraml 
and Its Arab Htt^loour* 
Combat 
Aircraft 
Strength 
First Llr» 
H l ^ 
P«r-formanc« 
J»t Fighters 
Army MedluM 
Manpower Tank 
(in Thousands) Strength 
Other 
Ariaoured 
vehicle 
Strength 
Egypt 429 2S1 320 2100 3900 
Jordan 94 74 65 616 992 
Syria 534 4S0 170 9990 
Israel 769 614 4S0 9600 8000 
Source : internatlcral Institute for strategic studies, London, 1982. 
resolution in November 1947. In May 1948 the U.S. was the 
first to recognize the newly established state of Israel. 
The understanding concerning strategic issues between the 
two countries goes back to the 1950s. In 1952 both states 
signed the Assistance Agreement concerning mutual defence 
according to which military services, tools and weapons 
provided by the U.S. to Israel would only be used for 
legitimate self defence or participation in the defence of 
the area within collective security arrangements. 
Israel becomes more important for the U.S. because 
without the Israeli support, it was not possible for the 
United States to continue its naval presence in the 
Mediterranean. It was this naval base from where U.S. 
balanced both U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Further the 
deployment of SLBM, Polaris, Poseidon and Trident System 
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made the USSR vulnerable to the U.S. attack.^ '^  By having an 
edge over fleets in the Mediterranean sea United Sates can 
reinforce arms particularly aircrafts to land and air units 
fighting from the bases in the West Asia. United States can 
target almost entire West Asia from her military bases in 
Israel. United States even has developed some special 
weapons for Israeli use on the condition that the U.S. would 
be provided with detailed information about their combat 
performance. Western countries also gained valuable 
information as a result of Israeli capture of much advanced 
Soviet weaponry. 
The U.S. considered the maintenance of Israeli power and 
security as the cornerstone of its West Asia policy. Israel 
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is seen in the U.S. as an indispensable strategic asset in 
the area. American intelligence circles in particular also 
believe that Israel is the most reliable ally in the region. 
Israel receives the lion's share of American military aid. 
Between 1950 and 1982 American military sales amounted to US 
$ 17 billion. On the other hand, the Israelis themselves 
know very well that they can not survive without American 
aid. For the first time in recent years both countries have 
started to put their commitments down in writing. In 1979 
the U.S. issued a Memorandum Agreement which was followed in 
April 1981 by another commitment by Secretary of States 
Alexander Haig to provide Israel with what is needed in 
order to develop its military industry. Both commitments 
became part of Haig's vision of strategic consensus in the 
West Asia. He wanted to create regional consensus against 
the Soviet Union with Israel as its dependable base. Hence, 
both sides concluded a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Strategic Co-operation in November 1981. This memorandum was 
activated in 1983 after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
Such a special relationship means an invitation to one of 
the superpowers to have a foothold in the area. It means 
also that the Arab states may either try to establish their 
own special relations with the U.S. (e.g. Egypt) or to enter 
into similar agreements with the erstwhile Soviet Union 
(e.g. Syria). 
After the collapse of Iran as a U.S. ally in the West 
Asia, Israel became the single U.S. defence partner in the 
region. A partnership that is most likely to result 
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eventually in Israel's playing an increasingly more 
important strategic role for the United States. Being the 
only reliable friend of United States, Israel possess the 
most sophisticated arms in the region. Israeli location for 
United States becomes more important in the sense that if 
Suez Canal is closed, it can provide easy access to Red Sea 
by land, thus can connect Red Sea with that of Mediterranean 
Sea. The ideal strategic bases in Israel can be used for 
direct military intelligence electronics warfare, 
reconnaissance, logistical support services and medical 
facilities. In addition, they are the most modern and 
advanced bases, stationing weapons found only in the U.S. 
and the NATO armouries. It is Israel which may help U.S.A. 
by providing information about the desert warfare and 
climate aspects of the West Asia and about the efficacy of 
the U.S. weapons and their defects. Forty five years of 
U.S. - Israeli friendship confirms that both the countries 
are important for each other. 
Despite all these factors there is one important factor 
which is serving as a bridge between United States and 
Israel and have their impact on American politics and 
policy, is the Jewish presence in United States. Though they 
are a very small minority but they use their franchise more 
than the average of all Americans. Moreover, American Jews 
have been important financial contributors to election 
campaigns of favorably disposed candidates even in 
constituencies that do not have substantial number of Jewish 
voters and this have to enhance their political weight.^" 
It is not only U.S. government which is providing financial 
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he lp to I s r a e l but U.S. Jews a lso c o n t r i b u t i n g a l o t t o the 
deve lopment o f I s r a e l . "There i s h a r d l y an i m p o r t a n t 
e d u c a t i o n a l , c u l t u r a l , s c i e n t i f i c o r ph1 I a n t h r o p h i c 
i n s t i t u t i o n in I s r a e l today which i s not supported i n some 
s i g n i f i c a n t way by A m e r i c a n J e w i s h a i d (as w e l l as 
governmental) a i d , i n c l u d i n g a l l the i n s t i t u t i o n s of h igher 
l e a r n i n g and r e s e a r c h , t h e main museums, t h e I s r a e l 
p h i l h a r m o n i c o r c h e s t r a , t he Hadassah Med i ca l C e n t r e and 
o t h e r f a c i l i t i e s , t h e H i s t a d r u t , a l m o s t t h e e n t i r e 
v o c a t i o n a l school system, and scores of r e l i g i o u s schoo ls , 
orphanages, and c u l t u r e and spor ts centres throughout the 
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country". Not only this, U.S. Jews also have been trying 
their best to brin^ scientists, artists, Journalists, 
politicians, sports stars etc. to Israel. In recent years, 
the number of American Jewish tourists in Israel have 
exceeded over 200,000 annually. They not only spend money 
that is helpful to the Israeli economy but have also brought 
to the masses of Israelis an awareness of the ties between 
their country and the United States. 
During 1960s, America sought to maintain regional 
stability through a balance of power in the area and treated 
Israel as a military proxy. Under the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations the U.S. became a significant arms supplier 
to the state of Israel. In 1962 President Kennedy assured 
Israel's foreign minister Mrs Golda Meir that "America and 
Israel were defacto allies".^° The U.S.-Israeli relations, 
however, cooled down during the Eisenhower-Dulles period but 
that was to remain only temporary departure. After the 196? 
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Arab-Israeli war. President Nixon's doctrine aimed at 
building up friendly regional states through aid resulted 
Into Increased American commitment to Israel. 
President Nixon had stated that "Israel must possess 
sufficient military power to deter an attack. As long as the 
threat of the Arab attack remained direct and imminent, the 
military balance must be in Israel's favour". He supported a 
policy that gave Israel a technological and military margin 
to more than necessary to offset Israel's hostile neighbours 
numerical superiority . President Nixon affirmed in 1970 
"We are for Israel because in our view is the only state in 
the Mideast which is pro-freedom and an effective opponent 
to Soviet expansion".^ President Jimmy Carter was the 
first American President to say publicly that Israel was a 
strategic asset to U.S. On 16 March 1977 he observed : "I 
think one of the finest acts of the world nations that's 
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ever occurred was to e s t a b l i s h the s t a t e of I s r a e l . " ^ ^ 
President Reagan made s i m i l a r statements •• "as perhaps 
the only remaining s t r a t e g i c asset in the region on which 
U.S. can t r u l y r e l y only by f u l l a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the 
c r i t i c a l r o l e , the s t a t e o f I s r a e l plays in our s t r a t e g i c 
c a l c u l u s . Can we b u i l d t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h w a r t i n g 
Moscow's designs on t e r r i t o r i e s and resources v i t a l to our 
s e c u r i t y and o u r n a t i o n a l w e l l b e i n g " . ^ ^ R e a g a n ' s 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n regarded I s r a e l as a cornerstone In the West 
A s i a and p r o v i d e d i r o n c l a d commi tment t o wha t I s r a e l 
c o n s i d e r s i t s s e c u r i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s . I n November 1983 
I s r a e l i Prime M i n i s t e r Shamir and Defence M i n i s t e r Arens 
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visited U.S. where they signed an agreement with the U.S. on 
strategic cooperation. A similar agreement was signed by the 
previous U.S. administration in 1981 which was freezed by 
the President Jimmy Carter following Israel's annexation of 
the Golan Heights. The accord provided for the creation of a 
Joint Committee exercise, the sharing of intelligence, and 
the stockpiling of American arms and ammunition on Israeli 
territory. From this strategic cooperation the U.S. 
forces gained many advantages including access for the U.S. 
navalship to Haifa and valuable exchanges on advanced 
technology. 
In May 1986, Israel joined the U.S. Strategic Defence 
Initiative Programme with its potential for applying ATB 19 
technology to countering the SS19 challenge to Israel. The 
U.S. Congress approved $ 180 million for Israel to develop a 
defensive system against short range missiles, thus making 
for the country's entry into the 'Star Wars' programme. °. 
(Financial and Military assistance which Israel 
received from U.S. will be discussed in Chapter^ ) 
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Chapter - 2 
Israel and Key Regional 
Powers 
ISRAEL AND KEY REGIONAL POWERS 
Since the end of Second World War and establishment of 
state of Israel, there has been a continued state of 
hostility between Arabs and Israel with each decade 
witnessing a major war between Israel and some of its Arab 
neighbours leading to a marked increase in military 
expenditures and arms imports in the countries concerned. 
The continuing state of hostilities between Israel and its 
neighbouring countries had adverse impact on the economies 
of these countries. The outbreak of hostilities in 1967 and 
October 1973 had led both Israel and Arab countries to 
acquire latest sophisticated weapons with a view to have 
strategic superiority against one another. 
In a review of the interaction of Israel and the 
Palestinian people after 1948 and the implications of their 
conflict for the global system, several themes, stand out. 
First is the continuing importance of nationalist identity 
and the search for self-determination on the part of 
Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. The creation of the State 
of Israel provided for this nationalist expression by one 
group of people. Palestinians were denied this basic form 
of political expression, although the same U.N. resolution 
that called for the establishment of a Jewish state also 
provided for a Palestinian state. This problem was further 
exacerbated with the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, among other territories, which has led 
to the continuing denial of the right of self-determination 
for the Palestinian people. The occupation also raised 
42 
crucial issues for Israel, which had to decide how it would 
relate toward the Palestinians in those occupied lands. 
Thus, the problems raised in the first half of the twentieth 
century by competing nationalist claims over the Mandate of 
Palestine were not resolved in the second half of the 
century; they merely took different forms. None of the 
actions taken by Israel, the Palestinians, or other parties 
to the conflict is the result of unanimous consent within 
their respective political communities. There is a wide 
range of opinion about how best to deal with the ongoing 
conflict and the extent to which accommodation or aggression 
is appropriate. 
Issues or values involved in the West Asian crisis is 
neither a religious conflict between the Muslims and the 
Jews nor a racial one between the Jews and the Arabs. The 
conflict, as pointed out by Prof R.L. Cleveland, "is 
fundamentally unique in contemporary international 
relations. It is not primarily the simple urge for 
territorial jurisdiction, as in the case of Kashmir. It is 
not power rivalry between the two principal ideological 
camps, as in Vietnam. Neither is this struggle the "absurd 
vendetta" it is described as being nor a manifestation of 
religious intolerance." It is rather part or chapter of 
the Afro-Asian struggle against foreign domination and 
exploitation, a politico-economic struggle between the 
Children of the soil, the Arabs who have lived there for 
centuries and, in the so-called era of the four freedoms and 
the Great Society, want to live there in peace and with 
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dignity, and the aggressive militant Zionists, who want to 
colonize Palestine with Jews drawn from all over the world, 
and thereby dominate and exploit West Asia. It is also a 
conflict between two nationalism, the Jewish nationalism, 
which is religious and racial, and Palestinian nationalism, 
which is secular and democratic. 
The relations between the Arabs and the Jews were before 
1918 excellent because of the Arab Muslim's tolerance and 
the friendly policy of the Palestine Colonization 
Association. In fact., as Anthony Nutting has observed, "the 
one people, the only people, in the whole civilized world 
who had not persecuted jews were the Arabs". There was no 
Inquisition as in Spain, no programmes as in Czarist Russia, 
no mass expulsions of Jews from towns and cities or Jewish 
ghettos as in Medieval England and Western Europe, and, of 
course, no concentration camps as in Nazi Germany. It was 
the Balfour Declaration and the activities of the Jewish 
Agency (Keren Hayesoal) which disturbed the even tenour of 
life and mutual friendships in the Holy Land. 
"The ambiguities of Israel's relationships with world 
Jewry, as observed by Don Peretz, have contributed in the 
small measures to the difficulties of its integration into 
the Middle East, Israel's Arab neighbours do not view it as 
a tiny nation of 8000 square miles and some two and a 
quarter million (now three million) inhabitants. Theirs is 
the traditional Zionist image of the Jewish state embracing 
the loyalty and full political, material, and moral support 
of World Jewry. In Arab eyes, Israel is a powerful colossus, 
4^ 
influential in the hierarchies of the world's great powers. 
Thus world Zionism, with its invaluable assistance to 
Israel, is a spectre constantly raised by the Arabs in 
answer to Israeli descriptions of their apparent physical 
limitations."^ That the Arab fears and suspicions are not 
groundless has been acknowledged by Uri Avnery, who has 
observed that the pan-Judaism of the Zionists feeds the anti 
-Zionism of the Arabs, and have been repeatedly 
substantiated by the attitude of the British and U.S. 
Governments towards Israel, and the moral and material 
support extended to Israel by the Anglo-American Jewry and 
the elite in Western countries. 
Differences and Discords with Egypt : 
History of the strained and conflicting relationship 
between Arab states and Israel can be traced back even 
before the creation of Israel as an independent Jewish state 
in may 19^8. It led to the first Arab-Israeli war soon after 
the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the partition of 
Palestine. The lead to the growing opposition of Arab 
nations to the creation of Israel and the existence as an 
independent state was given by Egypt, especially after the 
consolidation of power by President Nasser. Israel saw that 
it was Egypt of all Arab nations, which was its most 
strident and vocal critic and that it was undertaking 
measures which threatened the existence of Israel. 
In 1970s relationship between Egypt and Israel entered 
into a new phase of non-belligenrency. Prior to that, their 
relation was that of confrontation primarily based on the 
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Palestinian issues. This issue was the Ideological 
constituent of "Pan-Arabism" and was a counter to the 
growing threat of Zionism. However, the policy of non-
belligerency pursued by Egypt did not mean getting away from 
the Palestinian problem, but perhaps shifting of importance. 
Egyptian policy underwent a change from its earlier 
perception of Arab nationalism as the first priority. The 
policy of "Egypt-first" has enabled this shift. This change 
in the foreign policy of Egypt, emerged in post - 1973 war. 
The policy of non- confrontation was embarked even during 
the last phase of Nasser's life when he accepted the Roger's 
peace plan in July 1970. In 1971 Anwar Sadat also proposed 
peace with Israel but it was not properly heeded by Israel. 
The October War of 1973 changed the situation. As a result 
of Kissinger Diplomacy the first disengagement agreement 
(1974) followed by the second on (1975) came up as 
remarkable turning point in the relationship between Egypt 
and Israel. Egypt also began to lean more to the United 
States and the Western Block and started drifting away from 
the USSR, the old ally. 
The normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel 
received a jolt when Israel Invaded Lebanon in June 1982. 
Israeli invasion was sought to be justified on many counts, 
primarily an attempt by non-PLO Palestinians to assassinate 
the Israeli ambassador In London and the subsequent two-day 
artillery exchange between the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) 
and the PLO^. There were two major assumptions underlying 
the Israeli move. First, that the political power of the.PLO 
46 
and i t s In f luence on the West Bank cou ld be e r a d i c a t e d i f 
i t s t e r r i t o r i a l bases i n Lebanon were d e s t r o y e d . Second , 
t h a t I s r a e l ' s a c t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n would help the Maron i te 
P h a l a n g i s t s p r e s e r v e hegemony o v e r t h e more numerous 
Lebanese Muslims popu la t i on . Such a pha lang is t government, 
dependent on I s r a e l f o r i t s cont inued e x i s t e n c e , was a l so 
expected to s ign a peace t r ea t y w i t h I s r a e l . 
T h u s , I s r a e l i i n v a s i o n o f Lebanon soon a f t e r i t s 
w i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e l a s t p a r t o f S i n a i was a imed a t 
c o n s o l i d a t e d I s r a e l i h o l d o v e r Gaza and West Bank by 
l i q u i d a t i n g PLO. This event put Hosni Mubarak, the Egypt ian 
P r e s i d e n t , i n a very awkward p o s i t i o n . E g y p t ' s F o r e i g n 
M i n i s t e r , Kamal Hasan A l i , c a l l e d t h e i n v a s i o n , a 
"devas ta t ing blow" to peace e f f o r t , Egypt decided to f reeze 
nego t i a t i ons w i th I s r a e l on Pa les t i n i an autonomy besides 
a l s o f r e e z i n g t r a d e w i t h i t . Again the massacre o f t he 
Pa les t i n ians a t Shabra and Cha t i l a refugee camps in B e i r u t 
and I s r a e l ' s i nvo l vemen t in i t , put a h a l t t o f u r t h e r 
improvement in r e l a t i o n s between Egypt and I s r a e l . Egypt 
w i t hd rew i t s Ambassador f rom I s r a e l and denounced t he 
b e s t i a l I s r a e l i ac ts in Lebanon. 
Rela t ions between Egypt and I s r a e l were very s t r a i n e d , 
though the Peace T rea t y remained i n t a c t . I t was r e v e a l e d 
when Egypt i n fo rmed the U.S. t h a t i t i n t e n d e d t o resume 
t a l k s on autonomy w i th I s r a e l only a f t e r I s r a e l had f u l l y 
withdrawn from Lebanon. Thus, the Lebanese c r i s i s hera lded 
the era of co ld peace between these c o u n t r i e s , which proved 
to a great setback f o r the on-going E g y p t - I s r a e l i p rocess. 
47 
Egypt had been accused that while It had signed the 
peace treaty with Israel, it had sacrificed the interest of 
the Palestinians. Hence, Egypt was keen to pursue the 
question of autonomy for the Palestinians, an issue that was 
agreed upon during the Camp David Agreement. But that issue 
of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza was another factor 
which exasperated Egypt against Israeli inransigence. As it 
is on record that. President Sadat had even offered in 
November 1980 of an added incentive 1 million cubic meter a 
day of Nile water, in exchange for settlement of the 
question of Palestinian autonomy and Jerusalem issue, Israel 
did not respond favorably to it. The talks on the issues of 
West Bank and Gaza were suspended in march 1982 over the 
Israeli demand that the meeting be held in Jerusalem. Egypt 
refused the Israeli demand since it did not want to 
recognize Israeli claims over the city. Thus, Israeli 
intransigence prevented the Camp David Accord from providing 
the basis for a comprehensive peace settlement in West Asia. 
Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affais, Boutros 
Boutros Ghali, while commenting on the fourth anniversary of 
the pact, said on 26 March 1983, that lasting peace had not 
been achieved because of Israel's intransigence and (its) 
desire to annex the West Bank and Gaza. 
Apart from the above issues which obstructed a healthy 
bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel, Taba issue was 
directly related to both the countries. The Taba dispute 
bedevilled Egyptian -- Israeli relations since the Israeli 
refused to cede the 700 yard beach of Taba on the Gulf of 
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Aqaba when they withdrew from Sinai in 1982. The Israeli 
alleged that Taba was on the Palestinian side of 
internationally recognized 1906 boundary between Egypt and 
what was then the Ottoman -- ruled Palestine. 
Egypt formally complained to Israel about the opening of 
an Israeli hotel on Taba beach and claimed Taba as Egyptian 
territory. President Mubarak said, "We are prepared to 
resume talk on Taba and hope it will be settled by peaceful 
means". Israel was reported to have agreed to talks 
provided wider issues concerning bilateral relations were 
discussed. The Avia Soneste hotel in disputed Taba area, was 
opened formally in November 1982 . It is argued that Taba 
issue was a useful shield with which Egypt warded off 
Israeli overtures and US attempts to warm up the Egyptian --
Israeli peace. It is also argued that behind Taba issue, 
lurked a host of other reasons why the Egyptians tried to 
keep the Israeli at arms length. At home, peace with Israel 
had become a sensitive political and the opposition parties 
with religious overtones regarded the peace with a 
passionate hatred. In his meeting in September 1984 with the 
Israel's Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, the Egyptian Charge 
D. Affairs in Israel, Muhammad Basyuni, had stated that 
Israel must withdraw from Lebanon, improve relations with 
the Palestinians and resume negotiations over Taba in order 
to enjoy improved relations with Egypt. It was also hinted 
that the Egyptian ambassador might return to Tel Aviv, 
following on IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, President Mubarak 
had also declared that the return of Egypt's ambassador to 
Israel was linked to Israel's complete withdrawal from 
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Lebanon and progress on the Taba and Palestinian issues. 
Relations between Egypt and Israel, again received a 
Jolt following the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in 
Tunisia in early October 1985. Negotiations over Taba were 
suspended and chances for a summit between Israel's Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres and Egypt's President Husni Mubarak 
disappeared. Though the delegates of Egypt-Israel talks 
maintained that the first priority was to restore 
communications, cut after Israeli raid on PLO headquarters 
in Tunisia, the Taba border dispute, the return of Egypt's 
ambassador to Israel and the normalization of relations were 
among the topics to be discussed. 
The Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza 
called the "Intefada", added further complication to the 
Egypt-Israel relations. Egyptian President Husni Mubarak had 
tough time confronting the critics from both the right and 
left who had united temporarily and had demanded a harsh 
response to Israel's suppression of the riots which were 
initiated by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in 1987. The opposition demanded that Mubarak should 
abrogate the peace treaty with Israel. But he remained 
convinced that the way to full Arab-Israeli peace lies 
through an international conference at which Palestinians 
and Israelis would come to acknowledge each others rights. 
This stand also assures continued US financial aid. Egypt-
Israeli relations were constantly subjected to the pressure 
of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, Including the 
settlement of the Palestinians question. In that context, 
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the a t t i t u d e of Egypt and I s r a e l to v a r i o u s ^peace ' 
proposals assume great s ign i f icance. Af ter the conclusion of 
1979 peace t r e a t y , a number of peace i n i t i a t i v e s were 
p roceeded , though none of them has ab le to b r i n g a 
comprehensive peace of the Arab- Israe l i c o n f l i c t . 
Thus, the solut ion of the ove r -a l l Arab- Israe l i dispute 
c o n t i n u e d w i t h the c h i e f impediment to the g r e a t e r 
cooperation between Egypt and I s r a e l . Egypt under President 
Anwar Sadat, had taken a bold step in signing the Camp David 
Accord and the Peace Treaty and had even accepted the 
i so la t ion and boycott of the Arab-Islamic States. However, 
even Sadat had real ized that Egypt - I s rae l peace t reaty and 
normalizat ion of relat ions were f i n a l l y condi t iona l upon the 
settlement of the over -a l l Arab- Israe l i c o n f l i c t , especia l ly 
the P a l e s t i n i a n quest ion. Egypt cou ld not nego t i a te on 
behalf of Syria or Jordan but i t d id incorporate cer ta in 
common agreement v i s - a - v i s the Pa les t ine quest ion as i t s 
accord with Is rae l that were guaranteed even by USA. 
Differences with Jordan : 
At the end of the June 1967 war, Jordan became a home 
f o r thousands of new Pa les t i n i an refugees f l e e i n g the 
I s r a e l i occupat ion of the West Bank. Although the area 
comprised only some 2000 square mi les, a r e l a t i ve l y small 
part of Jordanian t e r r i t o r y , i t contained nearly ha l f the 
populat ion. According to a UN study, 
"The magnitude of the l oss i n J o r d a n ' s 
economic p o t e n t i a l because of the I s r a e l i 
occupation of the West Bank accounted fo r 38 
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p e r c e n t o f J o r d a n ' s t o t a l g r o s s d o m e s t i c 
p roduc t , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r l y high percentages 
f o r serv ices (55 p e r c e n t ) , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n (47 
percent) and wholesale and r e t a i l t rade (43 
pe rcen t ) . The c o n t r i b u t i o n o f the West Bank t o 
Jordan's output of some a g r i c u l t u r a l products 
was even higher ( e . g . over 60 to 65 percent 
f o r f r u i t s and vegetables and 80 percent f o r 
o l i v e s ) and, a l though the share o f the West 
Bank in t o t a l i n d u s t r i a l output amounted on ly 
t o about 20 percent , the number of i n d u s t r i a l 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s t h e r e r e p r e s e n t e d abou t 48 
pe rcen t o f the t o t a l f o r the kingdom 
employing 37 percent o f the Jordanian labour 
f o r c e s engaged i n i n d u s t r y . Income f r o m 
t o u r i s m and r e m i t t a n c e s f r o m J o r d a n i a n s 
working abroad - - two major sources of f o r e i g n 
exchange e a r n i n g s - - have d e c l i n e d abou t 85 
p e r c e n t and 50 p e r c e n t r e s p e c t i v e l y 
implementat ion of the "Seven year Programme 
f o r Economic Development o f J o r d a n , 1964 -
1970" has su f fe red a major blow. Severa l major 
p ro jec t s have had to be suspended and o thers 
r e - e x a m i n e d i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e new 
c i rcumstances, spec ia l emphasis being p laced 
on l a b o u r i n t e n s i v e p r o j e c t s w h i c h can 
a l l e v i a t e the inc reas ing unemployment". ' 
Between 1948 and 1967 Jordan alone c o n t r o l l e d a v i t a l 
p a r t o f h i s t o r i c Pa les t i ne . The West Bank and East Jerusalem 
both captured by I s r a e l in 1967 were par t of Jordan. With 
the loss of the West Bank, Jordan had been dea l t the hardest 
b l o w s . Ha l f o f i t s e n t i r e a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n was 
dest royed along w i th approximately o n e - t h i r d o f i t s earn ings 
from a g r i c u l t u r a l expor ts ( the west bank which had u n t i l 
then accounted f o r up to 45 percent of Jordans GDP)°. The 
West Bank 's p o t e n t i a l f o r e a r n i n g f o r e i g n exchange f r o m 
t o u r i s m passed i n t o I s r a e l i h a n d s . The t o u r i s t t r a d e 
centered on Jerusalem which had a t t r a c t e d more than h a l f a 
m i l l i o n v i s i t o r s annual ly before 1967^. In a d d i t i o n , I s r a e l 
pushed thousands of Pa les t i n i an refugees i n t o Jordan. About 
300,000 Pa les t i n ians crossed the r i v e r Jordan a f t e r the June 
1967 war. Thus the West Bank was an important p a r t o f the 
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Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
Jordan's perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
Palestinian issue flows from its geography and demography. 
Jordan stands along the longest confrontation lines with 
Israel, therefore, Jordan plays a central role as an Arab-
confrontation state with Israel. Jordan has more than 300 
miles long frontier with Israel, and 16 miles coastline on 
the Gulf of Aqaba and its Dead Sea coast is roughly 80 miles 
from North to South where Israel holds nearly 50 miles of 
the western shores. . Of the 300 miles the vulnerable and 
highly sensitive border with Jordan is along the sea of 
Galilee in the north to the Gulf of Aqaba in the south. The 
Jordan valley is Israel's preferred border, the vulnerable 
parts of the 250 miles border between Jordan and Israel 
today are less than 20 miles of relatively weak defenses 
specially the region of Bet Shean valley on the eastern side 
and the relative low land's of the Upper Jordan valley and 
Irbid region on the western side' . Jordan, thus is the 
closest of all Arab countries to the conflict and more 
deeply affected by It. 
From the time of the formation of the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan there was a steady drift of population from the 
West Bank to the East Bank so that by the early 1960's a 
slight majority of Jordan's population were residents of the 
East Bank. Nearly one million Palestinians had been added as 
full citizens to the original 400,000 Jordanians, the 
population of Amman swelled in three years from 30,000 to 
about 200,000^^. One of the main problems facing Jordan has 
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been the Increased pressure put on the available resources 
as the result of rapid population growth. This was initiated 
with the expulsion of people from Palestine by Israel in 
19^8 and from the West Bank in 1967. Today half of Jordan's 
population is Palestinians, most of them refugees after the 
1948 and 1967 wars. Jordan is the only Arab country to have 
granted automatic citizenship to the refugees. The 
population of the Israeli occupied West Bank has Jordanians 
1 ^  
citizenship as well. 
Jordanians regard Zionism as being open-ended in its 
geographic claims. They are aware that revisionist Zionism, 
endorsed by many of the Israeli Likud politicians who are 
still prominent in the Israeli government, considers that 
parts of Jordan belong to Israel's territorial heritage. Ben 
Gurion stated at the 17th Zionist Congress in Basle, "the 
river Jordan is not necessarily the perpetual limit of our 
immigration settlement we entitled to ask for the 
right to enter and settle in Trans Jordan" . He also 
stated that "the occupation of Jordan military will not only 
divide Arab states but, will destroy the Pan-Arab hopes and 
its soul."^^ Before 1967 war king Hussein had stated that 
"Israel without doubt uses the confusion to conquer the 
enclave on the West Bank and straighten out her frontier 
along the Jordan river.... Israel had directed most of its 
aggression against Jordan and if any attack were to be 
launched my country would without question bear the brunt of 
it."'^ 
The issue of the West Bank is a crucial element in the 
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J o r d a n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h I s r a e l and the PLO. S i n c e ]91^ 
J o r d a n no l o n g e r r e p r e s e n t s t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s s i n c e a 
d e c i s i o n was made a t the Rabat Arab summit m e e t i n g t o 
r e c o g n i z e t h e PLO as t h e s o l e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e 
P a l e s t i n i a n peop le . Thus, the J o r d a n i a n s , a re no l o n g e r 
recognized by the Arab wor ld as the rep resen ta t i ve of the 
Pa les t i n i an people. Moreover, wh i l e Sadat cou ld nego t i a t e 
the re tu rn of the Sinai and Asad cou ld nego t ia te f o r the 
Golan Heights , i t was not c lea r who should speak f o r the 
West Bank. There were two p r i n c i p a l candidates : the k ing 
of Jordan and the Pa les t i n ian L i b e r a t i o n Organ iza t ion (PLO). 
King Hussein was caut ious a lso because he faced the PLO as a 
c la imant to Arab Pa les t i ne . The PLO was an a s s o c i a t i o n o f 
groups of var ious s i z e s , founded under Egypt ian auspices in 
1964. Ten years l a t e r , an Arab summit mee t i ng revoked 
H u s s e i n ' s mandate to speak f a r P a l e s t i n i a n s - - a t l e a s t 
those under I s r a e l i con t ro l -and con fe r red I t on the PLO. But 
according to the PLO's c h a r t e r , Jews had no r i g h t t o a sate 
in the West Asia and I s r a e l was simply i l l e g i t i m a t e ( the 
same p o s i t i o n the Arab s ta tes had taken in 1948). Hence, 
the basis f o r c o n c i l i a t i o n between I s r a e l and the PLO was 
l a c k i n g . 
I s r a e l was a l s o not w i l l i n g t o t r a d e l and f o r peace 
cons tan t . A f t e r the 1967 war, the West Bank became a pa r t o f 
d a i l y l i f e in I s r a e l un l i ke the S ina i and the Golan. For 
some I s r a e l i s t h i s was n a t u r a l and p r o p e r , f o r t h e y 
considered the t e r r i t o r y (which they c a l l e d by I t s B i b l i c a l 
names, Judea and Samaria) to be pa r t of I s r a e l . Menachem 
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Begin and his associates, who formed the core of what became 
the governing Likud coalition in 1977, had oposed the United 
Nations decision in 1948 to place a third state in that 
area. For them, Biblical and historical associations made 
Hebron and Jericho at least as much parts of Israel as Tel 
Aviv or Jerusalem. They never accepted the legitimacy of 
Arab rule west of the Jordan River. The 1967 war had, in 
their eyes, set right a historic wrong. For them, the Sinai 
could be surrendered in return for the appropriate 
concessions but not the West Bank. That was part of Israel. 
Israeli Likud government has declared many times that 
Palestinian state already exists, namely, Jordan with her 
large Palestinian population. Ariel Sharon has long (since 
1976) advocated the demise of the Hashemite monarchy so that 
the Palestinians may establish their own state in East 
Jordan. There would then be no need to form a Palestinian 
state in the West Bank which he and other Israeli claim as 
part of Eretz Israel (Hebrew for Hhe land of Israel'). 
Ariel Sharon has stated that : "Jordan is Palestine, the 
capital of Palestine is Amman if Palestinian Arabs want to 
find their political expression they will have to do it in 
1 fi Amman. ° Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has also stated that 
" it is nearly an accident of history that this state is 
called the Kingdom of Jordan and not the Kingdom of 
Palestine."'^ In this context, the Israeli leaders 
justified their claims that Palestine is Jordan, by 
indicating that approximately three-quarters of the 
inhabitants of Amman came from western Palestine. Many of 
Jordans cabinet ministers and members of Parliament are 
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o r i g i n a l l y f rom western P a l e s t i n e , the major p a r t o f t h e 
c o u n t r y ' s economy and government a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s in the 
hand o f f o r m e r r e s i d e n t s o f w e s t e r n P a l e s t i n e . T h e i r 
c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t k ingdom o f Jo rdan i s a c t u a l l y a 
P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and t h a t any s o l u t i o n o f I s r a e l i ' s 
P a l e s t i n i a n problem must come a t Jordanian expense . 
King Hussein has warned against attempts to t u r n Jordan 
i n t o a replacement home land f o r P a l e s t i n i a n s . He cha l lenged 
I s r a e l ' s p o s i t i o n which t r i e d to present the Pa les t i ne issue 
as i f i t were tha t of a people w i thou t l and , a people who 
are searching f o r land. He maintained t ha t Jordanians are 
one peop le and t h e i r d e s t i n y was one and the same. In 
a d d i t i o n , Pa les t in ians were not i n t e res ted i n t u r i n g Jordan 
i n t o a Pa les t i n i an home land, they favoured the West Bank 
7 1 
and Gaza Strip for a Palestinian state.' 
Despite all these difference, Israeli settlement policy 
in the West Bank is also a bone of contention between two 
states. There was a general Israeli consensus for the 
retention of Jewish settlements along the length of the 
Jordan River, and control of the Judean hills which bisect 
the West Bank and command the Plain of Sharon where most 
Israelis live. These terms were roughly embodied in the 
Allon Plan, a scheme for the West Bank devised by one-time 
deputy Prime-Minister Yigal Allon. This was intended to 
achieving maximum territorial increase for Israel with 
minimal increase in Palestinian population. In other words, 
Allon wanted to build settlements on, and eventually annex, 
as much of the West Bank as possible to provide "defensible 
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borders", without having to add to the Palestinian 
population of Israel. In order to achieve this, a small 
Palestinian enclave would remain attached to Jordan, but the 
effective strategic eastern border of Israel was to remain 
the Jordan River. 
Thus, the settlements are an Integral part of a plan to 
incorporate the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Israel while 
cutting off easy contact among Palestinians and between 
Palestinians and other Arabs. Palestinians resistance to 
these settlements is based not on a reluctance to live near 
Jews, as it is often portrayed by Israel, but on the grounds 
that the settlements violate international law and are 
another way in which Israel is attempting to deny 
Palestinian nationalist identity and self-determination. 
Differences with Syria : 
U n t i l the mid-1970s, the major actor on the Arab side of 
the c o n f l i c t was Indisputably Egypt. But two disengagement 
agreements between Egypt and I s r a e l , in 1973 and 1975, 
s t a r t e d to defuse the E g y p t i a n - I s r a e l i dimension of the 
c o n f l i c t , and, through the Camp David Accords of 1978, Egypt 
and I s r a e l moved i n t o a c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n process t h a t 
r e s u l t e d in the s i g n i n g of a f o r m a l peace t r e a t y the 
f o l l o w i n g year. A f t e r Egypt l e f t the c o n f r o n t a t i o n , the 
major m i l i t a r y dimension of the Arab-Israel i c o n f l i c t became 
the c o n f l i c t between Is rae l and Syr ia , a state of a f f a i r s 
that continued u n t i l the end of the 1980s. 
t 
For Syria the conflict with Israel has long involved 
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three issues -. the Golan Heights, Lebanon, and the 
Palestinians, all of which are interlinked. Syria lies just 
northeast of Israel. The Israeli-Syrian border is only about 
70 km long it runs across a high (300 - 500 m) massif which 
peaks in the far north at Mount Hermon (Jabal Al Sheikh). 
The top of Heights is a rockstrewn plateau with temperatures 
running into the high forties during the summer and plunging 
into an icy cold during the winter.'^ The Golan Plateau is 
an extremely valuable strategic piece of terrain overlooking 
the upper Jordan valley and blocking the old route between 
Damascus and Palestine. The elongated plateau is roughly 35 
miles long from north to south and about 17 miles wide from 
east to west. The plateau is blocked huge mount Hermon 
Massif called Jabal Al Sheikh by the Arabs (rising to 9.223 
feet above sea level) and the eastern side of the plateau 
faces the Damascus plain. 
During the Six-Day war of 1967 Israelis sealed the 
plateau and occupied about 400 square miles area in the 
Golan. (This constituted 0.5 percent of Syria's 71.498 
square miles territory). The loss of the heights has 
influenced much of Syrian foreign and defence policy and its 
domestic situations. By capturing the Golan Heights Israelis 
enjoyed a massive topographical advantage. Their military 
position entrenched on the Golan Heights and Syrian capital 
Damascus became completely exposed to the Israeli guns. 
These guns kept up a constant harassment of the Syrians 
cities and towns. The Israeli forces are now in a position 
to present a threat to Damascus that is within forty miles 
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of relatively easy terrain. Thus the geography of the Golan 
requires that the Syrians should not face Israeli troops on 
the Heights because the Israeli would constitute a direct 
threat on the plain leading to Damascus . 
The majority of the native Syrian population (over 93 
percent ) was expelled by the Israeli forces from the Golan 
Heights. It is estimated that the number of Syrian refugees 
from the Golan is approximately 100,000 persons, most of 
them peasants whose homes and villages have been razed to 
make room for the new Jewish settlements. ' Only some 6000 
native Druze residents remained in the Golan Heights after 
the Israeli occupation and they are concentrated in five 
villages in the northern section of the region, the largest 
of which is Majd al Shams, 
Syria is the region's most persistent confrontation 
state having fought her neighbour in 1948, 1967, 1973 and 
1982. The key to their rivalry is the Golan Heights. The two 
countries fought for this narrow strip of land in 1967 and 
1973. Syrian fear that the Israel represents a serious 
challenge to their value and institutions, particularly 
after Israel's decision on December 14, 1981 to extend its 
legal and administrative jurisdiction to the Golan Heights 
and to allow for the largest concentration of Israeli 
settlement in the Syrian plateau. Jewish settlements on the 
7 7 Golan Heights now house about 12,000 Israelis . Former 
Prime Minister Begin said "we shall never withdraw from the 
Golan Heights. There is no such thing as giving up security 
in return for peace. There is no peace without security and 
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without the Golan Heights there is no secur i ty."28 
The stated Syrian goal in the years fo l lowing Camp David 
was to achieve "s t ra teg ic pa r i t y " wi th I s rae l . As President 
Haf iz Al-Asad expla ined i t , t h i s p a r i t y was a necessary 
precondit ion to any jus t resolut ion of Syr ia 's long-standing 
c o n f l i c t w i t h I s r a e l - w h e t h e r th rough war or t h r o u g h 
n e g o t i a t i o n . Moreover, as the prospects fo r an e f f e c t i v e 
c o a l i t i o n with Iraq disappeared, Syrian spokesmen explained 
that th i s par i ty would have to be achieved by Syria on a one 
- t o - o n e bas is w i t h I s r a e l . The w e l l - i n f o r m e d Asad 's 
biographer Patrick Seale has said that the Syrian president 
a r r i v e d at his view of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y from h is gloomy 
observation of the course of Sadat's peace diplomacy. In his 
v i e w , Sadat had not made peace w i t h I s r a e l , he had 
cap i tu la ted : Sinai had not been l i be ra ted , Egypt i t s e l f had 
been f e t t e red . Peace, he concluded, was not for the weak. 
President Asad is eager to regain the s t ra teg ic Golan 
Heights captured by I s rae l in 1967. He has been convinced 
that I s rae l is not w i l l i n g to return the Golan Heights to 
Syr ian c o n t r o l even i f cond i t i ons to mainta in I s r a e l i 
secur i ty are established and that the only possible approach 
to secure the return of the Golan l i es in posing a constant 
on 
and cred ib le st rategic threat to I s r a e l . Asad establ ished 
a long term doc t r i ne to achieve s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y w i t h 
I s r a e l , and he made repeated asser t ions tha t s t r a t e g i c 
p a r i t y must have more than j u s t a q u a n t i t a t i v e m i l i t a r y 
meaning. On March 8, 1986 President Asad expressed th i s 
c lea r l y when he stated that : 
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"when we proclaimed this slogan of strategic 
parity a few years ago we were aware that this 
did not just mean a tank vs. a tank or a gun 
vs. a gun but parity in all the domains of 
life : the economic, human, social, 
political, cultural and military we knew 
then that this could not be achieved over 
night but necessitated time and appropriate 
efforts: however, we have already covered a 
measurable distance."^ 
Syria has found itself in the position of being the 
major confrontationist state with Israel. The separate peace 
treaty signed between Egypt and Israel came as a blow to the 
Syrians, who consistently advocated the need for Arab 
solidarity in dealing with Israel. The Camp David peace 
process deprived Syria of a military option against Israel 
and had left the country more vulnerable than before. Syria 
found itself without a practical policy to win back the 
Golan, it was unable either to move towards negotiations or 
to prepare for war. Thus Camp David deal which ensured 
Egypt's withdrawal from the military confrontation with 
Israel enabled Tel Aviv to use practically all its military 
strength against Lebanon and Syria. 
During 1980s Egypt's military neutralization and Iraq's 
subsequent commitment of military power against Iran had 
narrowed Syrian's military options against Israel. After 
Camp David, Asad looked to the Soviet Union to provide 
deterrence. He saw Syria as the only possible effective 
challenge to Israel. Syria is motivated by the diplomatic 
support that the Soviet Union provided and the deterrent 
effect that Soviet support for Syria was presumed to have on 
the U.S. supported Israel. Also crucial is the role of the 
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Soviet Union in supplying the weapons that Syria required 
for its armed forces not only in the confrontation with 
Israel but also to satisfy the professional requirements of 
the military constituency on whose loyalty Asad depends for 
his own security. 
Syria failed to win back the Golan Heights in the 1973 
October war and had lost additional land before the cease-
fire. In Israel, there is a broad national consensus that 
the Golan Heights should under no circumstances return to 
Syria. An Israeli minister said that before talks begin 
between Israel and Syria, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad 
would have to accept two conditions : That no Syrian 
soldiers will be there and that the Jewish settlements will 
not only remain but expand in natural development . 
The Golan Heights are overlooking Israel's Hulu Valley, 
an important agricultural area. It is a smaller piece of 
territory than the Sinai, if Israel returned the Heights for 
the promise that the area would be demilitarized, and if 
Syria violated its promise, Israel would have very little 
time to mobilize and resist. It could be argued that Israel 
was stronger military without the Sinai so long as it was 
demilitarized, but the same argument was far less convincing 
when applied to the Golan. As the Golan Heights differed 
from the Sinai, so Syria differed from Egypt. As suspicious 
as they were of Egyptian intent, Israelis were even less 
disposed to trust Syrian good will. For its part, the Syrian 
regime was not willing, and probably not able, to address 
those suspicions by offering assurances like Egypt's. 
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^Damascus lacked Cairo's flexibility because its government 
lacked the same legitimacy. Syria was a twentieth-century 
creation, smaller than Egypt, with less weight in the Arab 
world. The Syrian leader Hafiz al-Asad lacked Sadat's 
authority. He stayed in power through repression and terror, 
and what legitimacy he possessed derived in large part from 
zealous pan - Arabism, expressed in uncompromising hostility 
to Zionism. 
Israel and Syria had some national security concerns 
stemming from the volatile situation in Lebanon. On both 
sides, however, official declaratory policy also helped to 
push these governments further into the Lebanese game. For 
the Syrian leaders, there were real national security goals 
to be met in eastern Lebanon, which forms a natural invasion 
route for forces seeking to attack Damascus from the south 
or west. They also felt, however, an occasional need to be 
seen to be confronting "the Zionist threat" some where on 
earth, although they never chose to do so on their own turf 
in the Golan. For the Israelis, meanwhile, there was concern 
for the vulnerability of communities in northern Israel to 
the guerrillas operating from south Lebanon. Syria has its 
own security reasons for wanting to keep Lebanon within Its 
sphere of influence. Asad sought to control the Lebanon 
front as a stable buffer against Israel and restricted 
Palestinian operations from Lebanese territories. Since the 
Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976, the Israelis and 
Syrians have tacity agreed that the Red Line (approximating 
the Litani River) should constitute the de facto security 
border between them. Thus, there is sort of understanding 
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between both countries over their respective security 
concerns in Lebanon. Syria opposed PLO military forays into 
Israel that threatened to bring the Israeli forces that much 
closer to Damascus via the Beka valley. This brought the PLO 
and Syria to blows. Israel has allowed Syria to move forces 
into Lebanon with certain restrictions -. Israeli Air Force 
planes would have complete freedom to carry out flights over 
Lebanese territory. The Syrian army will not move further 
south beyond an invisible line roughly stretching between 
Kafr Mashqi In the east and the Zabarani estuary In the 
west. Syrian forces would not move west of the Beka's valley 
east of the Mettern mountains, the main stronghold of the 
Lebanese force. The Syrians would also not deploy in 
Lebanon any surface-to-air missiles. Between 1978 and 
1989, the contest between Israel and Syria was, therefore, 
played out through primarily military rather than diplomatic 
means -- through opposing troops deployments on the Golan as 
well as in the two subsidiary arenas of Lebanon and the 
eastern Mediterranean. It was also pursued through both 
sides' continued acquisition of "strategic" deep-penetration 
capabilities that included bomber aircraft, surface-to-
surface missiles, and the ability to arm them with chemical 
warheads (in the case of Syria), or (in the case of Israel) 
chemical or nuclear warheads. In June 1982 Israel and 
Syria fought a short war, the fourth between those two 
countries in the last thirty five years. This was a small 
part of the larger Lebanon war, known to the Israelis as 
"Operation Peace for Galilee". It was a war limited in both 
time and space, most of the fighting between the two 
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countries took place during a forty eight hour period 
starting on June 9 and ending on June 11 in a battle field 
about 30 miles wide and 25 miles deep that included a 
Lebanese valley known as the Beka's and the surrounding 
mountains and hills.^^ Israel's air operations during the 
summer of 1982 were extra ordinarily successful. Whereas the 
Israeli air force took few losses, the Syrians suffered a 
devastating defeat. They completely lost air defence system 
including twenty surface-to-air missile batteries (SA -
2,3,6) and in excess of eighty five fighter aircraft (MIG 
21, MIG 23, MIG 25) because of this defeat Syrians ground 
forces in Lebanon had virtually no defence against Israeli 
air attacks and as a result suffered from intense air 
attacks. Syria lost more than 400 tanks. 
Differences with Lebanon : 
The Republic of Lebanon though a part of the Arab World 
is unique in many important respects. Unlike the others, 
Lebanon has neither a Muslim preponderence nor a Muslim 
character. Catholic chrisitians, particularly Maronites, 
constitute a seizable section of its population and have 
played a historically dominant role in the domestic politics 
of the country. The existence of a Christian community in 
Lebanon claiming a separate identity for itself and striving 
to establish a Christian state in the Levant was of 
tremendous importance for the state of Israel which came 
into existence in 1948. The Jewish state had been created 
in the midst of intense opposition first from the indigenous 
population, the Palestinian Arabs, and later on by the Arab 
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states who came out in support of the Palestinians. 
In November 1947 the passage of the partition plan for 
Palestine by the UN General Assembly immediately led to the 
outbreak of a violent conflict between Palestinians and Jews 
in Palestine. As the British mandate drew to a close in May 
1948, conditions along the Palestine-Lebanon boundary 
reverted to the chaotic state that had prevailed during the 
Arab revolt of 1936-37. An Arab guerrilla band known as the 
Arab Liberation Army, under the leadership of Fawzi al -
Qawugji operated on both sides of the Lebanon-Palestine 
frontier and southern Lebanon now part of the independent 
republic of Lebanon, again served as a sanctuary and staging 
area for Palestinian guerrillas. In the midst of this 
conflict it soon became apparent that an intervention by the 
regular armies of Arab states Including Lebanon in support 
of the Palestinians was imminent. 
Meanwhile Lebanon along with Egypt, Syria, Trans Jordan 
and Iraq participated in the first Arab-Israeli war. On 15 
May 1948 Israel's first day as an Independent state, two 
Lebanese infantry battalions and a company of armour 
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attacked and overran the tiny settlement of Malkiya. ^ The 
siezure of Malkiya placed Lebanon In opposition to the UN 
Partition Plan as it was located in an area designated by 
the UN as part of the projected state of Israel. Three days 
later Israel launched a counter-attack, took the Lebanese 
army by surprise and recaptured Malkiya.^° The settlement 
was to change hands once again when the Lebanese army 
reacting to Its defeat successfully stormed Malkiya and 
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another settlement Kadesh-Naftali on 6 June . After this 
victory Lebanon retired from active combat, turning over Its 
gain in the central sector to the Arab Liberation Army. 
Lebanon, however, found that disengagement was no easy 
matter. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), Intent upon 
securing as much of Mandatory Palestine as possible launched 
a campaign named "Operation Hiram" (named after the ancient 
king of Tyre) In October 1948, aimed at dislodging the Arab 
Liberation Army from Northern Palestine. The Arab Liberation 
Army was forced to abandon Palestine and retreated into 
Southern Lebanon. The IDF pursued the enemy into Lebanon and 
occupied eighteen Lebanese villages. The Israeli advance was 
halted only when it had reached the point where the Litani 
takes a westward bend . 
The Palestinian presence in Lebanon originated with the 
first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. The tragic turn of the war 
motivated an influx of over 140,000 refugees mainly from 
North Palestine (Eastern and Western Galilee) into 
Lebanon . Unlike the Armenians, the Palestinian refugees 
were not incorporated into Lebanon's own population, both 
because this was the policy decreed by the Arab League In 
order to preserve their national identity and because of 
Lebanese Christian opposition to such an Increase in 
Lebanon's Muslim population. Initially the refugees were 
temporarily settled in transit camps built In Southern 
Lebanon but from 1950 onwards the Lebanese government began 
to transfer the Palestinians to camp scattered throughout 
Lebanon . 
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If the Palestinian guerrillas did not pose a serious 
military threat to Israel's northern settlements then why is 
it that Israel resorted to a policy of conducting incessant 
raids against Lebanon ? Between 14 June 1968 and 10 June 
1974 (2188 days) UN observers reported 3036 Israeli 
violations of Lebanese territory which included twelve major 
operations. During these raids hundreds of Lebanese 
citizens, apart from Palestinians were either killed or 
wounded, thousands rendered home less as a result of the 
destruction of their hearth and homes and the crops of many 
villages burnt to ashes. The intensity of Israeli raids 
suggests two things. First, the Israeli intention was to 
liquidate all or any manifestation of Palestinian 
nationalism particularly its militant variant so forcefully 
represented by the Palestinian guerrillas. Second, the 
Israeli strategy was intended to facilitate the attainment 
of certain long term aims with regard to Lebanon. Israel was 
aware of the deep sectarian cleavages in Lebanon and the 
conflicting perceptions of Christians and Muslims towards 
the presence of Palestinians guerrillas in Lebanon. By 
resorting to a relentless series of raids Israel's aim in 
the long run was to bring about a polarization between the 
Lebanese Christians and Muslims over the issue of presence 
of Palestinian guerrillas in the country. Such a 
polarization, Israel calculated, would undermine the uneasy 
national consensus, reinforce trends towards Maronite 
Separatism as well as generate intense political strife. 
Domestic political strife could then lead to Lebanon's 
partition, a theme to which the Israeli leaders were not 
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averse, while at the same time giving Israel the option of 
asserting de facto control over Southern Lebanon or even Its 
annexation. ^ That a breakdown in the national consensus 
and domestic political upheaval was indeed one of the 
Israeli objective is clearly visible by an analysis of the 
nature and pattern of Israeli raids from the late 1960s till 
the onset of the Lebanese civil war. 
In May 1970 the IDF carried out a thirty two hour 
armoured raid of the Arkoub in Southern Lebanon. This large 
-scale operation, the biggest penetration of Lebanon since 
the 19<i8 war marked the beginning of a new and far more 
aggressive phase in the Israeli offensive against Lebanon. 
The IDF occupied a number of villages, compelling its 
residents to flee and just before withdrawing resorted to a 
^scorched earth' policy. During the May operations the 
commander of the Lebanese Army General Jean Nujaym 
instructed the units stationed near the border to return 
fire as a result of which the army suffered heavy 
casualities especially from the Israeli armoured columns. 
Syria also sent in some fighter bombers to strafe the 
Israeli columns and in the ensuing dogfights with the 
Israeli Air Force, three Syrian air crafts were shot down 
over Lebanese territory. 
Following the raid on Arkoub the IDF initiated a new 
policy of deploying permanent patrols on the Lebanese side 
of the border. At the same time the IDF built a network of 
roads on Lebanese territory connecting these with northern 
Israel.^° Apart from facilitating further Israeli raids, 
70 
the Israeli moves signified a step-by-step approach towards 
the incorporation of border areas into northern Israel. In 
September Israel carried out an even bigger raid than that 
of May. ^ It was preceded by days of continuous bombing by 
the lAF, artillery barrage and smaller raids. Meanwhile 
reports began to appear in Israeli newspapers that the 
unremitting series of raids was intended to empty the 
Southern villages completely in order to pave the way for a 
possible Israeli occupation of large sectors of Southern 
Lebanon. 
With increasing Palestinian presence in Lebanon after 
1970 Civil War in Jordan, Israel frequently used the 
Palestinian presence as a pretext to launch raids into 
Lebanon. On 14 March 1978, Israel launched its long-planned 
incursion against Lebanon (Operation Litani) occupying 
within three days an area upto the Litani River. The 
declared, objectives were to establish a security belt (a 
six-mile wide) and to eradicate the Palestinian commandos 
once and for all . Just before dawn on 14 March, Israeli 
artillery opened up on Lebanese villages held by the 
Palestinians and leftists. The shelling was followed by a 
ground attack with approximately 20,000 Israeli soldiers 
C 1 
advancing on five axes. The Israeli forces consisted 
mainly of regular infantry and paratroopers units. Command 
of the operation, code-named "Even Hachochma' (Stone of 
Wisdom), was given to the infantry. The IDF did not 
encounter any significant resistance except in two places, 
Bint Jubayl and Taibe, where the Palestinians briefly 
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engaged the advancing Israeli troops.52 The overwhelming 
majority of the commandos simply evacuated their positions 
and fled to safer zones in the north. The objective of the 
invasion was to wipe out all commando concentrations along 
the entire length of the Israeli- Lebanese border and to 
destroy all their special bases from which the commandos set 
out on missions deep inside Israeli territory . 
By the end of the first day Israel had secured what 
Haddad's militia had fa1led to provide all along : a buffer 
zone ranging in depth from five to twenty Kilometers, 
stretching from the the Mediterranean sea to the foothills 
of Mount Hermon. Between 16 and 18 March, the IDF continued 
to make small advances in those areas where the security 
belt was thinner than ten kilometers . Concerned about 
casualties, the IDF abandoned its traditional practice of 
high mobility, choosing instead to advance its infantry very 
cautiously behind a devastating wall of artillery fire. 
Although this technique minimized Israeli casualties, it led 
to a large scale civilian deaths and destruction . As the 
Israeli forces moved north, Haddad's militia followed in 
their wake, looting the Shilte villages which had 
successfully held out for so long.^° on 19 March, just when 
it seemed that the operation was coming to an end, the IDF 
suddenly broke out of the buffer zone towards the Litani 
river, and by evening, Israel controlled the entire area 
from its borders to the Litani river except for the town of 
Tyre.^^ 
On 6 June 1982 the Israeli forces launched "Operation 
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Peace f o r G a l i l e e " a l and , sea and a i r invas ion o f Lebanon. 
I s r a e l i f o r c e s commi t ted t o the i n v a s i o n a f t e r t h e a i r 
a t t acks cons is ted of 90,000 men, 13000 tanks , 1300 armoured 
p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e s , 12,000 t r o o p s and supp ly t r u c k s , 634 
combat a i r c r a f t and an unchallenged navy. With t h i s s t r e n g t h 
I s r a e l went to f i g h t 10,000 Pa les t in ians and a few thousand 
remnants o f Lebanon's d i s i n t e g r a t e d army and s m a l l a n t i 
I s r a e l p r i v a t e m i l i t i a s none of them supported by any a i r or 
CO 
naval force. Operation Peace for Galilee was to have been 
completed according to Israeli policy statements with the 
IDF's reaching the limit of 40 kilometers from the border. 
This was the strip necessary for neutralization, according 
to Israel's military expert so to keep Israeli territory 
immune from the PLO's long-range guns. Israel claim that it 
thus established the Lebanon security zone as a buffer 
against attacks by "Palestinian terrorism " or "Shia 
extremists". The other objective must have been to place 
Lebanon more firmly in control of the Christians who were 
friendly to Israel and thus enhance Israeli security on its 
CO 
nor thern border. 
The occupied zone extends f o r a few mi les from Sad ia , 
Lebanon 's t h i r d l a r g e s t c i t y . The area under o c c u p a t i o n 
inc ludes 171 v i l l a g e s and towns and i s home to over 350,000 
p e o p l e . Be fo re 1982 the occup ied area i n c l u d e d o n l y 59 
v i l l a g e s . No Pa les t in ians have been a l lowed to remain in the 
occupied a r e a . ° " The South Lebanon Army (SLA) t h a t I s r a e l 
s u p p o r t s i s made up s o l e l y o f C h r i s t i a n r e c r u i t s . The 
M i l i t i a ' s task was to p a t r o l and c o n t r o l the occupied zone 
and p ro tec t the C h r i s t i a n m ino r i t y w i t h back up f rom I s r a e l i 
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troops. 
Immediately after the PLO forces had withdrawn from 
Lebanon, the Israelis began their march into west Beirut. In 
w«st Beirut, the Israelis called on Christian militia, the 
Phalangists to go into the Palestinian refugee camps to 
round up any remaining PLO fighters. The Christian forces 
were reported to have slaughtered several hundred 
Palestinians, mainly woman, children and old men at Sabra 
fi 1 
and Chatila Camps. . The Israeli forces in Lebanon killed 
about 30,000 people left another 9000 crippled for life and 
made about one million people home less. The Security 
Council seeking Israeli withdrawal in many resolutions : 
508, 509, 512, 515, 516, 517 and the Israeli armed forces 
continuing their war on Lebanon and the Palestinians in 
egregious disregard of the world body's injunctions. 
In the central sector, the Israeli army had reached very 
near the Beirut-Damascus highway though it had yet to take 
control of this strategic road. The Israeli forces in 
eastern sector now began to exert pressure on the Syrian 
troops stationed in the Biqa valley taking full advantage of 
the fact that the later had already been encirlced from the 
west by the advancing Israeli column in the central 
sector. The aim was to dislodge or atleast neutralize the 
Syrian army stationed here. Once this was done, the Syrian 
capability to influence political development In Lebanon 
would be severely curtailed. 
On 9 June at 2 p.m. the lAF went into action attacking 
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the Syrian air defence missile system in Biqa. The Syrian 
responded by sending out scores of interceptors into the sky 
in a bid to protect their missiles from the Israeli attack. 
"The result was one of the biggest air battle in history : 
some 200 supersonic jet fighter targeting, dodging and 
firing at each other over an area of approximately 2,500 
square kilometer". The Syrian air force was no match to 
the lAF. The Syrian lost 90 of their Soviet built Mig 23s 
and 21s with no loss to the lAF and 19 of the SAM2, 3 and 6 
batteries were destroyed. 
The air attack on the Syrian missile batteries was 
accompanied by a ground attack against the Syrian army 
stationed in the Biqa. Shorn of its air support and heavily 
outnumbered the Syrian army soon found itself in a very 
precarious situation. In three days of intensive battle, the 
Syrian army was pushed back several kilometer, lost a large 
number of T-72 tanks and the IDF was on the verge of taking 
control of Beirut - Damascus highway. In this moment of 
crisis, Assad secretly flew to Moscow and appealed to his 
Soviet allies for immediate help and protection. This 
prompted Leonid Brezhnev to contact President Reagan on the 
hot line urging the American President to restrain Israel. 
On 11 June under American pressure Israel ultimately agreed 
to a cease-fire in the eastern sector negotiated by Philip 
Habib. The acceptance of the sease-fire was a tactical 
move on the part of the Israelis. Israel had already 
inflicted a crushing defeat on the Syrian army in Lebanon. 
Had it continued its drive against the Syrians, there was a 
llke-lihood of the war spreading to the Golan Height and 
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Soviet intervention. Israel wanted to avoid such unnecessary 
complications since it had already neutralized the bulk of 
the Syrian forces in Lebanon. 
In sum, Israel has always preferred a weak Lebanon made 
up of warring sects, each sects, controlling a limited area 
leaving the central government to seek favour and protection 
from its powerful southern neighbour. Israel is unlikely to 
allow Lebanon's reunification, it may continue to play the 
various Lebanese forces off against one another. Israel 
still occupies a large strip of land ranging in width from 
10 to 30 miles along the southern border. 
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Chapter - 3 
Israel and Regional Arms 
Proliferation 
ISRAEL AND REGIONAL ARMS PROLIFERATION 
Several factors are responsible for rapid arms 
proliferation in West Asia. Since the end of Second World 
War and establishment of state of Israel, there has been a 
continued state of hostility between Arabs and Israel with 
each decade witnessing a major war between Israel and some 
of its Arab neighbours leading to a marked increase in 
military expenditures and arms imports in the countries 
concerned. In the wake of continued state of hostilities 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours, the strategic 
environment is charged with mutual suspicion and each 
country affected by it is keen to ensure its security and 
maintain strategic parity against its adversary. The 
resultant outcome is discernible in the increase in armed 
forces and arsenals. 
See Table 1. 
During 1947-49, Israel had strategic military advantage 
over the neighbouring Arab countries. While Arabs had 22,500 
ground forces whereas Israel's strength was 70,000. During 
this period Israel had air superiority over its Arab 
neighbours. Israel had 80 aircrafts whereas there were 45 
air crafts available with the Arabs during that period. 
However, by 1967, the strategic balance had become 
advantageous to the Arabs. The Arab ground forces were two 
times larger than that of Israel in 1967. In terms of 
weapons as well Arabs had strategic advantage over Israel. 
However, by 1973, Israel had attained parity with its Arab 
adversaries. 
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Ttblm 1 
P a t t w n * In th» Arab-larMll M l l t a r y Build up 14«7 - 1979 
1*«T-1949 1956 19*7 1979 
Ar«b Israel Egypt Israel Arab Israel Arab Israel 
Ground 22,500 70,000 88,000 60,000 522,000 289,000 350,000 350,000 
Forces 
Tank same 14S 500 305 2,2SO 800 9,00O 2,120 
APCS »,250 3,145 
Naval 7000 2000 
Forces 
7,300 3,200 16.100 4,000 20,000 8000 
Ships/ 
Cra-fts 
45 172 25 165 
Air 
Force 
Air 
Cra-ft 
source : The 
tM 
45 
3,000 
80 
Military Balance 1961-
-
340 
-1974 
-
ISO 
39,500 
940 
6000 
340 
93,000 
1,280 
17,000 
625 
During the second half of 1970s I.e. 1975-1979, West 
Asia continued to retain its pre-eminent position as the 
largest arms Importing region with its share of 48 percent 
of total arms imports by the Third World. Iran emerged as 
the largest recipient of arms imports followed by Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Israel and Syria. United States 
remained the major supplier of arms to Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Israel and Jordan whereas Iraq and Syria received their arms 
supplies mainly from Soviet Union. 
The respective perceptions of national security by 
Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries have been the 
major determinant of spurt in arms proliferation in West 
Asia. Israel's perception of national security is very akin 
to and based on famous Jewish saying, "By fire and blood the 
Jewish state fell and by fire and blood it will rise 
again". The Jewish leadership in Israel always harped on 
the use of force as the only element of defence policy. 
David BenGurion, the Chief architect of Israeli security 
doctrine once said -. "The policy of Israel must be build 
only on the security factors-immigration, in support of a 
big power, state without boundaries and encircling the 
Arabs. We have to encourage the Jews to immigrate to Israel, 
cause this will settle the security problem on the long run 
and will pave the way for one expansion in the region.... We 
have to make war as a Jewish profession. The boundaries of 
Israel are those boundaries which Zshal (the Israeli Army) 
can reach.Zahal is the only Instrument which can define the 
Israeli borders."^ While reiterating Israel's right to use 
85 
f o r c e i n annex ing the t e r r i t o r i e s , E r e a l Sha roon , f o rmer 
I s r a e l i defence m i n i s t e r , emphasized the need o f arms f o r 
I s r a e l when he sa id on H December, 1981 : 
"The I s r a e l i s e c u r i t y problems i n the 1980s 
con f ron t two t h r e a t s : the Arab c o n f r o n t a t i o n 
and the S o v i e t expans ion .Thus the I s r a e l i 
s t ra tegy has to move i ns ide three c i r c l e s : 
t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l b e l t o f t h e A r a b f r o n t 
s t a t e s , th.e Arab s t a t e s i n t h e r e g i o n a l 
pe r iphe ry , and those s ta tes which can t h r e a t 
our secu r i t y (Turkey, Pak is tan , Persian Gul f 
and A f r i c a ) . To p r e s e r v e ou r n a t i o n a l 
s e c u r i t y , q u a l i t a t i v e and t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
s u p e r i o r i t y must be achieved over a l l the Arab 
s ta tes to prevent aggression by deter rence or 
to achieve v i c t o r y on the case of the f a i l u r e 
o f d e t e r r e n c e . Th is can be done o n l y (by 
eva lua t ing ) our arms and equipment p u t t i n g in 
mind t h a t I s r a e l c a n n o t t a p e w i t h t h e 
convent iona l arms race w i th the Arabs who have 
s u p e r i o r i t y in manpower and c a p i t a l . New arms 
generat ion have to replace the o l d ones . " 
I t emerges f rom the above pronouncements o f I s r a e l i 
l e a d e r s t h a t i m m i g r a t i o n o f Jews and a n n e x a t i o n o f 
t e r r i t o r i e s form the co re o f I s r a e l ' s s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . 
Besides, using fo rce is the only element f o r annexa t i on , but 
because of i t s l i m i t e d popu la t ion compared w i t h the Arabs, 
the p r i n c i p l e o f the " n a t i o n in arms" o c c u p i e s the t op 
p r i o r i t y . I s r a e l i l e a d e r s h i p i s e q u a l l y aware o f t h e 
c o n s t r a i n t s o f dependence on arms impo r t s as the s o l e 
e lement o f meet ing s e c u r i t y dependence, hence i t s t a r t e d 
concen t ra t i ng on developing indigenous m i l i t a r y i n d u s t r i a l 
complex. The t ang ib l e out come of I s r a e l i s t r a tegy had been 
the exacerbat ion of r eg iona l arms race. 
Between 1970 and 1979, t h e r e was massive i n c r e a s e in 
m i l i t a r y expendi ture of I s r a e l as w e l l as Arab c o u n t r i e s . IN 
1970, the m i l i t a r y expendi ture of Arab coun t r i es was $4,451 
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million which rose to $28,-463 million by 1979 registering, 
there by, seven times increase. The Israeli military 
expenditure rose three-fold from $ 1,417 million in 1970 to 
$ 4,724 million by 1979 . There was increase in the number 
of armed forces as well during this period. While in 1970, 
the strength of armed forces of Arab Countries stood at 
7,90,000 and it increased to 12,42,000 by 1979. Similarly, 
the strength of Israeli armed forces also rose from 1 , 
05,000 in 1970 to 1,65,000 in 1979. 
Arms proliferation in West Asia during 1970s can be 
understood by analyzing the arms acquisition by the leading 
arms importing countries of the region -. 
During the first half of 1970s, Egypt ranked second 
after Syria, in importing arms. Between 1970 and 1974 
Egypt's imported arms worth $ 2,181 million which accounted 
for 23 percent of West Asian regions total import of arms. 
The October 1973 war was followed by large resupplies of 
armaments to Israel whereas Egypt, due to break in military 
relations with the Soviet Union, went down the list. Egypt's 
switch to the US and the other western armaments began to 
show up in the statistics after 1975 and was more visible as 
contracted sophisticated weapons, such as the F-5E started 
arriving in Cairo . 
The arms acquired by Egypt during 1970s, reveal, that 
during this decade Egypt diversified its sources of arms 
acquisition. During this period, France acquired a major 
chunk of arms market in Egypt, having sold Mirage - 5 
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f i g h t e r s , h e l i c o p t e r s , t he C r o t a l e SAM system and Euro 
m i s s i l e MILAN. In 1980 nego t i a t i ons s ta r t ed between France 
and Egypt f o r the supply of Mirage 2000 and the Mirage F -
1C f i g h t e r s . 
B r i t a i n ' s e n t r y i n t o t h e E g y p t i a n s arms m a r k e t 
commenced only a f t e r 1975, in p a r t i c u l a r in connect ion w i t h 
Arab Organizat ion of I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n (AOI) p r o j e c t s f o r 
l i censed product ion of the Hawk t r a i n e r , the s w i n g f i r e a n t i -
tank m i s s i l e and the Lynx H e l i c o p t e r . ° The US m i l i t a r y a i d 
packages to I s r a e l and Egypt, agreed on the connect ion w i t h 
the s ign ing of the peace t r e a t y t ha t would c rea te s t a b i l i t y 
i n t h e r e g i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e s u p p l y t o E g y p t o f F-5E 
f i g h t e r s and poss ib ly the F-16, p lus 750 M - 113 - A - 2 
armored personnel c a r r i e s and severa l hundred o ther m i l i t a r y 
v e h i c l e s , the AIM - 7 and AIM - 9 a i r to a i r m i s s i l e s and 
500 Maverick a i r to sur face m i s s i l e s . 
P r i o r to October 1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i war, Jordan 's impor t 
of arms was almost n e g l i g i b l e . I t was only dur ing the second 
h a l f o f 1970s t h a t a heavy h e a r i n g o f t he p r o - w e s t e r n 
nat ions in West Asia had taken p lace . Jordan emerged as the 
t h i r d l a rges t importer of arms dur ing the second h a l f o f 
1970s. I t s arms imports were worth $ 2,615 m i l l i o n which 
accounted f o r 13 per cent o f r eg i on ' s t o t a l arms impo r t s . 
Du r i ng 1973-74, Jordan impo r t ed arms ma in l y f r o m t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s and some i tems f rom UK. IN 1974, Jo rdan 
r e q u i s i t i o n e d f o r 25 Northrop F-5A f i g h t e r s from I r a n . Since 
these a i r c r a f t s were o r i g i n a l l y s u p p l i e d by USA t o I r a n 
hence i t s t r a n s f e r t o Jordan e n t a i l e d American a p p r o v a l . 
88 
Following US approval In January 1974, Iran delivered the 
aircraft to Jordan in 1975 . In early 1974, Jordan also 
placed orders with UK for the supply of 5 Scottish Aviation 
Bulldog type trainer aircrafts worth $ 353,000 which were 
delivered in June 1974. 
In February 1974, United States under Mutual Assistance 
Programme (MAP) agreed to provide 36 F-5E/F - 5B fighter 
aircraft to Jordan. Besides, United States also provided 
improved version of Hawk S-A-missiles system, Hughes TOW A-T 
missile system to Jordan during 1974. During 1976-78, 
Jordan requisitioned Bell-709 AH-IS helicopters, 4 F - 5E-
Tiger -2 trainer aircraft, one C - 130 H transport plane, 
and 4 Sikorsky S-76 helicopters from the United States. 
Besides, the United States also supplied M-48 Patton and M-
60 - AI type main battle tanks, TOW and Hawk missiles to 
0 
Jordan . The arms bu i l d -up in Jordan was accompanied by the 
US dec la ra t i ons to the e f f e c t t ha t i t was not an arms b u i l d -
up b u t m e r e l y a r e p l a c e m e n t o f e q u i p m e n t . J o r d a n ' s 
a c q u i s i t i o n o f arms d i d n o t cause much a l a r m i n t h e 
r e g i o n . The Jo rdan ian government wanted t o a c q u i r e the 
MIM- 23B Hawk s u r f a c e - t o - a i r mobile m i s s i l e system but in 
t h e end s e t t l e d f o r a f i x e d s y s t e m . I n 1979 , J o r d a n 
concluded a deal f o r 36 Mirage - 3 f i g h t e r s , b reak ing the 
pa t te rn in which the Uni ted States was v i r t u a l l y the so le 
supp l i e r of major arms. Jordan a lso ordered the p i l a t u s PC-7 
m i l i t a r y t r anspo r t from Swi tzer land in 1979 and 200 S h i r - I 
b a t t l e t a n k s , f rom UK which were o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d f o r 
I r a n . 
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During the first half of 1970s, Syria had been the 
largest customer of Soviet arms In the region. Between 1970 
and 197^, Syria Imported arms worth $ 2,320 million thus 
accounting for 25 percent of the total arms imported in the 
region. In late 1973, Syria requisitioned for 54 MIG-21 
fighters aircrafts from Soviet Union which were delivered by 
May 1974^^. According to Israeli intelligence reports, in 
late 1973, Damascus placed orders for the supply of MIG-23 
1 7 
"Flogger" fighter aircraft which were supplied by 1974"-. 
Again in late 1973, under another agreement between Moscow 
and Damascus, the former agreed to supply 25 Sukhov SU-7 
fighter / ground attack aircraft which were delivered by 
1974 to Syria. 
During 1973, Syria placed orders for the supply of SAM -
7, SAM-6, surface to air and Frog - 7 SS-I-C Scud and Styx 
type surface to surface missiles with the Soviet Union which 
were delivered in 1974. Besides, Syria also asked for the 
supply of BTR - 50 armoured personnel Carriers, T-62 battle 
tanks and ^Osa' class missile boats from Soviet Union which 
were delivered to it by 1974. Most of the weapons supplied 
by Soviet Union to Syria during 1973-74 were the replacement 
for October 1973 war. 
During the second half of the 1970s, Syria imported arms 
worth $1,170 million which accounted for about 6 percent of 
region's total imports of arms. Though Soviet Union remained 
the biggest supplier of arms to Syria during the second half 
of 1970s yet a trend towards diversification was also 
noticeable from 1975 onwards when France, West Germany, 
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Swi tzer land and I t a l y a l so entered in Syrians arms market . 
I n 1977, S y r i a o r d e r e d f o r the supply o f HOT t y p e 
Euromiss i le from France and consequently the l a t t e r supp l i ed 
138 HOT miss i les dur ing 1977 - 7 8 ' ^ . Again in 1977 S y r i a 
a lso signed another agreement w i th France f o r the supply o f 
1000 land mobile Mi lan type o f m i s s i l e s . This deal was wor th 
$ 224 m i l l i o n and France s u p p l i e d these m i s s i l e s d u r i n g 
1978-79. France a lso supp l ied AS-34 Kormoran type of a i r - t o -
sh ip m iss i l es to Sy r ia in 1979, orders f o r which were p laced 
in 1977^^. 
B e s i d e s , S y r i a a c q u i r e d AD-212 and SH-3D S e a k i n g 
he l i cop te r s from I t a l y in 1978, orders f o r which had been 
placed in 1976. Sy r i a a lso got 16 MBB - 223 K type t r a i n e r 
a i r c r a f t from Swi tzer land and 2 L - 100-20 t r a n s p o r t planes 
f rom the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 1978. Dur ing 1977-78 , S y r i a 
a c q u i r e d 12 MIG - 27 f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t , 10 M i - 8 - H i p 
h e l i c o p t e r , T-62 tanks , AT-3 sagger, SA-ga in fu l land mobi le 
s u r f a c e - t o - a i r and SA-8 Grecko and SA-9 Gaskin su r face to 
a i r m iss i l es from the Sov ie t Union. According to Stockholm 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Research I n s t i t u t e (SIPRI) f und ing f o r 
these suppl ies was done by L ibya . . 
In ear ly 1979, Sy r i a had placed orders w i t h Moscow f o r 
the purchase o f MIG-25 Foxbat - A f i g h t e r i n t e r c e p t o r 
a i r c r a f t which were d e l i v e r e d i n September 1979^^ . I n 
January 1978, Syr ia nego t ia ted a deal w i th So ivet Union f o r 
the supply of h e l i c o p t e r , T - 6 2 main b a t t l e tanks and a n t i -
tank m i s s i l e s . Funds f o r t h i s purchase were e i t h e r p rov ided 
by L i b y a or I r a q . ^ " ^ A c c o r d i n g t o I s r a e l i I n t e l l i g e n c e 
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sources, Soviet Union a lso made a v a i l a b l e to S y r i a 100 T-72 
main b a t t l e tanks , SU-22 f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t and s u r f a c e - t o - a i r 
land-mobi le m iss i l es dur ing 1979. 
I s r a e l i Weapons Acquisitions 
Arms a c q u i s i t i o n has i n v o l v e d purchases f rom f o r e i g n 
sources and product ion by I s r a e l i t s e l f . I s r a e l have been 
pu rchas ing arms f rom Western c o u n t r i e s l i k e France and 
B r i t a i n but Uni ted States remains the major arms s u p p l i e r . 
P r o - I s r a e l i lobby in the Uni ted States attempted to p r o j e c t 
I s r a e l as a v a l u a b l e s t r a t e g i c asse t f o r s a f e g u a r d i n g 
American i n t e r e s t s i n West A s i a . The m i l i t a r y l e v e r a g e 
gained by I s r a e l dur ing the June 1967 war was s k i l l f u l l y 
m a n i p u l a t e d by t h i s l a b b y i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g t h e 
c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom and p o l i t i c a l o r t hodoxy o f t he ideas 
t ha t I s r a e l could con ta in Soviet expansion in the West A s i a , 
p ro tec t "moderate" Arab Regimes from th rea ts by " r a d i c a l " 
1 O 
f o r c e s , and m a i n t a i n r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y . A c c o r d i n g to 
R u b e n b e r g , " t h e s e m i s t a k e n a s s e s s m e n t s l e d t h e N i x o n 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to supply I s r a e l w i t h a l l the s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
weapons i t des i red and to prov ide f u l l support f o r I s r a e l ' s 
r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s , w i t h o u t any e v a l u a t i o n 
r e g a r d i n g t h e c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f I s r a e l i and A m e r i c a n 
i n t e r e s t s " ^ ^ . 
Fred J . Khour i , an eminent exper t on West A s i a , a l so 
support Rubenberg's assessment, when he says : "The Un i ted 
States created such a s t rong m i l i t a r y f o rce in I s r a e l t h a t 
there was l i t t l e i ncen t i ve to make those major concessions 
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considered in Washington to be necessary for peace with the 
Arabs. In addition, the more Israel was armed by the United 
States, the more dependent Arab states became on Soviet 
military and economic aid. In short, Israel's superior 
military power, and its resulting unwillingness to make the 
concessions needed for peace, made Israel more of a 
liability than an asset in preventing the spread of Soviet 
20 power and influence in the Middle East". 
After the June 1967 war. United States started arms 
supply to Israel in response of the Soviet arms supply to 
Egypt and Syria in a big way. In 1968, on the request of 
Israel, Johnson administration agreed for the sale of 50 
Phantom Jets and 25 additional skyhawks to Israel. United 
States provided to Israel new Phantom jets that were fitted 
with a pod of Electronic Centre Measures (ECMs) which could 
enable pilots to have warning when attacked by an enemy 
missiles. Pods that were capable of not only detecting but 
also diverting oncoming missiles were also supplied. The 
U.S. administration also provided new version of Skyhawks 
bombers. The smaller and slower but highly manoeuvrable 
Skyhawks, reputed to be one of the best allround tactical 
bombers in the world, were fitted with ECM pods. With the 
help of these sophisticated aircrafts Israel was able to hit 
the Egyptian radar positiions and thus enabling the Israeli 
pilots to have almost untramelled freedom in Egyptian air 
22 space.'•'•. 
United States did not disclose officially about the arms 
supply to Israel during the war of attribution but SIPRI 
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i n i t s pub l i ca t ions e n t i t l e d ^the Arms Trade w i th the T h i r d 
W o r l d ' , c la imed t h a t the US government had p r o v i d e d t o 
I s r a e l 18 a d d i t i o n a l Phantoms, 18 a d d i t i o n a l Skyhawks, 
Shr ike a i r - t o - -su r face m iss i l es and Walleys g l i d e bombs f o r 
use against the SAMs, along w i th M-60 main b a t t l e t a n k s , 
h e l i c o p t e r s and other equipments.^ 
In August 1970, I s r a e l acqui red $ 7 m i l l i o n package of 
arms equipment i nc lud ing anti-SAM e l e c t r o n i c dev ices , s t r i k e 
m i s s i l e s and c l u s t e r bomb u n i t s wh i ch were h i g h l y 
soph i s t i ca ted and had not p rev ious ly been prov ided to any 
f o r e i g n c o u n t r y , i n c l u d i n g t h e NATO a l l i e s . On 1 
September 1970, P r e s i d e n t Nixon agreed to s e l l I s r a e l 
a t l e a s t e i g h t e e n a d d i t i o n a l F-4 Phantom J e t s , j u s t 
i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e Sena te had a p p r o v e d a m i l i t a r y 
a u t h o r i z a t i o n b i l l t h a t gave t h e P r e s i d e n t v i r t u a l l y 
u n l i m i t e d a u t h o r i t y t o p r o v i d e arms to I s r a e l w i t h US 
f i n a n c i n g . 
I n the back drop o f c i v i l s t r i f e in Jordan i n J u l y -
August 1970 i n v o l v i n g Pa les t i n ians and Jordanians f o r c e s , 
I s r a e l ex t rac ted m i l i t a r y concessions from Washington on the 
p r e t e x t of rescuing k ing Hussain of Jordan aga ins t Syr ian or 
S o v i e t a t t a c k s . C o n s e q u e n t l y on 17 September 1 9 7 0 , 
Pres ident Nixon au thor i zed $ 500 m i l l i o n in m i l i t a r y a i d f o r 
I s r a e l and a l s o a g r e e d t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e d e l i v e r y o f 
p rev ious ly promised F-4 Phantom a i r c r a f t . In the l a t e r p a r t 
o f O c t o b e r 1970 when I s r a e l i P r ime - M i n i s t e r v i s i t e d 
Washington in search o f more a i r c r a f t and a rms , she was 
assured of ass is tance worth $ 500 m i l l i o n and a f a v o u r a b l e 
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response to her arms request for 197125. And in April 1971, 
the Nixon administration announced that the United States 
was supplying Israel with additional Phantoms and 
considering a new request for more. 
Jewish lobby in United States also put pressure on the 
U.S. administration for the supply of arms to Israel. On the 
eve of the election of 1972, President Nixon agreed to 
provide 42 F-4 s and 82 A-4s planes to Israel for the 
purchase to enlist the support of the American Jewry^'. 
Kissinger also supported US arms supply to Israel and said 
that the "Soviet would have to learn that the position of 
their clients could not be improved through procrastination, 
the Arab must not win with Soviet weapons or they would 
become intractable".^ Thus Nixon administration agreed to 
provide limited arms-80 Sidewinder missiles and bombracks-to 
Israel. Israel was also assured of replacement of heavy 
equipment destroyed during the 1973 war. 
The National Security Council and the Pentagon decided 
to provide "Nickel Grass" air craft to Israel. President 
Nixon also authorized shipments of certain materials to 
Israel costing $825 million including transportation during 
1973 war. Israeli forces were also provided some major items 
which included conventional munitions of many types air-to-
air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery, standard range of 
fighter air crafts ordinance, replacements for tanks, 
aircrafts, radios, and other military equipments which had 
been lost in action.^^ At least 600 US tanks valued at sum 
$ 250 million were sent to Israel during 1973 war.During the 
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\riar the US also sent its high-flying strategic 
reconnaissance aircraft, the SR-71 over the Egyptian front. 
The information gathered by these aircrafts were a great 
help to the Israeli forces.^'' 
From 14 to 25 October 1973, the resupply effort 
delivered approximately 11,000 tonnes of military equipment 
to Israel which included 40 F-4 Phantoms, 36 A-4 Skyhawks, 
12 C - 130 transport planes and 20 tanks. From 26 October 
until 15 November 1973 another 11,000 tonnes of equipments 
were delivered to Israel by the United States^'. On 19 
October 1973, the US Congress passed emergency legislation 
making available to Israel $ 2.2 billion to pay for the new 
weapons. In this way, United States had provided massive 
military assistance to Israel in the wake of October 1973 
war. 
Post 1973 period witnessed massive arms race in the West 
Asia vis-vis U.S. arms supply to Israel. As stated by the 
former Israeli Defence Minister, Shimon Peres, 'the overall 
Israeli capability (upto mid 1976) compared with the pre-war 
levels rose by about 30 percent, its artillery by about 25 
percent, its armored personnel carriers inventory by about 
60 percent, its combat planes by about 15 percent, and its 
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war vessels by 45 percent' . 
Though the exact figure of U.S. arms transfer to Israel 
in post 1973 war is not available, however, according to 
SIPRI Year book of 1978, the following munitions were 
supplied to Israel. They are as follows : Raytheon AIM-7F, 
Sparrow Air-to-Air missiles, Raythean AIM-9L sidewinder Air-
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t o - A i r m i s s i l e s , Boe ing-Ver to l CH-47C Chinook H e l i c o p t e r s , 
"Dabur - 77" C o a s t a l p a t r o l b o a t s , Grumman E-2C A i r b o r n e 
Warning c o n t r o l system (AWACS), McDonnell - Doughlas F-15A 
Eag le F i g h t e r I n t e r c e p t o r , S i k o r s k y HH - 53C E l l n t 
He l i cop te r , Lockhead KC-130H Tanker /Transpor t , Ford M-109 
155-mm H o w i t z e r , Ford M-113 AI Armoured c a r , M c D o n a e l l -
Doughlas RGM - 84 A Harpoon Shr ike a i r - t o - g r o u n d m i s s i l e s , 
Sikorsky S-61R He l icop ter amphibious t r a n s p o r t , McDonnel l -
Douglas TF-15A Eagle Combat t r a i n e r ^ ^ . Aga in i n 1975, 
I s r a e l was provided w i th the F-15A Eagle f i g h t e r I n t e r c e p t o r 
and in 1976 AWACS a i r c r a f t was a lso promised. The rap id 
growth in American ass is tance to I s r a e l can be asce r t a i ned 
t ha t a f t e r the f i r s t three years of 1967 war, i t was $ 40 
m i l l i o n a year and in the next three years i t averaged about 
$ 400 m i l l i o n n e a r l y 28 p e r c e n t o f he r t o t a l d e f e n c e 
expendi ture and in 1974-75 i t averaged about $ 1.5 b i l l i o n 
r a i s i n g i t to 42 percent of her defence spendlngs. 
Du r i ng the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f Nixon and Ford U n i t e d 
States extended a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f arms and ammunit ion 
t o I s r a e l bo th on g r a n t and sa les b a s i s . U n i t e d S t a t e s 
supp l ied arms to I s r a e l even when there was no t r e a t y about 
arms t r a n s f e r between the two c o u n t r i e s . F i n a l l y amendment 
In Foreign M i l i t a r y Sales Act of 1968 f i n i s h e d the l e g a l 
h i n d r a n c e on arms s a l e and thus c l e a r e d t he way f o r t he 
massive U.S. arms supp ly t o I s r a e l . Du r i ng t he v i s i t o f 
I s r a e l i Prime M in i s t e r Shamir and Defence M i n i s t e r Arens to 
Washington i n November 1983, P r e s i d e n t Reagan s i g n e d an 
agreement on s t r a t e g i c coopera t ion . The accord p rov ided f o r 
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Table 2 
US Econonlc and Military Assistance to Israel. 1968 to 1980 
($ Million) 
Year Total Economic Economic Military Military Soviet 
Aid Loans Grants Loans Grants Jews 
Reset-
lement 
Funds 
1968 76.8 51.3 0.5 25.0 
1969 121.7 36.1 0.6 85.0 
1970 71.5 40.1 0.4 30.0 
1971 600.8 55.5 0.3 545.0 
1972 404.2 53.8 50.4 300.0 
1973 467,3 59.4 50.4 307.5 - 50.0 
1974 2570.7 - 50.4 982.7 1500.0 36.5 
1975 693.1 8.6 344.5 200.0 100.0 40.0 
1976 2299.4 239.4 475.0 750.0 750.0 15.0 
1977 1757.0 252.0 490.0 500.0 500.0 15.0 
1978 1811.8 266.8 525.0 500.0 500.0 20.0 
1979 4815.1 265.1 525.0 2700.0 1300.0 25.0 
1980 1811.0 261.0 525.0 500.0 500.0 25.0 
Source : The Link, Washington, December, 1982, p. 3. 
I srae l i Military Superiority : 
I n s p i t e of t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l arms s u p e r i o r i t y and t h e 
massive arms supply by the United S t a t e s I s r a e l a l s o possess 
the s u p e r i o r i t y in modern weapons. I t s m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y 
in t h e r e g i o n i s u n q u e s t i o n e d and i s l i k e l y t o remain 
u n c h a l l e n g e d . The s o u r c e s of t h i s s t r e n g t h i n c l u d e 
i m p r e s s i v e human and t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e s o u r c e s . At t h e 
o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l , t h e s p a c e programme p r o m i s e d t o 
s t r e n g t h e n I s r a e l ' s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and r e a l - t i m e C I 
(Command, c o n t r o l , c o m m u n i c a t i o n and I n t e l l i g e n c e ) 
c a p a b i l i t i e s in b a t t l e f i e l d s both near and fa r from i t s own 
bo rde r s . By the end of 1988 I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y a n a l y s t s were 
t a l k i n g inc reas ing ly about the need to s t r eng then the long-
r a n g e o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a t had e a r l i e r been 
demonstrated in the bombing r a ids in I raq in 1981 in Tunis 
in 1985, and in the Apr i l 1988 a s s a s s i n a t i o n in Tunis of the 
PLO second-in-command, Khald a l -Wazi r . 
Other elements of I s r a e l i planning for a f u t u r e long-
range engagement included the con t inu ing development of i t s 
J e r i c h o m i s s i l e programme and t h e Arrow a n t i t a c t i c a l 
b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e (ATBM) research and development programme 
on which i t was e n g a g e d in c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e US 
S t r a t e g i c Defence I n i t i a t i v e (SDI). Bui lding up I s r a e l ' s 
long-range c a p a b i l i t i e s could help prepare the country for 
a contingency in which I r a q i , Saudi or o ther c a p a b i l i t i e s 
might be committed to an a n t i - I s r a e l war c o a l i t i o n . Under 
t h i s s p a c e p r o g r a m m e , I s r a e l d e v e l o p e d i t s Ofek spy 
s a t e l l i t e s , providing I s r a e l a capac i ty to p i n p o i n t mi l i tary 
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targets all over the Arab World.^^, 
Israel posses a sophisticated missile delivery system. 
During the early 1980s, Israel developed and deployed (in 
Negev Desert and Golan Heights) the Jericho II missiles, 
which is a solid fuel missile carrying a payload of 
approximately 1650 pounds over a range of some 400 miles. In 
1989, Israel had successfully tested an intermediate range 
missile, over a distance of 800 miles. Earlier, as part of a 
package of secret commitments for new weapons to Israel 
after the 1973 war, and in exchange for Israel's withdrawal 
from Sinai and Mitla Ghidi mountain passes, and to arrive at 
the Camp David Agreement, Israel was provided with US 
Pershing I missiles. 
In the aftermath of the 1973 war, while an official 
Israeli commission was investigating the causes of the 
intelligence failure, IDF planners set about trying to 
ensure that never again would they be at a loss in dealing 
with a surprise Arab offensive. Over the five years that 
followed 1973, the standing forces were increased by about 
50 percent over their pre war level, and the reserve force 
was more than doubled. The readiness and mobility of most 
parts of the IDF were increased, and ammunition stocks were 
multiplied. Technological improvements were introduced 
across a broad spectrum of the IDF's capabilities: interarm 
coordination and other aspects of command, control, 
communication and intelligence (C^I) were upgraded to state 
of the art levels.''*^  All of these steps had required a huge 
increase in defence spending-roughly double the level of the 
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early 1970s. 
Thus, in July 1988 Defence Minister Rabin made the 
following statement •. "one of our fears is that the Arab 
world and its leaders might be deluded to believe that the 
lack of international reaction to the use of missiles and 
gases gives them some kind of legitimization to use them. 
They know they should not be deluded to believe that, 
because if they are, God forbid, they should know we 
will hit them back 100 times harder".^ 
This statement had been made with regard to Iraq's use 
(against Iran) of missiles and chemical weapons, but the 
message for Syria, constantly accused by Israeli leaders of 
building a hostile chemical weapons and missile force could 
hardly have been clearer. By September 1988 Rabin was 
expressing his confidence that "our capacity to hit the 
Syrian rear, and Syrian launch -sites, is many times greater 
than the Syrians' capacity to hit our rear." He judged that 
"Israel today has a good deterrent capability vis-a-vis the 
Arab military threat".^. 
To maintain, and enhance qualitative superiority over 
any combination of adversaries, acting as a deterrence, 
geared to war prevention, is the main base of Israeli 
military thinking, and the powerful nuclear arsenal is the 
logical offshoot of that. Israeli security doctrine is based 
on the principle that a defensive approach to security can 
be maintained only through an operative offense, that is a 
defensive strategy by means of offensive tactics. The 1973 
101 
war made it clear that Israel is prepared to launch a 
nuclear counter attack. 
(Israeli military superiority can also be seen in Israeli 
Arms Industry and Israeli Nuclear Policy). 
Israeli Arms Industry : 
The Israeli arms industry has its origins in the 
establishment of a clandestine cottage - industry known as 
"Ta'as", for making small arms and ammunition, during the 
wake of 1929 Arab-Jew riots in the mandated Palestine. Soon, 
the Ta'as started assembling tanks, armored vehicles, 
artillery and aircraft which were smuggled, piecemeal, from 
different European countries and then reassembled. After the 
establishment of Israel, production was expanded and large 
quantities of war surplus was purchased from the US, under 
the categorization of scrap. A number of aircraft engineers 
from the USA moved to Israel and established the Israeli 
Aircraft Industry (lAI). During this phase, surplus 
components of tanks, artillery, naval guns were obtained, as 
scrap, from all over the world, and refurbished. The Israeli 
arms industry turned arms grafting into a fine art by 
improvising through trial and error and manufacturing parts 
of different makes and calibre. 
The 1956 war started a different phase in Israeli 
defence weapons programme when licensed production started, 
mainly with the French collaboration. Licensed production of 
Fouga Magister Jets, and artillery was a hallmark of this 
phase as well as modifications and refurbishing of Sherman 
tanks. Mirage aircraft and gun boats. 
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The 1967 war witnessed the start of another phase of 
Israeli arms production, starting independent design and 
manufacture of major weapon systems. The largest, and most 
sophisticated projects were in the aircraft industry which 
produced the Nesher (Mirage V) aircraft and the Kfir combat 
aircraft, and started work on the Lavi fighter aircraft. In 
the armoured field, Merkawa tanks were designed and produced 
with increased mobility and with 900 HP frontal engine. 
Other major productions included Gabriel (Sea-to-sea) and 
Shafrir (air-to-air) missiles, Saar, Reshef and Dvora patrol 
boats Galil assault rifle. 
The Israeli Defence Industry is one of the main planks 
of the country's economic structure, providing it the 
technology and infrastructure for industrial growth and 
absorbing the bulk of the employment force (nearly 25%). It 
is to be remembered that, for Israeli weapons, the 
manufacturers and the end users are usually the same as the 
scientists and engineers are soldiers also, and this has 
been a formidable advantage for Israel. This industry is 
the vanguard of the technological, scientific economic 
progress of Israel. 
The Israeli military industrial sector is based on a 
mixed ownership model comprising government-owned 
corporations, e.g. Histadurt (the general federation of 
labour) Hevrat Haovdim -owned companies as well as private 
concerns (there are apparently more than 100 private owned 
companies in Israel engaged primarily in military 
production). The representatives of these sectors 
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participate in a high level national security policy making 
process. In the light of the following considerations, the 
components of the complex share responsibility for various 
spheres of activity in ensuring Israel's basic and ongoing 
security formulation. The security perception compel the 
various branches of IDF for reinforcement and prepare itself 
for any possible challenge from the hostile Arab nations. 
This objective is manifested through preference for constant 
increase in defence spending, military manpower, military 
procurement (including both military imports and local 
procurement), arms production, intelligence activities, 
preventive measures against Arab terror etc. as well as for 
granting the security system autonomy in military policy-
making and priority over any other complex or any other 
public policy. 
The core components of the Israeli military-industrial 
complex are : 
1) The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
2. The intelligence branches (such as the Mossad) 
3. The Ministry of Defence 
^. The Defence Industries (both government owned 
industries and non-governmental enterprises) 
5. Political representatives. 
Most military development and manufacturing in Israel is 
carried out in units subject to the direct or indirect 
control of the Ministry of Defence (Israel Aircraft 
Industries, Ta'as and RAFAEL) and in the IDF ordinance 
corps, the activities of which are as : 
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The A i r c r a f t Industries : 
I s r a e l ' s l a rges t manufactur ing e n t e r p r i s e , has more than 
20,000 employees and a sale turnover (1980/81) of some i s 
4 . 2 . b i l l i o n , i nc lud ing US $ 400 m i l l i o n in e x p o r t s . The 
company founded in 1953 and became a government-owned 
c o r p o r a t i o n i n 1968, and autonomously c o n t r o l l e d by t h e 
M i n i s t r y of Defence, c u r r e n t l y has f i v e separate d i v i s i o n s 
and f i f t e e n s u b s i d i a r i e s p l a n t s . Among i t s bes t known 
p r o d u c t s a re the K f i r f i g h t e r p l a n e , G a b r i e l s e a - t o - s e a 
m i s s i l e s , Dabur and Dvora m i s s i l e b o a t s , p i l o t l e s s 
reconnaissance planes, the Westwind 1124 execut ive j e t and 
the Arava t r a n s p o r t . 
I t i s u n i q u e n e s s o f some p l a n e s , l i k e A r a v a and 
Westwind, made by l A I tha t they can be used both f o r c i v i l 
and m i l i t a r y purposes. For example, the Arava 202 ve rs ion i n 
a d d i t i o n t o range per formance and f u e l e f f i c i e n c y , i s 
des igned t o per fo rm a v a r i e t y o f m iss ions i n c l u d i n g : 
parachut ing assau l t t r a n s p o r t , c a u s a l i t y evacua t ion , cargo 
p a r a d r o p , and motor conveyance as w e l l as p a s s e n g e r 
t r a n s p o r t . So is the Seascan mar i t ime p a t r o l plane d e r i v e d 
from the Westwind execut ive j e t . An a l l - w e a t h e r , long - range 
a i r c r a f t , the modi f ied Westwind is developed by the IDF and 
t he armed f o r c e s of s e v e r a l o t h e r c o u n t r i e s f o r m a r i n e 
reconnaissance, s igna l i n t e l l i g e n c e , an t i -submar ine war fa re 
or even, depending upon i t s c o n f i g u r a t i o n , as an a i r - t o - s e a 
m i s s i l e p l a t f o rm ^^. 
l A I a l so produced the ind igenously designed f i r s t K f i r 
planes in 1975. Success in under tak ing l o c a l manufacture o f 
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so s o p h i s t i c a t e d a p lane as the K f i r , t oge the r w i t h i t s 
performance in ac tua l wa r fa re , s t imu la ted the i n t e r e s t o f 
p r o s p e c t i v e customers a b r o a d . The K f i r p lane was a g a i n 
mod i f i ed as K f i r C-2, the K f i r C-7, praised by exper ts f o r 
accuracy and v e r s a t i l i t y in ground at tack as w e l l as a e r i a l 
combat. 
l A I d id not conf ine only to the av i a t i on product ion but 
i t a l s o e n t e r e d i n t o o t h e r a r e a s , p redominan t l y n a v a l 
w a r f a r e and m i s s i l e deve lopment . The most popu la r e x p o r t 
i t em manufac tu red by l A I i s the G a b r i e l M K I I I , a t h i r d 
generat ion of the combat-proven Gabr ie l m i ss i l e f a m i l y . 
As r e f l e c t e d by the I s r a e l i Navy's opera t iona l exper ience in 
1973, the Gabr ie l is a radar guided m iss i l e which can be 
launched from a i r c r a f t or sh ip to skim at low l e v e l across 
bodies of water a t an e f f e c t i v e range of 36 k i l o m e t e r s . An 
o ther advanced sea-skimming supersonic m iss i l e system s o l d 
by the l A I is the Barak, used as a defence fo r ships aga ins t 
a i r c r a f t and m i s s i l e s . O t h e r n a v a l needs met by l A I 
designers are f i l l e d by the Dvora 71 combat boat which i s 
descr ibed as a f a s t m i s s i l e c r a f t capable of se rv ing as a 
long -range p a t r o l boat or f o r Harbor po l i ce and customs 
d u t i e s , armed e s c o r t and i n - s h o r e a s s a u l t . I n t h i s same 
c a t e g o r y a re e a r l i e r mode ls , the Dabur and S h a p i r i t f a s t 
p a t r o l b o a t s , a l s o manufac tu red by the l A I , i n a c t i v e 
se rv i ce w i th the I s r a e l i navy and repor ted to be o p e r a t i o n a l 
in severa l f o re i gn navies. I t i s a lso producing a n t i m i s s i l e 
m i s s i l e s and a he l i cop te r pad capable of being assembled on 
smal l ships of 400 tons or m o r e ^ . Today, l A I ' s main p r o j e c t 
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i s the Lavie f i g h t e r plan© cos t i ng $ 11 m i l l i o n each, t h a t , 
w i l l subsequently replace the present complement of Skyhawks 
and K f i r s . 
The Mi l i t a ry Industry (Ta'as) : 
The pioneer defence indust ry in I s r a e l (founded in 1933) 
employees about 14,500 persons in 31 p l a n t s and u n i t s 
manufactur ing weapons systems and p r i m a r i l y ammunition (o f 
which Ta'as is the IDF's p r i n c i p a l s u p p l i e r ) , sales t u r n 
over in 1980/81 exceeded $ 500 m i l l i o n , i n c l u d i n g $ 300 
m i l l i o n i n e x p o r t s . Among the best known Ta 'as deve loped 
p roduc t s a re the Uzi sub-machine gun, the G a l i l a s s a u l t 
r i f l e , Hetz tank ammunition and path c l e a r i n g bombs. 
B a t t l e - p r o v e n in env i ronments rang ing f rom snow t o 
dese r t , the Uzi sub-machine gun appeals to f o r e i g n armies 
because i t is r e l a t i v e l y inexpensive, l i g h t w e i g h t and can be 
f i r e d f u l l or semi-automatic from the hip or shou lder , and 
t h e r e f o r e , is equal ly adaptable by secur i t y p o l i c e as w e l l . 
Since 1973 the Uzi has been jo ined by another IMI p r o d u c t , 
the G a l i l 5.56 mm and the G a l i l 7.62 mm assau l t r i f l e , in 
s e r v i c e t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d . G a l i l i n i t s d i f f e r e n t 
v e r s i o n , automatic or semi-automat ic , comparable in f i r i n g 
w i t h NATO ammuni t ion ( i n c l u d i n g the s h o r t - b a r r e l e d SAR 
model) can be used by any k ind of m i l i t a r y f o r c e , i n f a n t r y , 
a i r b o r n e , amphibious or armored t roops . 
R o c k e t r y i s a n o t h e r a r e a o f s p e c i a l i z a t i o n by I M I 
weapons d e v e l o p e r s . I tems s o l d abroad i n c l u d e Ar rowhead 
Che tz t a n k s s h e l l s , a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s , bomb c a r r i e r s , 
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grenades and r o c k e t p r o p e l l a n t s used in the G a b r i e l and 
S h a f r i r . The two l a t e s t items of IMI are a m u l t i p l e rocke t 
launcher which reduces re load ing t ime from f o r t y - s i x minutes 
t o o n l y f i v e m i n u t e s and an a rmour - p i e r c i n g w a r h e a d 
adaptable to the TOW an t i tank m i s s i l e capable of p e n e t r a t i n g 
the Sov ie t T - 72 tank. 
The Armament Development Authority (RAFAEL) : 
I s r a e l ' s l a rges t research and development i n s t i t u t i o n , 
w i t h more than 5000 employees, was founded i n 1958 t o 
r e p l a c e t h e IDF S c i e n c e Corps and i t s s u c c e s s o r , t h e 
D i v i s i o n o f Research and P l a n i n g . RAFAEL'S m a j o r 
developments inc lude the Shaf i r 1 , Sha f i r 2 and Python 3 
a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s , a computer f o r f i r i n g c o n t r o l o f 
a r t i l l e r y and other products . 
W i t h i n the IDF i t s e l f , r e n o v a t i o n and deve lopment o f 
weapons systems is undertaken by the Ordinance Corps, w h i l e 
Tank Admin i s t r a t i on developed and manufactured the Merkava 
(Cha r i o t ) tank in a p ro j ec t which employed 4000 persons and 
requ i red an investment of approximately $ 199 m i l l i o n . 
Ramta Structures and System : 
This i s an l A I subs id iary of Beersheba. I t manufactures 
the l i g h t armoured reconnaissance veh ic les the RAMV -1 and 
RBY MK 1 -and a 20 mm t w i n - b a r r e l e d a n t i - a i r c r a f t gun. I t 
a lso designed and b u i l t the wo r l d ' s smal les t m i s s i l e c r a f t , 
the Dvora c lass which is mainly f o r expo r t . 
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Haifa Shipyards : 
Ha i fa developed the German designed French b u i l t SAAR 
f a s t a t t a c k c r a f t and In 19 February 1973 launched t h e 
R e s h e f , f i r s t of a new 460 ton SAAR-4 c l a s s . On 11 July 1980 
the A l i a , f i r s t of a new 488 ton SAAR - 6 c lass boat was 
l a u n c h e d . Th is was capab le o f c a r r y i n g a n t i - s u b m a r i n e 
h e l i c o p t e r . Hai fa bu i lds tanks and general purpose land ing 
c r a f t s . ^ ^ 
Defence Industry in Private Sectors : 
A f t e r the June 1967 war due to over burden on the s t a t e 
defense i n d u s t r i e s , l o c a l c i v i l i a n i n d u s t r i e s were inc luded 
in m i l i t a r y manufactur ing, f o r example, about 60 per cent o f 
the Merkava p r o j e c t ' s product ion volume was c a r r i e d out in 
the c i v i l i a n s e c t o r , p r o d u c t i o n took p lace a t 30 main 
p l a n t s , w h i c h s u b c o n t r a c t i n g work u n d e r t a k e n by 
approx imate ly 200 c i v i l i a n f i r m s . C i v i l i a n concerns inves ted 
a b o u t $ 35 m i l l i o n i n d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . . 
Some non-governmental sectors e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or as sub 
- c o n t r a c t o r s a re engaged in defence manu fac tu re f o r t he 
M i n i s t r y o f Defence. Some important i ndus t r i es among them 
are : Sol tam, which manufacture p r i m a r i l y 155 mm ammuni t ion, 
l i g h t and heavy mortars and t h e i r ammunit ion, T a d i r a n , the 
IDF's main supp l i e r of communications equipment and E l b l t , 
I s r a e l ' s l a rges t manufacture of computers^^. 
The c i v i l i a n economy a i ded l A I c o n s i d e r a b l y i n t he 
d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e K f i r f i g h t e r p l a n e , w i t h some 160 
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c i v i l i a n p lants working as subcon t rac to rs . TAAS employees 
a b o u t 500 c i v i l i a n m a n u f a c t u r e r s , w h i l e RAFAEL'S 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g p o l i c y i s t o s u b c o n t r a c t as much work as 
p o s s i b l e t o c i v i l i a n p l a n t . Du r i ng 1978-79 abou t h a l f o f 
RAFAEL'S product ion budget was a l l o c a t e d f o r procurement of 
weapons subsystems f rom the o t h e r defence i n d u s t r i e s and 
from about 150 c i v i l i a n p l a n t s , p r i m a r i l y those engaged in 
m e t a l w o r k , m e c h a n i c s , e l e c t r o n i c s and i n d u s t r i a l 
en 
chemistry ". 
Israeli arms production attained vast expansion during 
1967-73 wars. Arms production expanded six fold for TAAS and 
more than two fold for the lAI, with increase in personnel 
of 200 percent and 350 percent respectively. RAFAEL boosted 
its manpower complement by 250 percent during the same 
period. Just after the 1967 war, Israeli government 
encouraged the civilian population for the production of 
arms. The foundation was laid for the manufacture of the 
Israeli fighter plane and for Markava tank and since then 
RAFAEL developed approximately 100 new products for the IDF 
Though the main reason for the expansion of the Israeli 
arms industry is due to its constant involvement in war with 
her neighbours, but French arms embargo in 1967 to the West 
Asia including Israel necessitated Israel for local 
development and production of arms, France had been Israel's 
chief source of arms during the 1950s and 1960s, having 
supplied the Mirag 3, Mystere, Super Mystere, Vatour and 
Oregan planes, super Frelon helicopters, AMX tanks and other 
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military systems. As General Israel Tal (Markava Tank 
Project Head) points out the main reason for the 
development and production of the Markava as : "Varous 
nations have always refused to sell new and modern tanks to 
Israel. With the exception of the M-60 tanks, sold to us by 
the United States in 1971, no new tanks have ever been sold 
to Israel directly from the manufacturer. This situation 
compelled the IDF to face the problem of improving and 
refitting old tanks. It thus emerged that the curse of 
refusal to sell us new tanks bore a blessing in its wake : 
We were forced to set up an infrastructure for renovation 
and adaptation of tanks and to raise generations of 
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ordinance men who are experts in tank technology". 
Moreover, cancellation of Chieftain tanks by Britain 
also compelled Israel for the local production of tanks. 
Similarly, the delay in supply of F-16 fighter planes and 
postponement of the Memorandum of Strategic Understanding 
between the USA and Israel and delay in shipment of cluster 
bombs in the wake of Operation peace for Galilee by United 
States also necessitated for the local production of arms 
and ammunition in Israel. Thus Israeli desire to act feely 
in international community without any pressure put by the 
arms providing countries like political dependence, growing 
foreign debt, policies of banning, delaying or altering the 
timing of arms shipments also compelled Israel for the local 
production of arms. 
Since 1970s, Israel emerged as major arms supplier to 
the Third World countries of Asia, Africa, Central and Latin 
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America. Israeli exports of weapon systems have included •-
spare parts of aircraft, fighter planes, electronics, patrol 
boats, missiles, (Shafrir and Gabriel), Uzi machine guns, 
assault rifles, small arms and ammunition, avionics, engine 
components and artillery. These exports have been made to 
the USA and various European countries (Britain, Austria, 
Gemany, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland) and nearly sixty 
countries from the developing/under developing world in 
Latin America (Chile, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, 
Honduras, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina) , Africa 
(South Africa, Ethiopia, Uganda, Ciskei, Ghana, Kenya, 
Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zaire, 
Zimbabwe)^^, South East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Papua _ New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Tiwan, 
Thailand, Burma)^^. Not only the advance level of Israeli 
weapons R & 0 and industrial technology has made her weapon 
system equally good, if not better, as compared to those 
from the industrialized world, Israeli systems are less 
expensive than the latter besides being repeatedly battle 
tested. This underscores the success of Israeli defence 
industry in the export market. Where as Western markets are 
viewed basically in commercial terms, the developing world 
is considered an area where Israeli strategic influence can 
be enhanced through weapon sales. 
Israeli Nuclear Policy : 
The roots of Israel's nuclear programme can be traced 
back to the political and strategic developments that took 
place in the West Asia in the immediate aftermath of the 
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1956 Suez War. Israel started from the assumption that it 
had to have an army strong enough to obtain a decisive 
victory within a few days even if the Jewish State were 
attacked simultaneously by all the Arab States combined. 
Thus, to maintain and enhance, qualitative superiority over 
any combination of adversaries, acting as a deterrence, 
geared to war prevention, is the main base of Israeli 
military thinking, and the powerful nuclear arsenal is the 
logical offshoot of that. Israeli security doctrine is based 
on the principle that a defensive approach to security can 
be maintained only through an operative offense, that is a 
defensive strategy by means of offensive tactics. The need 
for the development of nuclear weapons was also emphasized 
by President Katzir in 1974 that, "It has been our intention 
to provide the potential for nuclear development. We now 
have that potential. We will defend this country with all 
possible means at hand. We have to develop more powerful and 
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new arms to protect ourselves." 
The main purpose of the Israeli nuclear programme was to 
provide the Jewish state with a weapon of the last resort. 
It was not to function as a substitute for conventional fire 
power and was not to be used as a regular instrument for 
conducting routine foreign policy either. Rather, it would 
constitute an instrument to offset the Arabs quantitative 
superiority in a moment of extreme emergency. The Israeli 
leaders calculated that the possession of nuclear capability 
would help the Jewish state in two ways : one, as a means of 
obtaining American support against Arabs if and when the 
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Arabs were on the verge of victory in a conventional war and 
two, if the Arab armies, were even to break through the 
Israeli defences, the nuclear option could be used to 
threaten the Arab States directly. 
Israel's first nuclear reactors were supplied by France 
and foundations of Israel's military nuclear potential was 
also laid at this time*^  . Israel's nuclear cooperation with 
France was kept a tightly guarded secret until an American 
V-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographed the nuclear reactor 
being constructed in Dimona in 1960. At first Israeli 
leaders vehemently denied that it was building a nuclear 
reactor but in December 1960, the Israeli Prime Minister, 
for the first time admitted in the Knesset that a nuclear 
reactor was being constructed in Dimona. He however, 
insisted that Israeli nuclear programme was entirely for 
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peacefu l purposes . Another European country t o a c t i v e l y 
help I s r a e l , in the l a t t e r ' s nuclear weapon programme, was 
Norway . I n 1959, a g a i n s t an I s r a e l i p l e d g e t o use i t 
e x c l u s i v e l y f o r peacefu l purposes, Norway supp l ied 22 tons 
of heavy water to I s r a e l , and more than 10 tons again in 
1970 . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Norway c o n d u c t e d o n l y one 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , i n 1961, b e f o r e the Dimona r e a c t o r was 
completed and when the heavy water was s t i l l in s t o rage , and 
was s a t i s f i e d w i th i t s eventua l peacefu l use. 
The October 1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i war was a major t u r n i n g 
p o i n t in so f a r as I s r a e l ' s nuclear po l i c y is concerned. The 
war went down i n the anna ls o f I s r a e l i s t r a t e g y as a 
d i s a s t e r and a near c a l a m i t y . I t took the l i v e s o f some 
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three thousands Israeli soldiers and cost as much as the 
entire 1973 annual budget. Again, the successful Arab oil 
embargo which resulted the fourfold increase in oil prices 
enabled the Arabs to acquire arms for oil. Moshe Dayan, a 
proponent of the bomb and a powerful figure in the Israel's 
political life began to openly air his scepticism regarding 
Israel's demographic and economic ability to maintain a 
sufficiently strong deterrent posture on the basis of 
conventional weapons alone. As he declared on one occasion : 
"Israel should invest in security within the bounds of its 
economic capacity. It is not our purpose to maintain a 
conventional balance of force with all the Arab states over 
whose motives and armament programmes we have no control. We 
therefore have to put the emphasis on the IDF's quality, and 
not allow ourselves to be led into an arms race which will 
destroy our economy without necessarily ensuring our 
security. Quality and imaginative IDF solutions can preserve 
our edge over Arab quantity and not the current attempt to 
CO 
compete w i th our adversar ies quan t i t a t i ve l y . " " ' ^ 
By 1974 , t h e p ro -bomb l o b b y i n I s r a e l had become 
p reponde ran t in n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making and a 
dec is ion seems to have been taken to a c c e r l a t e e f f o r t s to 
ob ta i n access to some nuclear dev ice . Top I s r a e l i leaders 
i nc reas ing l y t a l ked of a nuclear op t ion a l b e i t i n ambiva lent 
t e r m s . For i n s t a n c e , P r e s i d e n t Eph ra im K a t z i a w h i l e 
addressing a group o f s c i e n t i s t s in 1974 sa id t h a t i t had 
a lways been the i n t e n t i o n t o p r o v i d e the p o t e n t i a l f o r 
nuc lear development. "We now have t h a t p o t e n t i a l " , he s a i d . 
"We w i l l defend t h i s c o u n t r y w i t h a l l p o s s i b l e means a t 
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hand. We have to develop more powerful and new arms to 
protect ourselves. "^ '^  Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
interviewed by British TV the same year said that Israel 
would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the 
Middle East. In the same breadth he added,"We can't afford 
to be second either" . 
A nuclear weapon testing by Israel is not confirmed but 
is believed that, in September 1979, there was a joint 
Israeli -South African nuclear test. Israel is believed to 
possess a substantial arsenal of more than 200 nuclear 
6 7 
weapons with an annual addition of five to ten weapons. 
Israel's nuclear weapons making facility at Dimona, in the 
Negev desert, produces 88 pounds of Plotunium annually, 
making it possible for Israel to build a nuclear weapons 
using 8.8 pounds of Plutonium, with a yield in the range of 
100-200 Kilotons. Simultaneously, Israel had developed an 
indigenous surface to surface missile ^Jericho' with a range 
of 1500 kilometers which could be used to deliver the bomb. 
As the nuclear programme surged ahead, hawks, within the 
Israeli political and military establishment began to demand 
that Israel should go public with the bomb. Israel, they 
argued, had no alternative but to disclose a nuclear option 
and, in fact, to turn nuclear devices from weapons of last 
resort to an integral part of the normal order of battle. 
Despite such calls, the mainstream Israeli leadership 
did not announce the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
its regular strategic posture and preferred to maintain 
their ambivalent attitude : Israel will not be the first to 
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possess a nuclear weapons or develop a nuclear reactor 
because Israel consider it a direct threat to its 
existence.As in July 1981 Israeli F -16 fighter bombers flew 
650 miles to bomb the Iraqi nuclear plant outside Baghdad 
which was capable of producing nuclear weapons within the 
next two decades. Since then, there are no Arab states with 
nuclear programmes which are likely to become even a minor 
threat to Israel. 
Israel's ambiguity regarding its nuclear policy was put 
to severe test during the 1991 Gulf War. While it is a fact 
that attacks of Scud missiles did almost paralyze the whole 
country for a number of weeks, it is interesting to note 
that these missiles were armed with conventional warheads 
instead of chemical warheads as Saddam Hussein had 
threatened. Israeli leaders had already issued stern 
warnings in August 1990, when Yitzhak Shamir declared that 
if those planning to attack Israel will dare do so, they 
will pay a terrible price. It is believed that the fear of a 
nuclear retaliation was what deterred Saddam Hussein from 
launching a chemical weapons attack on Israel. 
Israeli attitude towards the ^Nuclear non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) is that it endorses the treaty in principle and 
it even voted in favor of the UN resolution commending the 
text. Israel has, however, not signed the NPT while most of 
its Arab neighbours have done so. Israel came up with a very 
ingenious argument as to why it did not sign the NPT. 
According to Israeli leaders the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards system used to verify compliance 
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administration, the US has for the most part preferred to 
look the other way as Israel continued with its nuclear 
programme. Inspite of the knowledge that Israel had diverted 
200 tons of Uranium concentrate from Europe (in 1968) the 
Nixon Administration offered Israel peculiar NPT provisions, 
thus leaving the Dimona reactor outside the International 
Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Inspection System. The UN 
General Assembly, on 11 December, 1979, passed a resolution 
(97 to 10 with 38 abstentions) calling on Israel to open all 
of her nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections. The US voted 
against the Resolution. All this had happened at a time 
when (in 1976) the C.I.A. had confirmed to the U.S. 
government that Israel was in possession of ten to twenty 
fully developed nuclear weapons. Successive American 
governments since the time of Nixon administration have 
simply accepted the Israeli official position that Israel is 
not engaged in manufacturing a nuclear weapon and that it 
will not be the first to introduce such weapons in the 
region. It may also be pointed out here that given the 
strategic value of Israel's ambiguous posture, it is 
extremely unlikely that the American government can force 
Israel to sign the NPT, no matter how strong the pressure it 
exerts.^^ 
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Chapter -4 
Israel and the 
Palestinians 
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS 
The Arab-Israeli conflict has become the most endemic of 
all regional conflicts in the world today. Its beginnings 
reach back a hundred years, when political Zionism initiated 
a drive, in the 1890s, to establish a Jewish state In 
Palestine to be achieved by massive Jewish immigration and 
colonialization under the sponsorship of European powers. 
Historically, by 640 AD the whole area of what is now 
known as Palestine came under the rule of the Muslim Arabs 
who originated in the Arabian peninsula. During the Muslim 
rule an overwhelming majority of Palestine's inhabitants 
became Arabized and embraced Islam. A minority of the 
populace remained Christian. Between 1099 and 1291, 
Palestine was ruled by the European Crusaders. The Crusaders 
were driven out of Palestine in 1291 by the Muslim 
Mamelukes, who ruled from Cairo. The Mameluke rule came to 
an end in 1516 with the conquest of Palestine by the Ottoman 
Turks. The Ottoman rule of Palestine came to an end in 1918 
when the Allied forces occupied the country and acquired 
Palestine and Trans Jordan as mandates of the League of 
Nations. 
Until the 1880s, the Jewish settlement in Palestine was 
basically religious, Arab attitude towards the non-zlonlst 
Jewish community was tolerant, and the relations between the 
Arab people and the Jewish community were good. Unlike the 
Zionist Jews, who claimed Palestine as a Jewish national 
home, the old Jewish community did not display any interest 
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in political self-government. With the continuous Jewish 
immigration and settlement in Palestine which started in the 
latter part of the 19th century and which increased the 
ratio of the Jews to the total Palestine, population, Arab 
antagonism against the Zionist settlers became discernible^. 
In 1915 and 1916, letters were exchanged between Sharif 
Husayn of Mecca, spokesman of the Arab national cause, and 
Sir Henry McMahan, the British High Commissioner for Egypt, 
on the terms for Husayn's entering into an alliance against 
the Turks, the allies of Germany and Britains enemy. In a 
letter dated 24 October 1915, McMahan pledged, on Britain's 
behalf, to recognize the independence of the Arabs in areas 
other than the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, 
portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of 
Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, and in areas in which 
Britain was free to act without detriment to France's 
interests. *• 
On the basis of McMahan's pledges, the Arab revolt 
against the Turks started on 5 June 1916. It had a 
considerable military significance. The Arab forces 
prevented a sizable number of Turkish troops and supplies 
from reaching Higaz and protected the right flank of the 
Allied forces as they engaged the Turks in Palestine. The 
Arab forces also undermined the German moves to make the Red 
Sea a submarine base. As a result of the Arab revolt, the 
call by the Ottoman Sultan for a Muslim holy war against the 
Allies did not appeal to the people in the territories under 
Allied control.^ 
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On 16 May 1916, Britain, France and Russia secretly 
concluded the Sykes - Picot Agreement, which provided, among 
other things, that when the Ottoman Empire was defeated, the 
ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine would be placed under 
British control and the rest of the country would be under a 
special international regime. 
The Allies were hard pressed in 1916 by the Germans. In 
the spring of 1917, a number of Jewish leaders occupied 
influential positions in the new Russian Duma. Hoping to 
encourage these leaders to keep Russia in world war I, 
Britain sought to placate the Zionists. The apathy of a 
sizable portion of the US Jews towards the war, even after 
the American administration decided to enter it on the 
Allies' side, was a source of concern for Britain. The 
German Government was making efforts to win the support of 
German and world Jews. By placating the Zionists, Britain 
aimed to alienate the Jews of Central Europe towards the 
Central Powers. Some senior British officials were 
influenced by Zionist arguments that a Jewish Palestine 
would enhance Britain's strategic and economic interests in 
the West Asia. Additionally, Britain sought to win the 
support of the French Zionists in getting France's agreement 
to alter the Sykes-Picot Agreement so that Britain could 
acquire Palestine for herself. All these factors produced 
the Balfour Declaration issued on 2 November 1917, which 
Viewed with favour the establishment of a Jewish national 
home in Palestine', while affirming that ^nothing shall be 
done which will prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
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existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine'.4 
The Arab population of Palestine, both Muslim and 
Christian, which the Balfour Declaration referred to as 
^non- Jewish communities', amounted in 1918 to 644,000 
persons, whereas the Jews numbered about 56,000 and owned 2 
percent of the entire land of Palestine ., According to the 
1922 census, Palestine's population totaled 752,048 persons, 
of whom 589,177 persons, or 78.4 percent were Muslims, 
71,464 or 9.5 percent. Christians, 83,790 or 11.1 percent 
Jews and 7,617 or 1 percent, others. Except for a few 
thousand persons, all the non-Jewish population was Arab. . 
In the years immediately following World War I, there 
were several opportunities for Palestinians to express their 
desire for independence rather than rule from abroad. For 
example, in 1919 President Wilson appointed the King-Crane 
Commission to ascertain the political preferences of the 
people of Greater Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia and to 
make recommendations to the Paris Peace Conference. After 
meeting with a variety of groups in June, July and early 
August, the commission reported that there was strong Arab 
support for independence, consistent with the promises of 
the Hussain-McMahan correspondence. On the other hand, it 
stated, there was tremendous resistance to the possibility 
of the French being granted a mandate over the region. The 
United States or Britain was preferred as the mandatory 
power If independence was to be denied. 
These recommendations, however, were not made in time to 
be considered by the Paris Peace Conference, nor do they 
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appear to have carried weight when the San Remo Conference 
of April 1920 met to finalize a settlement with Turkey and 
to allocate mandatory responsibility in the Levant. To the 
contrary, the San Remo Conference endorsed the idea of the 
Jewish homeland and instructed the British administration in 
Palestine to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable 
conditions and .... (to encourage) close settlement by Jews 
on the land". Despite this statement of support the 
conference did not accept the World Zionist Organization's 
recommendation for a state of Israel in all of Palestine as 
well as parts of Jordan and Lebanon. In making their 
decision, the European powers were motivated less by 
overwhelming support of Jewish nationalism on its own merits 
than by an awareness of how such a Western enclave could be 
valuable to European interests. On 22 July 1922, Britain was 
confirmed as mandatory power by the Council of the League 
of Nations. Article 4 of the mandate provided for the 
recognition of a Jewish agency for Palestine to cooperate 
with the mandatory power In creating a Jewish national home. 
It added that the Zionist Organization shall be 
recognized as such agency. . 
The early 1930s saw a number of additional commission 
reports, white papers, and private letters, all designed to 
clarify the British role in Palestine and the balance 
between Palestine and Zionst claims. For example, the Shaw 
and Hope-Simpson reports, written in response to the 1929 
riots, condemned the Jewish policy of excluding Palestinians 
labour from Jewish lands and suggested that the principal 
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causes of the riots and other disturbances were Palestinians 
fears of continuing Jewish immigration, concerns about their 
economic future, and disillusionment at the failure of 
Britain to support Palestinian national aspirations. 
In 1936 the Peel Commission was sent to Palestine to 
assess the options available to the British to deal with 
this increasingly intractable situation. In its report, 
issued 7 July 1937, the commission acknowledged that Jewish 
immigration to Palestine had political as well as economic 
dimensions to be dealt with — a direct con-tradiction of 
the British approach since 1922. This constituted an 
acknowledgment by Britain that the achievement of Jewish 
nationalist aspirations in Palestine was of necessity 
prejudicial to the rights of the indigenous Palestinian 
population. The commission recommended the partition of 
Palestine into a Jewish state and a Palestine area to be 
merged with Trans Jordan. This was precisely the solution 
the Palestinians had feared all along and this report set 
off the second stage of the Palestinian Revolt in the fall 
of 1937. The Zionist Congress meeting of 1937 also rejected 
the partition plan as presented. Zionists argued that the 
proposed Jewish state was too small, that Jews had an 
inalienable right to settle anywhere in Palestine, and that 
Britain should pay for the transfer of all Palestinians from 
the territory of the new Jewish state to the Jordan Valley 
and the Beersheba district. 
The fundamental issues that had led to the Palestinian 
Revolt were not resolved by the Peel Commission's proposals. 
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Thus, Britain decided to invite representatives of the 
Jewish Agency, the Arab countries, and the Palestinians to a 
round-table conference in London to be held in March 1939. 
The purpose of the conference was to develop a position on 
Palestine acceptable to all parties. The involvement of the 
Arab States reflected the increasing internationalization of 
the Palestine conflict. The Conference was a failure, 
however, because of the incompatibility of the goals of 
Zionists and Arabs. When it became clear that the conference 
was dead locked, Britain issued its own policy statement on 
17 May 1939 known as Mac Donald White Paper, which concluded 
that the partition plan proposed by the Peel Commission and 
by a 1938 Partition Commission was also unworkable. 
On the outbreak of World War II the Arabs and Jews 
decided not to embarrass the British government and seized 
all acts of violence. As attested by the Palestine 
government, the Arabs of Palestine demonstrated their 
support of democracy at the outbreak of war, and there were 
spontaneous appeals in the Arab press to Arabs to rally to 
the side of Great Britain and set aside local issues, acts 
of terrorism were roundly condemned. While Arab notables 
called on the High Commissioner to assure him of their 
loyalty^. It was latter admitted that the British government 
was thus "able to build up the comprehensive military 
organisation based in Cairo which served them so well". 
The Jews in Palestine also unanimously agreed to out aside 
their opposition to British policy in Palestine and 
demonstrated their loyalty to the cause of the democracies. 
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The f i r s t t h r e e y e a r s o f t h e war w e r e , h o w e v e r , 
p r o f i t a b l y used by the Z i on i s t in t h e i r plans f o r P a l e s t i n e . 
I n May 1942 , a C o n f e r e n c e o f A m e r i c a n , Eu ropean and 
Pa les t i n i an Z i o n i s t was held a t B i l tmore Hote l o f New York 
c i t y which o u t r i g h t l y re jec ted the B r i t i s h orders to l i m i t 
t h e i n f l u x o f Jews i n P a l e s t i n e . I t demanded t h e 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an u n d i v i d e d J e w i s h s t a t e . I n t h e 
meanwhile Z i o n i s t t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s acce le ra ted t h e i r ac t 
or subve rs i on and t e r r o r i s m . In 1947 a t t he h e i g h t o f 
Z i o n i s t a c t s o f t e r r o r i s m and s a b o t a g e t h e M a n d a t o r y 
government made one l a s t a t t e m p t t o s e t t l e the P a l e s t i n e 
problem by suggest ing to both Arabs and Jews t h a t B r i t i s h 
t r us teesh ip over Pa les t ine should cont inue f o r another f i v e 
years w i th the declared ob jec t of p repar ing the count ry as a 
whole f o r independence . 
The Arabs presented t h e i r own proposals f o r independence 
w i t h g u a r a n t e e f o r Jew ish m i n o r i t y r i g h t s w h i c h were 
unacceptable to the B r i t i s h government, the Jewish agency on 
the other hand re jec ted the governments proposals o u t r i g h t 
and i n t e n s i f i e d i t s t e r r o r i s t and sabotage a c t i v i t i e s . 
On 18 F e b r u a r y 1947 t h e B r i t i s h F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y 
announced i n t h e House o f Commons t h a t H i s M a j e s t y ' s 
government had found t h a t " t h e Mandate has p roved t o be 
unworkable in p r a c t i c e tha t the o b l i g a t i o n s undertaken to 
1 2 the two communities had been shown to be i r r e c o n c i l i a b l e " ' ^ 
and t h e r e f o r e , announced i t s i n t e n t i o n to g i v i n g i t up. In 
despera t ion , the B r i t i s h government handed i t s mandate over 
P a l e s t i n e back t o the League o f N a t i o n s ' s u c c e s s o r s , t he 
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United Nations to decide its status. 
Exposed to heavy Zionist and U.S. pressure, the United 
Nations Special Committee recommended, in September 1947, a 
partition of Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, 
and an international zone of the Jerusalem area. No specific 
plans were taken by the Palestine Arabs or by the Arab 
Governments to prevent the implementation of these 
recommendations. Arab guerrillas were defeated by the 
offensive of the Jewish forces in April 1948, and the major 
Arab towns and areas were occupied by the Jewish military 
units before the British officially withdrew from 
Palestine'^. On 14 May 1948, the National Council, 
representing the Palestine Jewish community, declared Israel 
as an independent state. The Council decided to act as a 
provisional Council of State. The Jewish Agency Executive 
(JAE), which served as the cabinet of the Jewish state in 
the making, was designated by the Council as the Provisional 
government of the new state. . 
Fighting followed between Israel and the Arab armies of 
the neighbouring Arab countries of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon. When the armistice agreements were signed in 1949 
between Israel and these countries,over 80 per cent of 
Palestine had been taken over by the Israelis, leaving about 
20 percent of Palestine, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 
in Egyptian and Jordanian hands respectively. After May 
1948, Jewish immigration into Palestine continued. Unlike 
the period before 1948, when almost all the Jewish 
immigrants came from Europe, specially Eastern Europe, large 
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numbers of Jewish immigrants started coming from the Middle 
East and North Africa. 
Of the total Palestinian population of approximately 
900,000 people, only 120,000 to 150,000 remained in what 
became Israel after the 1948 war. These Palestinians, who 
lived mostly in the Gallillee, the Little Triangle region, 
and the Negev, were viewed by Zionist leaders as a threat to 
the internal security of Israel and as a hindrance to the 
achievement of a fully Jewish state. At the same time, 
Israel's position in the world community depended in part on 
its image as an outpost of democracy in a nondemocratic Arab 
world. Israel's solution was to grant citizenship to the 
remaining Palestinian population, but then to place under 
military control most of the towns and villages in which 
Palestinians lived. These regulations meant Palestinians had 
to obtain permission to travel in or out of a security area, 
their economic activities were restricted their property 
could be seized, and they were subject to arrest or even 
expulsion for political reasons. The Israeli policy also 
served to isolate the Palestinian citizens from the rest of 
the Arab World. In addition, the Israeli government passed 
new rules that further constricted the economic and 
political position of Palestinians. The 1950 Law for the 
Acquisition of Absentee Property, for example, said that any 
person who had left his or her usual place of residence at 
any time between 29 November 1947 and 1 September 1948 for 
any place outside of Jewish control was considered an 
absentee person whose property could be confiscated and 
placed under the control of the custodian of absentee 
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property. This was true even if the person had left home 
only for a short period of time to avoid the fighting, had 
returned immediately thereafter, and was a legal resident of 
the state (a present absentee). Further more, once property 
was declared absentee property, this status would remain in 
force, even if it could later be proved that the property 
had been classified incorrectly. 
A second set of regulation, known as Emergency Articles 
for the exploitation of uncultivated areas, was often used 
in connection with the Absentee Property Law. The emergency 
articles allowed the agriculture ministry to take over any 
land not cultivated for the previous three years. A common 
tactics was to declare an area formed by Palestinians a 
closed military zone so that no Palestinians was allowed to 
enter it. After the three-years period had elapsed, the 
land could then be declared uncultivated and could be 
confiscated and turned over to the department of 
agriculture. In addition, the finance minister had the 
authority to confiscate land "for public purposes." 
Once the Palestinians began to recover and to attempt to 
organize themselves,their efforts were suppressed by the 
Israeli military administration that controlled every facet 
of Palestinians life. Throughout the 1960s, Palestinians 
protested against the military administration, which was 
finally abolished in 1966. This did not mean, however, that 
Palestinians were fully equal citizens of Israel. There were 
and remain significant differences in the educational and 
social service funding for Palestinian villages, many 
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employment possibilities, particularly in the leading 
sectors of the economy such as the military-industrial 
complex, are closed to them, and as non-Jews who are not 
allowed to serve in the military, numerous benefits only 
available to those with military service or religious 
exemptions are denied to them. 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
By the mid 1960s there was a growing belief among 
Palestinians that they would have to take control of their 
own political future, as neither the international community 
as a whole nor the Arab states appeared willing or able to 
assist Palestinian self-determination efforts. The Arab 
states had their own problems, and although they frequently 
were rhetorically supportive of the Palestinian cause, few 
were willing to take political risks on behalf of the 
Palestinians. 
At the beginning of 1964, however, the situation for the 
Palestinians began to change. The Change came with the 
decision by the council of the Arab League to form a shadow 
Palestinian entity -- the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), which under Nasserite influence, was intended to be a 
docile expression of the Palestinian national consciousness 
that could divert Palestinians from any movement that might 
be seeking to express an independent stance. The Arab League 
set up the PLO under the leadership of Ahmad Shukairy, and 
agreed to establish a Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), to be 
formed on the lines of a conventional army, and to be under 
the control of the various states in which its contingents 
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were to be placed. 
On January 1, 1965, Yasser Arafat announced the 
formation of Al-Fatah. It had a majority on the Executive 
Committee of the PLO and a majority in the National 
Assembly. In 1969 Arafat became Chairman of the PLO. The 
PLO was a coalition of eight Palestinian groups all having 
the objective of establishing an independent state of 
Palestine. The largest group within the PLO was Al-Fatah led 
by Arafat which for long formed well over 80 percent of the 
PLO's guerrilla fighting strength, over the other groups. 
All the organizations under the PLO umbrella were actually 
pro-Soviet and had received massive aid from Moscow in arms 
training and political support. Moscow also recognized the 
PLO officially in 1976 and a PLO office opened in Moscow 
which was eventually promoted to full diplomatic status in 
1981. ^ ^ 
Since the late 1960s, the PLO has developed an elaborate 
bureaucratic structure with virtually all the elements of a 
functioning government. This has allowed it to meet at least 
some of the economic and social service needs of the 
scattered Palestinian people. With its observer status at 
the United Nations and its membership in the Arab League,the 
PLO has served as the official voice of Palestinian people 
in the international arena, providing the coherent, unified 
policy statements lacking since the 1930s. 
There are four main political and resistance movements 
with in the PLO : Fateh, the Popular Front for Liberation of 
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Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (DFLP), and the Palestine Communist Party 
(PCP). Fatah was created in the late 1950s by young 
Palestinian activists, including Yasir Arafat, living in 
Kuwait and Gulf. Since gaining a position of dominance with 
in the PLO in 1969 Fateh has developed a significant 
political component in additions to its military dimension. 
Since its inception, Fateh has remained independent of 
control by any Arab government and has emphasized 
Palestinian independence ahead of other goals such as Pan -
Arabism. It is first and foremost a nationalist group. 
Beyond this, it does not have a distinctive ideological 
position, although the majority of its supporters are 
moderates and conservatives rather than progressives, and it 
tends to link itself with the more traditional Arab states. 
Fateh, also has a policy of restricting the armed struggle 
in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
emerged out of the Arab National Movement (ANM), which was 
established in Beirut around 1950 and was closely identified 
with Nasserism after 1954. The PFLP was created in December 
1967 by Palestinians, including Christian physician George 
Habash, who had been involved in the ANM since its inception 
and shared its Pan - Arab, leftist orientation and its 
opposition to conservative or reactionary Arab regimes. In 
the Past the PFLP argued that the Palestinian liberation 
would be achieved only in the context of wide spread 
political change in the Arab world, although more recently 
it has deemphasized this as a necessary connection. The PFLP 
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has consistently supported the formation of a democratic 
secular state in Palestine. 
The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine was 
created in 1969 when a Jordanian, Nayif Hawatmeh , a 
Christian like George Habash, broke away from the PFLP. The 
reasons for the split were complex, but one factor was 
Hawatmeh's men's objections to the PFLP's dramatic military 
operations out side of mandatory Palestine, such as the 
plane hijackings in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Like the 
PFLP, the DFLP is left-wing, with an emphasis on grassroots 
mobilization. From its beginning, the DFLP advocated 
establishing a democratic Palestinian state in which the 
rights of Arabs and Jews to express their national cultures 
would be respected. This differed slightly from Fateh's 
early idea of a democratic secular state as it reflected, an 
acceptance of a distinctly Jewish national identity and lead 
in 1974 to the Palestine National Council's (PNC) advocacy 
of a Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza alongside 
the State of Israel. 
In addition to these three resistance organizations --
which, with the "independent" members, formed the core of 
both the PNC and the PLO Executive Committee in the 1970s 
and 1980s -- there are a number of additional groups of 
varying strength and popularity. The most important of 
these, the Palestine Communist Party, has had an autonomous, 
well organized leadership inside the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip for many years. The Communists were a key underground 
opposition force against the Jordanians in the West Bank and 
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against the Egyptians in Gaza prior to 1967, and they played 
a significant role in opposing the Israeli occupation of 
these areas after 1967. Particularly skilled at 
organizational activities, the PCP has been involved in 
trade unions and other institutions and has consistently 
opposed extremists political demands and tactics. Its 
strength was acknowledge when it was brought into the PLO 
Executive Committee at the eighteenth PNC meeting in 1987. 
There are several smaller Palestinian groups, including 
Syrian-controlled Saiqa, the Iraqi-affi1iated Arab 
Liberation Front (ALF), the tiny Libyan-Supported Popular 
Palestinian Struggle Front (PPSF), founded by Bahjat Abu 
Gharbiyya (who died in 1989) and the Palestinian Liberation 
Front (PLF). A fifth group, the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine -- General Command (PFLP-GC), was 
established in 1968 by Ahmed Jabril as a breakaway from the 
PFLP. Although the PFLP - GC is small, its involvement in 
numerous terrorist actions and consistent rejectionist 
policies have damaged the Palestinian national movement in 
the eyes of many in the West. Jabril,who is extremely 
hostile towards Arafat, was expelled from the PLO at the 
seventeenth PNC meeting and the PFLP-GC is not represented 
in the PLO Executive Committee. 
The Palestinians have never governed themselves, nor 
have they even had a strong and cohesive leadership. The PLO 
formed, a coalition which was based on ideological 
differences. Divisions are deeply rooted among different PLO 
groups. Twelve or more organizations are working for one 
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r e v o l u t i o n . This may be, a r i t h e m e t i c a l l y encouraging but 
c r e a t e s an e n d l e s s l y f r u s t r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n . Abu l y a d has 
s t a ted t h a t , "we had twelve o rgan iza t i ons which meant twe lve 
leadersh ips , twelve d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i e s and twelve guns 
p o i n t i n g in twelve d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s , from a l l t h a t our 
i l l s grew." . 
However, the a f t e r m a t h o f the 1967 A r a b - I s r a e l i war 
wi tnessed the sudden growth of Pa les t i n i an armed r e s i s t a n c e 
i n the West As ia and f rom 1968 to 1972 the P a l e s t i n i a n s 
became i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s in the A r a b - I s r a e l i 
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conflict. Since the 1967 war, or to be more precise 
since large scale guerrilla activity began in the spring of 
1969, the rate of Israeli casualties both military and 
civilian have noticeably risen. The total Israeli casualties 
for the period between June 1967 to July 1969 amounted to 
1952 but fatalities are listed as only 401.'^ 
It was thought that guerrilla warfare if escalated 
might pose a challenge which the Israeli army would find 
difficult to tackle. The Fedayeen found it difficult to 
carry out operations across the Jordan River because of 
Israeli security measures. Israeli agricultural settlements 
were concentrated at many points along the Jordan River, 
entrenchment had taken a different from, the main advance 
line of defence consisted of electronic fences, watchtowers, 
minefields and mobile patrols. Helicopters and armed units 
operating from behind the advance positions formed the main 
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striking force against guerrilla attacks. 
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adjustment of its long term objective liberating all of 
Palestine to the narrower objective of establishing a West 
Bank -- Gaza State. 
Hence, the PLO has been challenged by religious elements 
within its territories. The Islamic movement has been 
critical of the PLO's search for a diplomatic solution to 
the Palestinian question. It considered the PLO's quest for 
a political solution as "a liquidation of the Palestinian 
question", and departure from military struggle. Islamic 
advocate have stated that they would oppose the initiation 
of any dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
Thus, from an Islamic religious view, the Arab-Israeli 
conflict allows no room for compromise. The followers of the 
Islamic movement are adamant about not recognizing Israel or 
dealing with it even if the PLO should authorize such a 
move. They believe that there is no room for reconciliation 
with the Jewish state, and confrontation with Israel should 
be total and comprehensive, and Israel should be fought with 
all available means. . 
The Islamic youth movement in the Occupied Territories 
consist of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Tahrir, the pro-
Khomeini group, the pro-Fatah Muslim group and Al D'wa Wal 
Tabligh. All these Islamic groups aim at reconstructing 
Islamic society and creating an Islamic state . Since the 
outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in 1987 fundamentalist 
have become increasingly important political forces. The two 
main groups are the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas, 
literally "Zeal") and Islamic Jihad, both being underground 
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groups who c a l l f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n of Mandatory P a l e s t i n e 
as a n a t i o n a l home land and p u b l i c l y r e j e c t i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
i n i t i a t i v e s on exchanging land f o r peace. Both have t h e i r 
s t ronges t support in the Gaza S t r i p . Although Hamas i s an 
o f f s h o o t o f t h e M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d , i t has g a i n e d 
s i g n i f i c a n t ground in the West Bank. 
W h i l e t h e PLO r e t a i n e d m a j o r i t y s u p p o r t among 
P a l e s t i n i a n s , Hamas appeared to have ga ined g r o u n d . I n 
e l e c t i o n s f o r the UN Re l i e f and Works Agency (UNRWA) S t a f f 
Counc i l in the Gaza S t r i p in mid 1990 Hamas won 15 out o f 27 
sea ts . I t s e l e c t i o n success and i t s claims of growing appeal 
i n t h e West Bank and Gaza p a r t i c u l a r l y among the young 
emboldened Hamas in mid 1990 to demand between 40 and 50 
percent of the seats on the Pa les t i n i an Nat iona l Counc i l and 
the PLC's Permanent - i n - e x i l e as a p recond i t i on f o r J o i n i n g 
the PLO, i t s o ther demands are the PLC's r e j e c t i o n o f any 
r e s o l u t i o n shor t of the f u l l re tu rn of mandatory P a l e s t i n e , 
a r e t u r n to the m i l i t a r y s t rugg le in the form of J ihad or 
holy war to l i b e r a t e Pa les t ine and r e f r a c t i o n of a l l recent 
concess ions i n c l u d i n g r e c o g n i t i o n o f I s r a e l ' s r i g h t t o 
e x i s t . The PLO re jec ted the demands. In l a t e 1990 I s r a e l i 
s e c u r i t y f o r c e s c racked down on both Hamas and the PLC, 
hundreds were a r res ted many others were wounded or k i l l e d in 
the f i g h t i n g ^ ^ . 
Most p e o p l e a s s o c i a t e t h e P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n 
O r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i t s m i l i t a r y branches : t he P a l e s t i n e 
L i b e r a t i o n Army and the m i l i t i a f o r c e s . I n f a c t , the m i l i t a r y 
d imens ion i s on l y one p a r t o f a l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t 
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f u n c t i o n s i n many ways as a g o v e r n m e n t - i n - e x 1 l e . The 
l e g i s l a t i v e body of the Pa les t in ians the Pa les t i ne N a t i o n a l 
C o u n c i 1 , c o m p o s e d o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m r e s i s t a n c e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , unions and popular o r g a n i z a t i o n s , as w e l l as 
" i n d e p e n d e n t s " who are not a f f i l i a t e d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r 
group. The PNC is the supreme a u t h o r i t y f o r the PLO and is 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c r e a t i n g g e n e r a l p o l i c y g u i d e l i n e s . Two 
t h i r d s of i t s members must be present f o r a quorum to e x i s t , 
and dec is ions are made on the basis of simple m a j o r i t y r u l e . 
The PNC has met severa l t imes in the past . I n i t s session 
h e l d on 12-15 November 1988, i t d e c l a r e d f o r t h e 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an independent P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and 
a c c e p t e d UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n s 242 and 338 
i m p l i c i t l y recogn iz ing the State of I s r a e l . 
The l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n s of the PNC are complemented by 
the Cen t ra l C o u n c i l , es tab l i shed In 1973, and the f i f t e e n -
members Execut ive Committee (Cab ine t ) , which is e l e c t e d by 
s e c r e t b a l l o t d u r i n g the PNC mee t i ngs . These bod ies a re 
respons ib le f o r Implementing the po l i cy d i r e c t i v e s of the 
PNC and, in the case o f the Execut ive Committee, a l so handle 
the day to day running of the government. Each member o f 
t he E x e c u t i v e Committee has a s p e c i f i c p o r t f o l i o t h a t 
corresponds to a department of government, such as h e a l t h , 
educa t i on , p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s , p lanning and the P a l e s t i n e 
N a t i o n a l Fund. Through these depa r tmen t s , t he P a l e s t i n e 
L i b e r a t i o n Organ iza t ion provides s o c i a l , economic, m e d i c a l , 
c u l t u r a l and other serv ices to the Pa les t i n ians l i v i n g under 
I s r a e l i occupat ion or in e x i l e . 
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The Jerusalem Issue : 
The city of Jerusalem holds a special importance among 
the occupied territories because some of the holiest places 
of Muslims, Christian and Jews are situated in it. 
Historically, demographical and culturally it has been an 
Arab city. People of all religions have been freely visiting 
it through the centuries. The 1949 armistice line drove 
through Jerusalem in a north-south direction. The old, 
walled city and a few areas to the north of it remained in 
Arab, and Jewish suburbs became part of Israel. In June 1967 
the old city was captured by the Israeli army and three 
weeks later it was annexed by the Government. 
The numerous invasions, conquests, war and armies that 
have attacked, deported from it many nations and monarch who 
made it their capital starting from 300 B.C. until today, 
reflect the political struggle of the different powers to 
dominate this city. This struggle was not limited to the 
regional powers but included many armies coming from outside 
the areas. The history of holy city can be traced : 
The Jebusites after the son of the Arab Canaaite tribes, 
that had emigrated from the Arabian peninsula, had built 
"Uru-Shalam," the name given to Jerusalem and signifying 
^house of peace'. From this time of the Arab king Malki 
Sadik in the nineteenth century BC, the city experienced 
tremendous growth. It was the period of Abraham and the 
third dynasty in Egypt. The Pharaohas maintained trade and 
political relations with all the countries of the region, 
and Egypt had a profound influence on the land of Canaan. 
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Jersulem subsequently passed under the Amerite dynasty 
and it was not until the thirteen century BC that the 
Amerite kingdom was attacked by the Jews under the command 
of Joshua. The king of Jerusalem at the time was Adoni 
Sadik and was allied with four minor kings of the land of 
Canaan. The battle went in Jashua's favour and the five 
kings were put to sword. But Jersualem did not fall into the 
hands of the invader. 
For more than three centuries after the reign of 
Joshua,the attacks against Jerusalem continued ceaselessly 
as it was not until the year 1000 BC that David entered 
Jerusalem through cunning more than through conquest since 
he had previously been in the service of the Amerite kings 
and had learned their methods of combat. Having become King 
of Israel, after the death of Saul, David achieved 
resounding victories against the Philistines. He chose for 
himself another capital. Jerusalem was, infact, invaded and 
3 1 destroyed eighteen times in the course of its history. 
Its Canaanite and, therefore, Arab population remained and 
constituted the majority. David and King Soloman were unable 
to Judaize this city. The king Soleman built the temple 
which bears his name. 
The Pharaoha o f the twen ty - second dynas ty began to 
a t tack Judaea a f t e r the death of Soloman in 931 BC . Then 
came the tu rn of Assy r ians , the Persians and o t h e r s . The 
Kingdom of I s r a e l enjoyed peace f o r only seventy y e a r s , and 
e x p e r i e n c e d the v i c i s s i t u d e s o f f o r t u n e u n t i l i t s f i n a l 
c o l l a p s e . A f t e r many w a n d e r i n g s , d i s a s t e r s and t h e 
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deportation of Israelite kings and leaders, particularly to 
Babylon, Persia and Mesopotamia, Jerusalem was captured by 
the Assyrian King Nabukhadnezar in the sixth century BC. Its 
king was deported, his sons were beheaded and the temple of 
Soleman was destroyed in 587 BC, The population was also 
deported to Babylon. Thus, the Kingdom of Israel and that of 
Judaea collapsed in a part of historical Palestine. 
After reconquering Jerusalem, Cyrus, the king of Persia 
in 539 BC, permitted the Jews to return to Jerusalem and 
assisted them to invade Egypt. In 323 BC, the Greeks 
invaded Palestine and reached Jerusalem. All attempt to 
Hellinize the country by Alexander the Great went in vain 
and Canaanite heritage, culture and language prevailed in 
the country. The Greeks were succeeded by the Romans who 
occupied Jerusalem in the year 63 BC. A period of semi-
independent rule followed with Arab ruler in the Edomites, 
the Msccabaniens etc. 
During the fairly early days of Roman rule, Jesus Christ 
appeared and proclaimed his Gospel. Although this is 
regarded by the Jews as a continuation and a development of 
Judaism, he preached alternatively and, therefore was 
strongly opposed by them, which led to his persecution trial 
and execution. The attitude of the Canaanites and other 
local people was much different and many of them accepted 
the new religion. The Roman general Titus finally ended the 
Jewish presence in Jersualem, plundered their property and 
demolished the temple which had been rebuilt during the 
Persian reign. 
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The Political power over the area passed from Rome to 
the Byzantine in 324 AD and was ended in 637 AD when a new 
flood of Arab immigrants came out of the heart of Arabia 
into Palestine and the surrounding fertile Crescent. This 
marked the Arab Islamic era of Jersulem for the years after 
and until this day. Abdul Malik Ibn Marwan the Ummayad 
Caliph, reconstructed the Al-Aqsa mosque beside the dome of 
Al-haram Al-Ibrahmi. There was an interruption of one 
century in which Jerusalem was besieged by the Crusaders 
until the time when Saladin al Ayubi defeated the European 
invaders and liberated the holy city in 1187. Since then the 
Arab unquestionably formed the majority of inhabitants of 
the holy city as it retained its Arab Character under the 
Ottoman Empire, which succeeded Arab Caliphates. Palestine 
being a part of that Empire, the Palestinians, on the same 
footing as the other Arabs of West Asia, were full citizens 
enjoying the same rights as the Turkish citizens and shared 
with them sovereignty over all the provinces of the Empire. 
Thus, the sovereignty of the Palestinian people was 
exercised continuously over Jerusalem until the 
establishments of the British Mandate over Palestine in July 
27, 1922.^^ 
The British Government already committed to the Zionist 
organization through the Balfour Declaration to establishing 
a national home for the Jews in Palestine had opened the 
door wide to Jewish immigration in the Palestine and 
Jerusalem, as a result Jewish population -- some 58000 
people (8% of the population) in 1920, rose to 700,000 (33% 
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of the popu la t ion) , according to B r i t i s h records , which d id 
not inc ludes i l l e g a l immigrat ion. The Z i o n i s t movement had 
as ea r l y as 1918, made over t e f f o r t s to a l t e r what has come 
t o be known as the " s t a t u s quo" o f Jerusa lem by making 
t e r r i t o r i a l c la ims on the areas o f the ho ly c i t y i n t he 
guise of r e l i g i o u s r i g h t s . Thus, the stage was a l ready set 
i n 1920 f o r the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t Z i o n i s t u s u r p a t i o n o f 
Jerusalem. In sp i t e of t h i s un lawfu l support of the B r i t i s h 
c o l o n i a l power the c i t y of Jerusalem has remained comple te ly 
Arab except f o r r e l a t i v e l y few Jews in the Jewish q u a r t e r . 
The new m i g r a n t Jews f r o m 1922 t o 1948 f o r m e d t h e i r 
se t t lement ins ide and outs ide the wa l l s of the c i t y . 
At the request of the B r i t i s h Government the problem of 
Pa les t i ne was brought, in 1947, before the Uni ted Na t i ons . 
Meanwh i le , the coun t ry was r a v a t e d by c o n f l i c t and war . 
Because o f I t s r e l i g i o u s s i g n i f i c a n c e and s y m b o l i s m , 
Jerusa lem became a c e n t r e o f convenrgence and ^Arab -
Jewish c o n f r o n t a t i o n . A large number of Jewish immigrant had 
s e t t l e d in a new expanded western sector wh i l e the anc ien t 
e a s t e r n s e c t o r , i n c l u d i n g t h e w a l l e d c i t y , r e m a i n e d 
predominant ly Arab. The United Nations Spec ia l Committee on 
P a l e s t i n e , a p p o i n t e d by G e n e r a l Assembly t o s u b m i t 
p roposa ls , which concluded by p a r t i t i o n i n g Pa les t i ne I n t o 
two I n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e s - - A rab and J e w i s h and by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s i n g Jerusalem under the Genera l Assembly 
r e s o l u t i o n 181(11) of November 20, 1947. As in the case o f 
the estab l ishment of the mandate, the P a l e s t i n i a n peopl©, 
not even the popula t ion of Jerusalem, p a r t i c i p a t e d n e i t h e r 
i n t h e d e b a t e nor t h e d i s c u s s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g 
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internationalization. Nevertheless, the resolution did not 
confer on the United Nations sovereignty over Jerusalem. The 
clauses of the new Statute of Jerusalem provided for its 
establishment as corpus separation under special 
international regime administered by the United Nations. The 
Trusteeship Council was designated to discharge the 
responsibilities of administering the city. However, neither 
the Trusteeship Council nor the General Assembly could 
implement the Statute. After the war of 1948, the Jewish 
Agency accepted the principle of internationalization as a 
part of the agreement of the United Nations to the partition 
project. When Israel applied for membership of the UN, the 
Israeli delegates gave written assurance that Israel would 
not oppose the Internationalization of Jerusalem. The 
resolutions of the UN's mentioned these assurances, but as 
soon as it was granted membership, it voted against the 
resolution concerning the system governing the city under 
internationalization. 
Jerusalem After 1967 : 
The aftermath of the first Arab-Israeli conflict led to 
a drastic change in the boundaries of Israel and Palestine. 
While Palestine lost its territorial entity as Gaza was 
taken by Egypt and West Bank along with East Jerusalem 
remained with Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In 1950 this 
Kingdom began to be known as Trans Jordan signifying the 
Jordanian sovereignty over West Bank. However, both the 
Israeli and the Arab sides considered the city of Jerusalem 
as a part of their territory and it was then that the term 
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-The Two Jerusalems' appeared and became familiar to the 
world. This situation prevailed until just before the 
annexation of Jerusalem by the Zionist Israel in June, 1967. 
As annexation does not rest on any legal or moral basis, 
this action of the military authorities of Israel was 
condemned by the world public opinion and by the UN Security 
Council who deplored this action and called on Israel to 
respect the Arab Character of the city. The UN resolution 
252 of May 21, 1968, called upon Israel to rescind all such 
measures taken and desist forth with from taking any further 
action which tends to change the status of Jersualem. This 
was followed by a series of resolutions adopted by the UN 
Security Council, such as, resolutions 267, 271, 476, 478 
etc. 
Instead of abiding by the world opinion on this issue, 
Israeli civil and military authorities have been taking 
steps to arm the western sector of the city 
administratively. Municipally, economically, culturally and 
educationally to alter the Arab status of the holy city. 
Arab homes were demolished and their lands inside and around 
the city were confiscated. The Israeli occupiers have 
planned the total elimination from Jerusalem through 
intimidation by morality of the old, the exodus of the young 
abroad for education and gainful employment and through 
introduction and seizure of Arab property and by refusing to 
recognise Arab ownership if the owner is not personally 
living on the property. At the same time the Israelis are 
attempting to sell Arab property to Jews in other countries 
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who have never ever been 1n Israel. 
Israeli Government policy since 1967 has dictated that 
the demographic dominance of Israeli Jews over Palestinians 
should be maintained at a ratio of approximately 7 :3 at 
least, and that future planning should be determined by this 
objective. '^  Table 1 shows that, by and large, this 
objective has been achieved. 
The fact that, in the face of a high natural increase in 
the Palestinian population and significant Palestinian 
immigration into the Jerusalem municipal area, Israel 
initiated two interlinked government policies. First, the 
Israeli government expropriated Palestinian land in and 
around the Jerusalem area and placed restrictions on the 
usage of the remaining Palestinian land. This effectively 
halted the expansion of Palestinian suburbs and villages 
within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries.^^ Second, new 
Israeli immigrants were encouraged to settle in the new 
housing estates or "settlements^ built upon these 
expropriated lands. Indeed, in 1970's it was proposed that 
80% of all new immigrants to Israel should be channeled to 
Jerusalem for the very purpose of asserting Israeli Jewish 
36 demographic dominance in the city. 
Despite of all these, Israelis have committed heinous 
attacks against the Muslim Holy places in Jerusalem. With 
Muslim holy places placed under the direct control of the 
Israelis and repeated attempts to destroy those sites--th9 
Al-Aqsa Mosque "Dome of the Rock', -- the first Kiblat in 
Islam and the third holiest sanctuary. The Israeli soldiers 
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Table 1 
Population Growth In Jerusalem 
of Non-Jews (Palestinian) and Jews (Israeli) 1967-84 
Total 
267, 800 
313,800 
407,100 
446,500 
Palesti 
% 
26.7 
26.7 
28.2 
28.4 
nian Israeli 
% 
73.3 
73.3 
71.8 
71.6 
1967 
1972 
1980 
1984 
Source : Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, No. 3, 
1984, Jerusalem : Jerusalem Institute for 
Israel Studies, 1985, p. 89. 
invaded these holy places and their murderous designs 
resulted in many Arab deaths and the destruction of the many 
portions of the holy places. In this regard, Christian holy 
places have also not been spared having been subjected to 
various forms of destruction, robbery, arson and seizures. 
The aim of all these policies has been the ultimate 
Judaisation of all of Jerusalem, including the essential 
infrastructure dealing with all aspects of Arab Society. 
With regard to economy, all Arab banks were closed including 
the Arab Bank, the Cairo Bank, the Jordan Bank, the Real 
State Bank, the National Bank and Intra Bank. These banks 
were not only closed but their assets were confiscated. 
Israeli currency was introduced as also the Israeli system 
of taxation, including the supplementary tax and the defence 
tax which is collected from the Arabs for the benefit of 
Israeli Army.occupiers of their land. The result was a total 
paralysis of the Arab economy and a continuous Arab exodus 
from Jerusalem to the East Bank into Jordan. The effect of 
these measures was to force the Arab economy, in all of its 
aspects into dependency on Israel so that the Arab would 
become an inseparable part of Israel's economy. 
Yet another aspect of Judaisation was the sullying of 
the official Islamic Judiciary.They removed the High Court 
of appeal from Jerusalem and amalgamated the courts. They 
forced the Arab Judge and employers to become part of the 
Israeli Law Ministry. Thus, the official Judiciary of Arab 
Jerusalem was completely linked to the Judiciary of Israel, 
because of the total refusal of Arab lawyers and Judges to 
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submit themselves to these illegal actions, the Israelis 
ignored all judgments of Muslim religious courts and refused 
to accept the petition from the Muslim Waqfs or the Muslim 
committee on Jerusalem. 
The Israeli Government took further steps, in the face 
of international condemnation, to decree on July 30, 1980, 
that Jerusalem, complete and United, is the eternal capital 
of Israel, that Jerusalem is the seat of President of the 
State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court. 
The proposal for shifting of American and other western 
embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem is a dangerous 
implication. 
It has been universally recognized that the core of the 
West Asian conflict is the Palestinian problem and that core 
of the Palestinian problem is the denial to the of their 
inalienable right to self-determination incluo ng the 
establishment of an independent state, the case lerusalem 
is analogous to this. Jerusalem has for a millennium been 
the home of the Arab people and its Holy places have always 
been a sacred trust of the respective faiths. The conclusion 
is that until the day comes when the rights, including the 
sovereignty of the Palestinian people, are restored in the 
occupied territories and Jerusalem and until the rights of 
the Muslim and Christian faithfuls in the Holy City were re-
established, it is difficult to foresee peace in the West 
Asia. 
The Intifada : (Palestinian Uprising) : 
The Palestinian uprising (The Intifada) began in 
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December 1987. This was due to the maturation of long-term 
social and economic process within Palestinian society under 
the impact of Israeli military administration. But the 
trigger incident occurred on 8 December, when an Israeli 
army tank transporter collided with a line of cars filled 
with Palestinian workers waiting at the military checkpoint 
at the north end of the Gaza Strip. Four workers were killed 
and seven others seriously injured. Rumours spread that the 
accident was a deliberate action in retaliation for the 
killing in Gaza of an Israeli salesperson two days earlier. 
That night, the funerals for three of the workers turned 
into a massive demonstration; protests and demonstrations 
continued the fallowing day and a young Gazan man was shot. 
Thus, the Palestinian Intifada had begun. Several thousands 
of the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who normally 
worked on Israeli projects refused to do so. The jprising of 
Palestinians had an enduring political, social '--d economic 
impact not only on Arab-Jewish relations within the 
territories but also throughout the Israeli society. 
The Intifada caught the Israelis unaware, and it took 
some time for the government to formulate a response to it. 
The massive size of the demonstrations in the early days of 
the Intifada, its rapid spread from Gaza to East Jerusalem 
and the rest of the West Bank, the discipline shown by the 
demonstrators, the use of nonviolent actions such as tax 
resistance and commercial strikes, the rapid formation of an 
indigenous United National Leadership to coordinate the 
Intifada activities, and the breadth of involvement by 
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Palestinians were all unexpected. Initially, the Israelis 
described the Intifada as just a peak in the normal cycle of 
violence and considered it sufficiently minor that Israeli 
Defence Minister Rabin traveled to the United Stated three 
days after it began. 
After two weeks and the first of many waves of mass 
arrests, there was a temporary lull in the protests, giving 
the Israelis reason to think the uprising was being 
successfully suppressed. It quickly became clear this was 
not the case. Soon Israel took more draconian measures to 
attempt to control the situation, such as cutting off water, 
electricity, and phone lines to some of refugee camps in 
Gaza, banning all international phone calls not cleared 
through the military; establishing curfews and other 
collective punishment against entire villages; making more 
arrests; and expelling perceived Palestinian leaders. In an 
effort to reduce the large number of shooting '^aths, the 
IDF implemented a policy of treating demonstrators with the 
Intention of breaking bones. At the same time, there have 
been both a broadening of the situations in which the use of 
guns by Israelis is permitted and a steady relaxation in the 
enforcement of the rules governing such gun use. 
The Palestinian uprising in the occupied areas has 
created a phase of political depression and widened more 
than ever the deep chasm between the Israelis who want to 
retain the territories and those willing to give them. 
Intifada has created a political turmoil within the country. 
It has forced the Israeli society to reconsider its 
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relationship with the Palestinians more seriously and 
created a growing minority within Israel who are prepared to 
to speak up for Palestinian rights. ^^ The Intifada for the 
first time has given rise to polarization within Israel's 
society with regard to the Palestinian question. Its aim is 
to exhaust Israel by forcing it to sustain the deployment of 
large forces to deal with the uprising together with heavy 
economic damage, and intensify the internal debate within 
Israel and strengthen and encourage those parties that 
favour an Israeli withdrawal from the territories. It seeks 
to draw international attention to the plight of inhabitants 
there and refocus world attention on the Core problem of the 
West Asia. In short, the Intifada has the central aim of 
asking the world community to find an immediate solution to 
the Palestinian problem. 
The human costs of the apprising have also been severe. 
At the end of thirty months, at least 83? Palestinians had 
died as a result of direct actions by Israeli occupation 
forces. Gunfire killed 688 Palestinians; 61 died from 
beatings, stoning and causes other than shooting; and 88 
died from tear gas inhalation. Of these, 207 were sixteen 
years or younger; many were not yet in their teens. Although 
the majority of the Palestinian deaths occurred at the hands 
of Israeli security forces, fifty deaths were attributed to 
Israeli settlers or civilians. Forty-five Israeli soldiers 
and civilians were killed by Palestinians during this 
period.In addition, over 100 Palestinians accused of 
collaborating with the Israeli occupation authorities were 
killed by the Palestinian resistance movement. Over 40,000 
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Pa les t in ians had been a r res ted by the end of October 1989, 
and by the beginning of 1990, nine thousands of these were 
being held in " adm in i s t r a t i ve d e t e n t i o n " ( f o r up to one year 
w i thout t r i a l ) . In the f i r s t two and a h a l f years o f the 
I n t i f a d a approximately 90,000 Pa les t i n i ans requ i red medica l 
t r e a t m e n t f o r b u l l e t wounds , b r o k e n b o n e s , t e a r gas 
i n h a l a t i o n and re la ted problems. 
By the end of 1989 I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y a lso demolished 267 
homes and p a r t i a l l y or t o t a l l y s e a l e d 130 o t h e r s f o r 
" S e c u r i t y " reasons and d e s t r o y e d an a d d i t i o n a l 759 
b u i l d i n g s , mostly homes, f o r f a i l u r e to be l i c e n s e d ^ . Since 
the In te fada began, the m i l i t a r y has c losed a l l co l l eges and 
u n i v e r s i t i e s (a few community c o l l e g e s were p e r m i t t e d t o 
reopen in March 1990, and the n u r s i n g schoo l a t a l -Quds 
U n i v e r s i t y resumed c l a s s e s i n J u n e ) , s h u t down t h e 
elementary and secondary schools in the West Bank f o r many 
months a t a t ime, banned the popular committees t h a t manage 
d a y - t o - d a y P a l e s t i n i a n a f f a i r s , c l o s e d down P a l e s t i n i a n 
n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , destroyed tens of thousands o f mature 
f r u i t s and o l i v e t rees belonging to P a l e s t i n i a n s , and put 
la rge areas of the West Bank and Gaza S t r i p under extended 
m i l i t a r y c u r f e w . I s r a e l i s o l d i e r s and bo rde r p o l i c e can 
e n t e r A rab homes w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t , c r a c k d o w n on t h e 
P a l e s t i n i a n p r e s s , censor a l l news p a p e r s , magazines and 
books i n the t e r r i t o r i e s and pu t r e s t r i c t i o n s on c i v i l 
l i b e r t i e s . ^ ^ 
However, despi te of a l l these d i f f i c u l t i e s , the I n t i f a d a 
produced and c r e a t e d some advantage and ach ievements i n 
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favour of the Pa les t i n i ans . The I n t i f a d a has c o s t l y Impact 
on I s r a e l ' s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , c r e a t i n g a ma jo r new 
i n t e r n a l secu r i t y t h rea t to the occupying I s r a e l i f o r c e s . 
I s r a e l ' s t rade surplus in goods and serv ices w i t h the West 
Bank and Gaza dropped by two t h i r d s from $ 174 m i l l i o n in 
1987 to only $ 56 m i l l i o n in 1988 a loss of $ 120 m i l l i o n . 
In 1988 I s r a e l ' s M in i s te r of Economy, Gad Yaacoby es t imated 
the economic cos t o f the I n t i f a d a a t between $ 600-700 
m i l l i o n , roughly equ iva len t to 2 percent of I s r a e l ' s Gross 
Domestic product . . 
The most important outcome of the I n t i f a d a has been King 
Hussein 's dec is ion on July 3 1 , 1988 to r e l i n q u i s h Jordanian 
sovere ignty over the West Bank in favour of the PLO, thereby 
k i l l i n g the s o - c a l l e d " J o r d a n i a n O p t i o n " and f o r c i n g the 
wor ld to deal d i r e c t l y w i th the P a l e s t i n i a n s . For Jordan, 
t h e I n t i f a d a has posed a c o n f l i c t i n g c h a l l e n g e . The 
e m o t i o n a l p u l l o f the I n t i f a d a m igh t e n g u l f J o r d a n ' s own 
P a l e s t i i a n s e s t i m a t e d a t between 40-50 p e r c e n t o f t he 
-. ..• 45 popu la t ion . 
The I n t i f a d a is l a r g e l y , i f not s o l e l y , respons ib le f o r 
the change in PLO's posture dur ing the per iod under rev iew. 
T h i s has l e d t o t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n o f an i n d e p e n d e n t 
P a l e s t i n i a n s ta te by the PLO in occupied t e r r i t o r i e s , and to 
the PLO's dec is ion to renounce t e r r o r i s m and accept I s r a e l ' s 
r i g h t t o e x i s t wh ich i n t u r n paved t h e way f o r t h e 
d ip loma t i c dia logue between the Uni ted States and the PLO. 
The I n t i f a d a has drawn i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n t o t he 
Pa les t i ne problem and made i t c l ea r t ha t P a l e s t i n i a n s are 
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important partners in any settlement in the West Asia. 
Land for Peace Approach : 
Arab and Palestinian attitudes toward Israel have 
changed greatly but quietly In recent years. Twenty years 
ago, an Arab summit at Khartoum vowed that Arab world would 
never recognize, negotiate, or live in peace with Israel. 
Today, the intensity of Arab-Israeli confrontation is 
decreasing. Egypt and Israel are formally at peace, Jordan 
has a defacto peace with Israel, and Syria, while fashioning 
itself a confrontation state, has scrupulously respected its 
1975 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights and has 
tread cautiously in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese 
parliament endorsed a normalization accord with Israel in 
1983, though this is now abrogated. The fires of rejection 
burn brightly along the periphery of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict-in Libya Yemen, Iraq, and among various Palestinian 
groups. But the Arab parties most involved in the conflict 
have come to accept the reality of Israel and some recognize 
the need for an accommodation. Even Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, 
who is determined to carry on the fight, grudgingly accepts 
that Israel may be here to stay. Indeed, for most Arabs the 
debate has ceased to focus on the patronizing and profitless 
question of whether Israel should exist or not, rather, it 
turns instead on the more practical and promising matter of 
boundaries. '. 
Fifteen years earlier, Yehoshafat Harkabi noted that 
Arab attitudes towards Israel could change as a result of a 
164 
number o f f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g the Arab s t a t e s ' I n c r e a s i n g 
concern w i th t h e i r domestic a f f a i r s , leadersh ip changes, and 
e x h a u s t i o n and d i s a p p o i n t m e n t in the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t 
4ft 
Israel . He was correct, key Arab states now accept the 
reality of Israel, some would even like to end the conflict 
with Israel. As they had to recognize Israel's staying power 
and their own limitations, the cost/benefit calculus became 
more relevant. The Arab-Israeli conflict has not ended, but 
it has evolved into a series of arrangements between the two 
sides. This has created a lull in the confrontation which 
has by now come to assume a more permanent character. But 
stability in the Arab-Israeli arena is not an inexhaustible 
commodity. A permanent impasse in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process may make it increasingly difficult to preserve the 
accommodations that now exist. Also, the question arises : 
if key Arab states have accepted the reality of Israel, 
which Israel have they accepted ? is it an Israel in 
control of the West bank, Gaza, and Golan Heights or one 
prepared to cede territory to its neighbours in return for 
formal peace ? 
The 1973 war broke the stalemate in Arab-Israeli 
relations, by changing attitudes in both Israel and Egypt. 
After 1973, Cairo was willing to make peace in exchange for 
the return of the Sinai peninsula. Egyptian leaders could 
make this trade because they had less need of the legitimacy 
conferred by a pan-Arab crusade against Zionism than the 
other Arab states. Their people felt an allegiance to Egypt 
in a way that had no parallel among the people of Syria or 
Jordan. Egypt's weight and place in the Arab world allowed 
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it to end the confrontation with Israel if It chose to do 
so. Anwar as-Sadat decided to make that choice. The 1973 war 
had a profound impact on Israel. In principle Israel had 
been ready to negotiate since 1948, but after 1967 the 
Israelis merely waited for Arab initiatives. They believed 
that they could sustain the postwar lines without exertion, 
that the certainty of defeat would deter the Arabs from 
trying to recover their lands by force. Thus, Israel could 
afford to wait for an offer of peace. The 1973 war proved 
these assumptions mistaken. It made clear that the Arabs 
would fight to recover their territories. Through the war 
was won by Israel, its eruption was a defeat for Israel's 
policy. The status quo proved more costly than Israelis 
expected. In weighing the security dilemma after 1973, 
conciliation looked more attractive and provocation-
perpetuating Arab hostility by retaining captured territory-
more dangerous. The return of the territories offered 
Israel the prospect of peace, an end to the dangerous round 
of wars, and the chance to build the Jewish state without 
constant threat of attack. Muting the hostility of its Arab 
neighbours, which had dominated Israeli national life since 
the founding of the state, would mean achieving a supreme 
national goal. 
The Camp David Agreements, therefore, seemed to mark a 
watershed in the history and politics of the West Asia. The 
head of an Arab country for the first time negotiated a 
peace settlement with his Israeli counterpart. And, again 
for the first time, Israel agreed to the principle of 
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trading occupied territories for the sake of peace. Unlike 
some Israelis, Sadat intended the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty to be the beginning, not the end of the peace 
process. According to the terms of "A Framework for Peace 
Agreed at Camp David", and according to the terms of the 
treaty which the Egyptian National Assembly ratified, the 
treaty was to be followed immediately by negotiations that 
would result, first, in the Israeli military government's 
replacement in the West Bank and Gaza with a Palestinian 
self-governing authority through a transitional period. 
Then, within three years, negotiations would begin on a 
durable peace and on relationships among Israelis, 
Palestinians and Jordanians. The Egyptians objective remains 
essentially the same, and Egypt recognized the need to do 
what was not done after Camp David-to involve Palestinians 
and Jordanians in the negotiating process. 
In the aftermath of the 1990/91 Gulf war, the Bush 
Administration, as a result of its overwhelming victory 
against Iraq as the dominant member of the coalition, 
appeared to be ideally placed to offer from its own good 
graces what it had been unwilling to offer to appease Iraq, 
namely a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The PLO had accepted the principle of negotiation and of the 
existence of Israel, much of the Arab world was prepared to 
support such an initiative, and Israel seemed sufficiently 
weakened by the strategic changes attendant on the end of 
the cold war to be unable to resist US pressure to 
negotiate. 
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By March 1992- fo l lowlng an I n i t i a l , "symbol ic ' sess ion 
of the conference, held in Madr id , Spain, in October 1991, 
f o u r sess ions o f n e g o t i a t i o n s between I s r a e l i , S y r i a n , 
Lebanese, and Pa les t in ian-Jordan ian de legat ions had been 
h e l d , but l i t t l e progress had been achieved w i th regard t o 
the subs tan t i ve issues which the conference was in tended to 
a d d r e s s , i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e q u e s t i o n o f t r a n s i t i o n a l 
P a l e s t i n i a n autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza S t r i p , 
pend ing n e g o t i a t i o n s on the " p r m a n e n t s t a t u s ' o f t hose 
t e r r i t o r i e s . Ra the r , these b i l a t e r a l t a l k s had become 
deadlocked over procedural issues. I s r a e l i d e l e g a t i o n s , wary 
o f m a k i n g any g e s t u r e wh i ch m i g h t be c o n s t r u e d as 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f P a l e s t i n i a n independence, c o n s i s t e n t l y 
q u e s t i o n e d t he s t a t u s o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n - J o r d a n i a n 
d e l e g a t i o n and the r i g h t o f the P a l e s t i n i a n component t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e s e p a r a t e l y i n n e g o t i a t i o n s posed a c o n s t a n t 
t h r e a t to the f a l t e r i n g peace process . 
A f t e r a ser ies of b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , the e leven th 
round o f b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n , however, which commenced i n 
W a s h i n g t o n on 31 Augus t 1993 , a m a j o r u n e x p e c t e d 
breakthrough was achieved between I s r a e l and the P a l e s t i n i a n 
d e l e g a t i o n , w h i c h c u l m i n a t e d i n t h e s i g n i n g , on 13 
September , by I s r a e l and the PLO, o f a d e c l a r a t i o n o f 
p r i n c i p l e s on P a l e s t i n i a n s e l f - r u l e i n t h e O c c u p i e d 
T e r r i t o r i e s . The a g r e e m e n t , w h i c h e n t a i l e d m u t u a l 
r e c o g n i t i o n by I s r a e l and the PLO, had been e l a b o r a t e d 
du r ing a ser ies of secret nego t ia t ions mediated by Norwegian 
d i p l o m a c y . The d e c l a r a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s e s t a b l i s h e d a 
d e t a i l e d t i m e t a b l e f o r I s r a e l ' s d isengagement f r om the 
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O c c u p i e d T e r r i t o r i e s and s t i p u l a t e d t h a t a p e r m a n e n t 
se t t lement of the Pa les t i n i an quest ion should be in p lace by 
December 1998. 
While i t was welcomed as a major break through i n the 
West As ia peace process, the dec la ra t i on of p r i n c i p l e s was 
never the less regarded as only a t e n t a t i v e f i r s t s tep towards 
the r e s o l u t i o n o f the r e g i o n ' s c o n f l i c t s t h a t c o u l d be 
threatened from many d i r e c t i o n s . Although the I s r a e l i Prime 
M i n i s t e r , I tzhak Rabin, was able to ob ta in the r a t i f i c a t i o n 
o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s , and o f I s r a e l ' s 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f the PLO, by the Knesset on 23 September , 
t h e r e was w idespread o p p o s i t i o n t o i t f rom r i g h t - w i n g 
I s r a e l i p o l i t i c a l groups. By the same token, the conc lus ion 
of the agreement aggravated d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the PLO and the 
wider P a l e s t i n i a n L i be ra t i on Movement. Wi th in the PLO some 
s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s , h i t h e r t o l o y a l t o Yasser A r a f a t ' s 
l e a d e r s h i p , now d e c l a r e d t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o h i m , w h i l e 
d i s s i d e n t g r o u p s , such as the Democrat ic F r o n t f o r t he 
L i b e r a t i o n o f P a l e s t i n e , denounced the d e c l a r a t i o n o f 
p r i n c i p l e s as t reason. Most observers regarded the f u t u r e 
success o f the agreement between I s r a e l and the PLO as 
dependent on the a b i l i t y of the mainst ream PLO t o g a i n 
popu la r s u p p o r t f o r i t f rom P a l e s t i n i a n s r e s i d i n g i n the 
West Bank and the Gaza S t r i p . 
An other t h r e a t to the accord, which Is more dangerous, 
comes from the fundamenta l is t Hamas. The Hamas c a t e g o r i c a l l y 
r e j e c t s the p r e s e n t P L O - I s r a e l i agreement . I n f a c t , i t i s 
s t r ong l y opposed to the e n t i r e peace process i t s e l f t h a t was 
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launched In Madrid. It calls for the total destruction of 
Israel. After the signing of the accord, its leaders have 
made it clear that they will try to sabotage the deal by 
carrying out attacks on Israeli settlers and soldiers. Even 
though the fundamentalist group is not a part of the secular 
PLO, the attitude of Hamas is very crucial because it is the 
second most important political force in the West Bank and 
Gaza after Arafat's supporters. It has a sizable following 
in the territories, specially Gaza which is going to be the 
nerve centre of the autonomy experiment. 
The reaction to the declaration of principles by the 
other Arab Governments engaged in peace negotiations with 
Israel was mixed. King Hussein of Jordan welcomed the 
agreement between Israel and the PLO, and Jordan immediately 
agreed an agenda for direct negotiations with Israel, which 
was also ratified by the Knesset on 23 September. Lebanon, 
however, feared that the divisions that the declaration of 
principles had provoked within the Palestinian movement 
might in future lead to renewed conflict in Lebanes-
territory. It remained unclear, too, whether Syria-which 
neither condemned nor welcomed the declaration of principles 
-- would continue to support those Palestinian groups 
opposed to the PLO's position. It is alleged that the US and 
Israel are trying to put pressure on Asad to silence the 
opposition from the radical groups.But the only way to 
achieve this will be to reach an agreement with Syria. That 
will happen only when Israel agrees to withdraw from the 
Golan Heights on which Syria seems to have a categorical 
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posi tion. 
The other radical Arab states like Iraq, Libya and non-
Arab Iran also oppose the accord. They will continue to 
support the rejectionist groups though the impact would be 
less effective due to their geographical location. But Iran 
may cause severe damage to the implementation of the accord 
as it is the main supporter of the Haamas and the Islamic 
Jihad. 
The PLO-Israeli accord is a major step forward in the 
ongoing search for peace in West Asia. But the accord should 
be a beginning towards the achievement of a .comprehensive 
peace in the region. Mere granting of autonomy to the 
Palestinians will not result in a comprehensive peace. 
Further, the only way to defeat the rejectionists on both 
sides is to move along the course steadily. Israeli 
government has to prove its sincere desire for peace by 
adhering to the time schedule of the accord. Secondly, 
Israel should also reach agreement with Syria, Jordan and 
Lebanon on the border disputes. For Arafat, the first task 
is to how to maintain law and order during the transition 
period. As the Palestinians change their guerrilla outfits 
and take on the job of policing the area, Arafat has to 
ensure that the Israeli soldiers and settlers are protected. 
Secondly, Arafat has repeatedly pointed out that the present 
accord is just the first step not the last one. There are 
dangers that the Israelis might be thinking in terms of 
making it the last step. Arafat has to ensure that this does 
not happen. 
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D e c l a r a t i o n of P r i n c i p l e s on P a l e s t i n i a n 
Self -Rule : 
On 13 September 1993 I s r a e l and the PLO signed 
a d e c l a r a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s on P a l e s t i n i a n 
s e l f - r u l e in Washington in the presence of the 
PLO Chairman Yasser A r a f a t , the I s r a e l i Prime 
M i n i s t e r I t z h a k Rabin and the US P r e s i d e n t 
B i l l C l i n t o n w h i c h was s c h e d u l e d t o t a k e 
e f f e c t on 13 October 1993. From t h a t da te 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r e d u c a t i o n and c u l t u r e , 
h e a l t h , s o c i a l w e l f a r e , d i r e c t t a x a t i o n and 
tour ism was to be t r a n s f e r r e d from the I s r a e l i 
m i l i t a r y government and c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
to ^author ized P a l e s t i n i a n s ' in the West Bank 
and the Gaza S t r i p (on the s i g n i n g o f t he 
dec la ra t i on I s r a e l and the Pa les t i n ians were 
to beg in n e g o t i a t i o n s on the w i t h d r a w a l o f 
I s r a e l i armed fo rces from the Gaza S t r i p and 
the town o f J e r i c h o in the West Bank ) ; a 
P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i c e f o r c e was t o be 
e s t a b l i s h e d , c o m p r i s i n g PLO f i g h t e r s f rom 
ou ts ide the West Bank and the Gaza S t r i p , a 
j o i n t I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a n s L ia ison Committee 
was t o be f o r m e d , an I s r a e 1 i - P a l e s t i n 1 an 
Economic C o o p e r a t i o n Commi t tee was t o be 
e s t a b l i s h e d t o assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
water , e l e c t r i c i t y , energy, f i n a n c e , t r a n s p o r t 
and communications, t r a d e , i n d u s t r y , labour 
r e l a t i o n s , t r a i n i n g , the e n v i r o n m e n t s , t he 
media, an i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic development 
programme f o r the West Bank and the Gaza S t r i p 
and a reg iona l economic development programme. 
J o r d a n and Egyp t were t o be i n v i t e d t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e on the j o i n t I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a n 
L i a i s o n C o m m i t t e e i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e 
procedures f o r the admission of Pa les t i n i ans 
d i s p l a c e d f rom the West Bank and the Gaza 
S t r i p in 1967. 
Jpe dec la ra t i on of p r i n c i p l e s f u r t h e r requ i red 
I s r a e l and the P a l e s t i n i a n s to conc lude an 
agreement on the w i thdrawal of I s r a e l i armed 
f o r c e s f rom the Gaza S t r i p and the J e r i c h o 
a rea ( t h e w i t h d r a w a l t o be comple ted by 13 
A p r i l 1993), and on deta i le'd arrangements f o r 
P a l e s t i n i a n s c o n t r o l o f those a r e a s , by 13 
December 1993. On t h a t d a t e a f i v e - y e a r , 
t r a n s i t i o n a l pe r iod of Pa les t i n i an s e l f - r u l e 
was to beg in . 
The d e c l a r a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s f u r t h e r 
s t i p u l a t e d t h a t e l e c t i o n s t o a P a l e s t i n i a n 
Counci l should be held before 13 July 1994. 
By tha t date an i n t e r i m agreement was to have 
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been concluded to determine the s t r u c t u r e and 
powers of the Council . P a l e s t i n i a n s from e a s t 
J e r u s a l e m would be p e r m i t t e d t o v o t e , and 
poss ib ly s tand as c a n d i d a t e s , in the e l e c t i o n s 
to the Counci l . I s r a e l i armed forces withdrawn 
from the Gaza S t r i p and the Je r i cho a rea were 
to be deployed o u t s i d e t h e major p o p u l a t i o n 
c e n t r e s in the r e s t of the West Bank before 
the eve of the e l e c t i o n s to the Counci l , and 
were to r e t a i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the s e c u r i t y 
of I s r a e l i s e t t l e r s . On t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n of 
the P a l e s t i n i a n Council the I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y 
government and the c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were 
to be d i s so lved . 
F i n a l l y , t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s 
s t i p u l a t e d t h a t by 13 December 1995 
n e g o t i a t i o n s were t o have begun on t h e 
p e r m a n e n t s t a t u s of t h e a r e a s u n d e r 
t r a n s i t i o n a l P a l e s t i n i a n s e l f r u l e , t h e 
permanent s e t t l e m e n t to t a k e e f f e c t by 13 
December 1998"^° 
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Chapter - 5 
Conclusions 
An Assessment of the Israeli Security 
and Regjionai Balance of Power 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
An Assessment of the I s r a e l i Secur i ty 
and Regional Balance of Power 
I s r a e l 1s a s t a t e f o r which the secur i t y dilemma has 
been most acute. I t s example, t h e r e f o r e , i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s 
un i ve rsa l f ea tu re of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s not as a no rma l , 
bu t as an extreme c a s e . A l t hough aware o f i t s s e c u r i t y 
d i l e m m a , and p r e p a r e d t o s u b s t i t u t e c o n c i l i a t i o n f o r 
de ter rence, I s r a e l i s , have so f a r been able to do so on ly in 
d e a l i n g w i t h Egyp t . A t t e m p t i n g to p r a c t i c e a p o l i c y o f 
c o n c i l i a t i o n s a f e l y , I s r a e l i p o l i c i e s a f t e r 1973 were 
des igned to reduce the r i s k t h a t concess ion r e q u i r e d by 
c o n c i l i a t i o n might r e s u l t in unsuccessful appeasement. Such 
r e d u c t i o n i n r i s k were accompl i shed ( o f t e n w i t h Amer ican 
a s s i s t a n c e ) t h r o u g h s t e p by s t e p t e s t i n g , s y m b o l i s m , 
m u t u a l i t y , and compensation. But the i n a b i l i t y o f I s r a e l to 
c a r r y out a s i m i l a r p rocess w i t h i t s o t h e r a d v e r s a r i e s 
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t r a n s l a t i n g t h i s 
t h e o r e t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e i n t o concrete p o l i c i e s . 
Secur i ty is the c e n t r a l problem of I s r a e l ' s e x i s t e n c e , 
i t has high s ta tus in I s r a e l ' s Society and the l a rge amount 
o f resources are a l l o c a t e d to i t . I s r a e l i s e c u r i t y dilemma 
i s t h a t i t can env i sage peace i n West A s i a o n l y f r om a 
p o s i t i o n of s t reng th but once having achieved t h a t p o s i t i o n 
there seems to be f u t i l i t y in nego t i a t i on as i t i s secure in 
any case. The p o s i t i o n of Pa les t ine and the es tab l i shmen t 
o f I s r a e l i n 1948 l e d t o t h e f i r s t A r a b - I s r a e l 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n . This c o n f r o n t a t i o n was to lay the f ounda t i on 
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o f a f u t u r e pa t te rn of i n t e r - s t a t e re la t i ons in t h i s reg ion 
: The issue of s u r v i v a l as l i n ked to secur i ty f o r I s r a e l and 
the quest ion of usurping of t e r r i t o r y by e rs twh i l e c o l o n i a l 
powers and the r e s u l t a n t displacement of the l oca l populace. 
Subsequent h i s to r y saw the ranging of i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r ces 
on both s ides . There were wars again in 1967, 1973 and in 
Lebanon in 1982. A l l these wars f u r t h e r entrenched I s r a e l i 
power in the region and a lso al lowed i t to expand in the 
name of s e c u r i t y . The t e r r i t o r i a l expansion was made hand in 
hand w i t h c rea t ion of new Jewish set t lements . I s r a e l t r i e d 
to t a c k l e the border problems by expanding i t s f r o n t i e r s and 
c r e a t i n g new Jew ish s e t t l e m e n t s a l o n g t h e b o r d e r . I n 
a d d i t i o n , i t has re ta ined c o n t r o l over most s t r a t e g i c po i n t s 
a l o n g the bo rde r . I n c o n t r o l l i n g the West Bank, I s r a e l i 
l e a d e r s b e l i e v e t h a t , the land i t s e l f c rea tes s t r a t e g i c 
dep th , and I s r a e l i set t lements can provide a k ind o f e a r l y 
w a r n i n g . R e t u r n i n g t h e b u l k o f t h e t e r r i t o r y t o A r a b 
c o n t r o l , i t contends, would v i r t u a l l y guarantee an a t t a c k . 
A look a t I s r a e l i c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y w i l l show the 
ex ten t of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l expansion. In 1947-48 i t occupied 
areas a l l o t t e d to Arab P a l e s t i n e , then in 1967 i t took the 
Golan He igh ts , the West Bank, the Gaza and Sinai pen insu la . 
S ina i was l a t e r given back to Egypt in 1982. I t marched i n t o 
Lebanon and w h i l e w i t h d r a w i n g he ld and s t i l l ho lds sou th 
Lebanese t e r r i t o r y e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or th rough i t s p roxy 
m i l i t i a f o r ce the South Lebanon Army (SLA). I s r a e l today has 
m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y , chemical and nuclear c a p a b i l i t y , l ong -
range m i s s i l e s , s o p h i s t i c a t e d a i r c r a f t s , r econna i ssance 
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satellite, submarines, and enjoys a commanding strategic 
position with natural defence aid such as physical barriers 
(mountains, rivers, internal strategic depth to absorb an 
attack). It receives more than $ 3 billion a year in U.S. 
aid plus retain her strategic alliance and special 
relationship with the U.S. 
During the decade of 1980's, Israel destroyed the Iraqi 
reactor, invaded Lebanon, shared complicity in the massacres 
of Sabra and Chatlla, daily violated the human rights of the 
Arab living in the occupied territories and bombed the 
P.L.O. Headquarters In Tunisia. Israel's strength lies 
mainly In the military power and Arab disunity. Arab unity 
Is a direct threat to Israel that must be prevented, and 
regional instability as well as domestic turmoil serve 
Israel's immediate purposes. The Arab system Is probably the 
most penetrated system in the world having largest degree of 
internecence quarrels. The Arab state system is distinctly 
multipolar. Several of the Arab states (Iraq, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia ) are important yet none appears to have the 
potential for exerting widely accepted leadership, let alone 
hegemony. There is no mutual cooperation among Arab states, 
no joint plans, no coordination, no clear and precise common 
views and even no normal diplomatic relations. There exist 
mutual suspicions, competing aspirations, different region 
types and historical rivalries (Damascus versus Baghdad 
versus Cairo). This competition among the Arab countries and 
their mutual mistrust has considerably helped Israeli 
military strategy. It was however, the courage and devotion 
of the Israeli forces and enhanced Israeli security 
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environment as well, that helped to neutralize the effect of 
greater Arab numbers. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait has 
further sharpened the intra-Arab rivalries that have long 
thwarted hopes of forging a regional unity against Israel. 
In the Arab world, security of the regime (ruling elite) 
and not the national security appears to be more important. 
That is why one can not find a national security council 
within most of the Arab states. Thus, in its real sense, 
there is no real national security concept in the Arab 
states, but there is the concept of "regime security". Any 
degree of change within the Arab governments or regimes will 
directly affect their national security and in many cases 
the regime security as well. This is not so in Israel, where 
national security is more important and the concept of 
regime security does not exist. In the past, the Arabs tried 
to destroy their national security to keep the regime 
security and to hold power. For example, this happened in 
Syria in 1981, in South Yemen in 1986. At present, with the 
winds of changes within the Arab world the status quo may be 
changed in favour of the national security. 
Two stages may be clearly distinguished to the security 
problems that confronted Israel. Right after the war of 
independence, the challenge Israel faced was to husband its 
limited resources and to use them in such a way as to deter 
any Arab coalition from going to war. In this, Israel 
succeeded brilliantly, especially in the 1957-1967 periods. 
In the later years, however, a series of accidents combined 
to deceive Egypt's Gamal, Abdel Nasser about Israel's real 
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strength In comparison with the forces at his command and 
drove him to precipitate war. 
The failure of Israel to deter Its enemies impelled 
Israel to revise its basic strategy and seek to use the 
assets it had gained in the war to achieve security through 
forcing a favourable peace settlement. This switch to a 
strategy of "compellence" involved a much greater admixture 
of the political with the military than had the previous 
strategy of deterrence. In dealing with the military 
aspects of the problem, which assumed the novel forms of a 
war of attrition.guerri11a action and terrorism, Israel did 
well, although not as brilliantly as in the previous stages. 
However, an uneven and generally madiocre handling of the 
political aspects of the strategy denied it the success it 
might have achieved and impelled the Arabs to gamble on a 
surprise general war rather than yield to openended demands. 
The impressive recovery of the military from the Initial 
blunders of the 1973 Yom Kippur war prevented a complete 
failure of the compellence strategy. It remains to be seen, 
however, how long Israel can preserve what was salvaged, 
and, especially, how intelligent will be the handling of its 
political aspects in future. 
The growth of Israel's military power during the years 
extended to many other areas and was compounded by many 
qualitative improvements in organization, training, command 
and control, and so on, but the examples cited suggest the 
extent of Israel's effort to build up and maintain the means 
to support a strategy of total deterrence. However, as 
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events were to show, the Israeli strategic design had two 
flaws that proved to be its undoing. The total military 
superiority' necessary to a strategy of total deterrence was 
almost inherently impossible for Israel to achieve because 
the bulk of its military establishment depended on reserves 
while the enemy's rested on standing forces. As long as that 
was the case there were bound to be moments and situations 
in which superiority was actually or could be on the side of 
the enemy. However, in theory they offered the enemy 
opportunities and openings that undermined absolute 
deterrence. Post 1973 war period brought many questions 
before Israel as how to close the gap which the Arabs 
exploited so well between Israel's standing and mobilizable 
strengths ? How to prevent a possible repetition of long and 
costly warfare and restore the possibility of open 
operations and rapid decision right from the outset of 
hostilities ? And how to keep a favourable relation of 
forces in the face of plausible Arab war coalition endowed 
with vastly superior resources ? 
To pursue its 1973 post-war defence effort Israel had to 
strain its economic resources to the utmost. Direct and 
indirect defence expenditures in 1974 and 1975 amounted to 
36 per cent of GNP, nearly double the pre-war level. Even 
so, Israel had to depend to a decisive extent on increased 
American assistance. In the first three years after the Six 
Day War, for instance, American military assistance to 
Israel averaged about $ 40 million a year - a very small 
proportion of its total defence expenditures. In the next 
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three years, it averaged about $ 400 million - close to 28 
percent of total defence expenditures. In 1974-75 the 
American contribution averaged $ 1.5 billion - fully 42 
percent of Israel's defence spending. In addition, the 
United States had been virtually the only supply source for 
the high technology sophisticated weapons that have become 
the mainstay of Israel's post war strategy. But the United 
States' willingness to provide that kind of help has been 
bound with an evolving conception of shared American -
Israeli interests. Consequently, continuation of that aid, 
and therefore of Israel's ability to pursue its defence 
strategy, will inevitably be limited by the ability of the 
two countries to continue to accommodate each other in the 
face of changing circumstances. 
Emergence and continuation of the arms race is the 
direct consequence of arms acquisition. In an atmosphere of 
disputes and tensions, the arms acquisition by a country is 
suspected by the other as a threat to its security, 
compelling the latter to go for arms too. As a result there 
starts the arms race. For example, Israel acquired as many 
F-15 fighters given to Saudi Arabia in 1978, to create 
military balance which had got disturbed due to Saudi 
Arabia's massive arms acquisition. Similarly, the recent 
missile race between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and between 
Israel and Jordan and Iraq, are the aftereffects of purchase 
of CSS-2 missile by Saudi Arabia from China and acquisition 
of foreign assistance by Syria, Jordan and Iraq In their bid 
to enhance the range of their missiles to an extent of 
covering the whole or half of Israel. 
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Despite disarming the Palestinians, defeating the Arabs 
in the October War and Syria later in the Lebanon War as 
well as also enjoying military superiority over the Arabs, 
Israel's internal and external security has not improved 
beyond a low level. Military might of Israel is still 
insufficient to ensure the security of Israel without 
possessing control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the 
Arab side their borders are still not free from the Israeli 
threats. 
Arms have not enhanced the capability of the West Asian 
states to fight war they are generally engaged in. Israel in 
the last two wars virtually destroyed the most advanced 
weapons of the Arab states. The Iran-Iraq war exemplified 
the mishandling of the weapons. Arms were destroyed or/and 
remained unused due to the sheer ignorance of the armed 
forces of the belligerents about them. Moreover, arms in 
many wars like the Lebanon war, turned out to be a hurdle in 
smooth combat operation mainly because of knowledgelessness 
of military personnel to operate and maintain them. 
Indigenous arms production has also not reduced the 
regional powers dependency on the supplier. Because the need 
for latest weapons system, produced only in the supplier 
state, keeps the West Asian states tied with their 
suppliers. Israel's example is noteworthy. It is heavily 
reliant upon the United states for its next generation of 
sophisticated aircrafts like F-15 and F-16 and AWACS, 
although it is producing and selling the arms known for 
187 
their technical quality, etc. 
Q u a n t i t a t i v e l y s p e a k i n g . West A s i a i s t h e l a r g e s t 
importer of the Th i rd World and the wor ld ' s arms. Accord ing 
to the WMEAT, 1988, Middle East imported 37.7% of the t o t a l 
supp ly t o the w o r l d and I r a q , and Saudi A r a b i a were t he 
l a r g e s t i m p o r t e r s o f w o r l d arms, w h i l e S y r i a and Egypt 
occupied 4th and 7th p o s i t i o n respec t i ve ly in the l i s t of 
top 10 leading arms impor te rs . In the A r a b - I s r a e l i sec tor 
there has been I s r a e l vs S y r i a , Jordon, Egypt arms race , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , the arms race between I s r a e l and S y r i a i s most 
symbo l i c one. In 1987, I s r a e l had 679 combat a i r c r a f t s , 
3 ,900 t a n k s , w h i l e S y r i a ' s a rmory i n c l u d e d some 478 
a i r c r a f t s and 4000 tanks. The f i g u r e demonstrates neck to 
neck arms race between the two coun t r i es . 
A c q u i s i t i o n o f nuc l ea r arms and a s s i s t a n c e i s an 
important goal of the West Asian s t a t e s ' defence programme, 
a l though most of them are the s igna to r ies to the NPT. I r a q 
i s a l l se t t o r e s t a r t i t s nuc lea r programme, damaged by 
I s r a e l i a t t a c k i n 1980 and h a l t e d by i t s war w i t h I r a n . 
S ince i t has j o i n e d the NPT g roup , Egypt i s p u r s u i n g a 
c landes t ine nuclear w i t h the help of two American f i r m s , a 
French, the 'Framatome', the I t a l i a n f i r m ^N1ra ' , and the 
West German f i r m ^Krafwark Un ion ' . U t te r d i s rega rd o f the 
NPT by i t s s i g n a t o r i e s and t h e s u p p l i e r s o f n u c l e a r 
a s s i s t a n c e t o West A s i a , I s r a e l ' s n u c l e a r i z a t i o n and 
loopholes in the NPT i t s e l f , are the basic causes u n d e r l y i n g 
West A s i a ' s quest f o r n u c l e a r i z a t i o n in v i o l a t i o n o f t he 
NPT. 
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The West Asian states have also sought foreign help to 
produce and acquire chemical weapons. China is the newest 
and the most potential source for acquiring chemical 
technology. However, due to Iraq's indiscriminate use of 
these weapons against Iran and Kurdish people and its 
threat to the US forces stationed in the region during the 
Persian Gulf crisis, it is very likely that the Western 
suppliers will make sincere efforts to stop transferring 
chemical weapons to. the Third World in general and the West 
Asian states in particular. 
The Brandt Commission rightly stated that arms 
expenditure had cost a slur on the economic growth of the 
West Asian states. Rapid growth in arms purchases has slowed 
down the developmental projects. Arms purchase in West Asia 
has risen twice to economic development. Even the non-oil-
states of West Asia have directed a substantial part of 
their income and petroaid on arms purchase instead of 
economic development. 
Maintenance of internal security of the allies has been 
important factor for the guiding US arms proliferation 
policy in West Asia. This is so because contrary to the 
ruling establishment, the forces of change are anti US in 
nature. Hence, any revolutionary change in client states is 
bound to reduce the US arms supply. Iranian example more 
than sufficiently demonstrates this fact. Thus, the US arms 
principally and primarily aim at regime's security and that 
is why the states prone to disturbances and terrorism from 
within, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other GCC countries, 
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and Jordan and Egypt, have been the leading recepients of 
the US arms. Security of the allies from outside attack, 
regional or extra-regional, is an equally important aspect 
of the US policy of arms export to West Asia. Right from 
Nixson's period, arms have been given to the allies with an 
aim to equip them with enough wherewithal to deter external 
threat or aggression without seeking a direct military 
intervention by the US. 
The external threat, like the Internal one, in West Asia 
is liable to mark an end to the US hegemony over the 
concerned states; therefore, the US is hardbound to transfer 
most sophisticated weapons to ensure recipient's safety from 
any danger.external in nature. Iraqi threat throughout the 
1970s and the Iranians threat in the 1980s preoccupied USA's 
policy of arms transfer, aiming"deterrence to" and "defence 
from" the "external" aggression. Certainly, the recent Iraqi 
threat to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other pro-US states of 
the Persian Gulf, and Israel, forced the US to bear the 
responsibility for the security of its allies which could be 
most effectively maintained by the U.S. arms transfer and by 
its own physical presence. However, this again could result 
in grave economic and political strain as well as opposition 
to its militant posture in the area. 
To counter Soviet influence and that of Its surrogates 
has been the central theme of the US arms transfer policy, 
right from the president Nixon down to Reagon 
administration. President Carter, who in the early years of 
his term'gave little emphasis to Its objective, In the later 
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years, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, pursued it 
with the greater deal of determinism and activeness. Sale 
of arms to Saudi Arabia and Iran during the last years of 
his presidency stemmed from this goal. And even North Yemen, 
recipient of the USSR's arms did not remain an exception 
with regard to the policy of containment. President Reagan, 
throughout his first term, followed this policy full-
bloodedly, and in the second one exempted West Asia as the 
region subject to the superpowers policy of disarmament. 
President Bush, although not facing the danger of Soviet 
advancement in West Asia, showed apprehension about the 
USSR's arms in the area, thereby, indicating an implicit 
willingness for the continuity of arms supplies in the 
region. 
Moreover, the US provided arms to the West Asian states 
to secure bases and strategic facilities, crucial for 
monitoring the USSR, having access to oil supply, for the 
working of CENTCOM, meeting politico-military situations and 
removing the US-West Asia distance. There may not exist 
direct deal of "arms for bases" like the "arms for oil" but 
the US arms bear enough influence on the recipient to grant 
facilities to the US. Henceforth, the US has acquired 
facilities at the important bases of the countries, which 
receive the US arms. 
Commitment to the security, territorial integrity and 
political independence of Israel, constitutes the key of the 
US arms proliferation policy in West Asia. Besides 
historical, moral and ideological commitment, strategic 
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significance of the country has also been an important 
factor behind the United States' unlimited arms supply to 
Israel. The United States by a bilateral agreement-article 
10 of Memorandum of Agreement-is bound to provide military 
assistance to Israel. Israel was the only non-NATO and the 
Third World country which was exempted from Carter's arms 
restraint policy in order to maintain its "deterrence 
strength". 
Truly speaking, the American arms in Israel have 
strengthened its defensive and offensive capability. "The US 
arms", in the words of H. Kissinger, "saved Israel in 
October 1973 war from collapse". Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 was encouraged by arms supplied afresh to 
Israel by the USA in the same year. The nature, volume and 
quality of arms transferred to the Arab states have also 
been subject to Israel's security. The US has given same 
amount of arms to Israel to offset the Arab states, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Even the Congress, known 
for its stand on arms restraints has not only been liberal, 
but it bypassed US administrations ^laissez fair' policy in 
granting approval of arms package to Israel. 
There have been the gravest of the effects of arms 
acquisition. Acquisition of arms in exchange for base 
facilities to the supplier has been doubly harmful to the 
West Asian states, who have not only lost the power to 
exploit superpowers interests in the area, but also become 
subject to the domination by the later. For, arms transfers 
have materialized superpowers objective to drag the world's 
192 
most strategically important area into Cold War Camps and, 
as a result, reduce the West Asian states to the role of 
proxies in their regional and global strategy. 
After the end of the Cold War the regional arms races 
have not diminished, while on the other hand, a few more 
ones have, as the logical corollary to the post Persian Gulf 
War alignments and realignments,come up. The Arab-Israeli 
arms race is an offshoot of the Arab Nationalism-Zionism 
rivalry and was merely sustained by the Cold War. This is 
why though the Cold War has ended and the Soviet Union, the 
main supplier of arms to the Arab side till yesterday, has 
dismembered and nor is Russia capable of, and willing to, 
carry on its predecessor's arms transfer policy, the Arab-
Israeli arms race does not seem, most probably, to be 
adversely affected by these tumultuous changes in the 
international system. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel, as in 
the past, shall continue to get their arms supply from the 
USA and other Western sources and with this the arms race 
among these countries is highly likely to witness an upward 
trend. Syria, until recently a major recipient of the Soviet 
arms and the main Arab power engaged in arms race with 
Israel, after having turned into a US ally since the Persian 
Gulf crisis shall resort to the American arms to carry on 
its arms race with Israel. 
To sum up, the typical geo-strategic, political and 
economic features of West Asia determine the armament in the 
region. Armament, therefore, is basically regional in 
character. Analyzing the factors of arms acquisition in West 
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As ia , I t may a lso be concluded t ha t armament i s a necess i t y 
t he re . However, over r e l i a n c e on m i l i t a r y s t reng th and over 
c a p a b i l i t y t o buy t h e a r m s , have g e n e r a t e d e x c e s s i v e 
armament ensued arms races , and brewed tensions and r i v a l r y , 
each being the reason behind the growing d e s t a b l i z a t i o n o f 
West as la . In s h o r t , though necessi ty In n a t u r e , arms are 
disadvantageous in the u l t i m a t e . 
As f a r as peace in the region is concerned, w i t h the 
c o l l a p s e o f S o v i e t U n i o n , the US has emerged as a key 
a r b i t r a t o r in the f u t u r e of West Asian p o l i t i c s and a s i n g l e 
most powerful I n f l uence . This US ascendancy can be t raced 
t o t h e Camp D a v i d b r e a k t h r o u g h o f 1978. I t had been 
demonstrated in the success fu l complet ion of E g y p t - I s r a e l 
t r e a t y . I n t h e p o s t K u w a i t phase t he US has f u r t h e r 
strengthened i t s p o s i t i o n in the reg ion. Thus peace in the 
West Asia at t h i s j unc tu re of h i s t o r y can not and w i l l not 
be ach ieved w i t h o u t the a c t i v e invo lvement o f t he US. 
Americans dea l t w i t h the Gul f c r i s i s and fo rced Baghdad to 
p u l l o u t i t s t roops from Kuwait . The US can p ressu r i ze I s r a e l 
to p u l l o u t from the Arab lands through imposing i t s w i l l by 
w i t h h o l d i n g l o a n s and c u t t i n g o f f a i d . I n t h e A r a b 
percept ion the US remains r e l u c t a n t to push I s r a e l beyond a 
c e r t a i n p o i n t . The Arabs p e r c e i v e t h i s US r e l u c t a n c e as 
p r o b l e m a t i c , e s p e c i a l l y on the backdrop o f a c t i v e Arab 
cooperat ion given to the US In the Kuwait c r i s i s . 
I t i s now c lea r t h a t peace In the West As ia depends on 
two formulae f o r exchange •• Land and s e c u r i t y . The Arabs 
want t h e i r occupied t e r r i t o r i e s l i b e r a t e d and I s r a e l wants 
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security guarantees. With land returned, the Arabs wants the 
Palestinians peoples rights to be restored. With security 
Israel wants Arab recognition and accommodation. This now 
seems to be an attainable formulae for peace. It has been 
difficult in the past because Arabs and Israelis were 
polarized by the Soviet Union and the US. Now, the situation 
has changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of US as a single most powerful influence. 
The impasse in peace efforts have forced a few Arab 
states to see a military option as the only solution in this 
troubled region. They maintain that peace will not be 
achieved through negotiation and war remained the only way 
to change the balance of power in West Asia and to solve 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The military option is looked at as 
the only realistic chance the Arabs have of recovering the 
lost land, as what was taken by force can be recovered by 
force. Nevertheless, one must not give up the efforts for 
peace through a negotiated settlement. A great deal of 
international pressure was exerted upon Israel after the 
Gulf War to get it to the negotiating table. This paved the 
way to the Madrid and Washington peace talks between Arab 
and Israel. 
On 13 September 1993, the Gaza-Jericho autonomy accord 
was formally signed in Washington. Many termed it as a 
"historic breakthrough". Realistically speaking this 
tantamounts to indulging in surface level emphoria without 
taking into account the ground realities. Doubts regarding 
the logical culmination of the accord in a final 
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rapprochement between the Israelis and Palestinaisn have 
been expressed because there are hard-liners on both the 
sides who denounce the deal as a "sell out and surrender". 
In Israel, the rightist Likud maintains its strong 
opposition to the accord. This has brought a schism within 
the Israeli society putting the two main political parties 
the Labour and the Likud, on two diametically opposite 
poles. The Likud argues that the accord with the PLO is a 
compromise with the long-held Jewish dream of creating an 
"Eretz Israel" (Greater Israel) in the Biblical land, 
Israel's control over the West Bank and Gaza argues Likud, 
is vital to security. On the Palestinian side, it is 
regretted that Arafat's agreement with Rabin will harm the 
inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. The 
Palestinian radicals and fanatics alike claim that the 
autonomy accord side lines four major issues for which the 
Palestinians have been struggling for so long. They are (1) 
the question of Jerusalem 2) the notion of an independent 
Palestinian state, 3) the right to return of 3 million 
Palestinians living in the diaspora, 4) and the issue of 
Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Another source of threat to the accord, which is more 
dangerous, comes from the fundamentalist group Hamas. The 
Hamas categorically rejects the present PLO-Israell 
agreement. In fact it is strongly opposed to the entire 
peace process itself that was launched in Madrid. It calls 
for the total destruction of Israel. Even though the Hamas 
is not a part of the secular PLO, the attitude of Hamas is 
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very crucial because it is the second most important 
political force in the West Bank and Gaza after Arafat's 
supporters. 
At the Arab level too the accord does not seem to have a 
smooth sailing. Initially all the frontline states, Syria, 
Jordan and Lebanon, criticised Arafat's solo diplomacy which 
violated the tenets of a common co-ordinated Arab-PLO 
strategy to deal with Israel. As it stand, Syria's attitude 
in the coming months will be crucial. Jordan has already 
agreed to follow the PLO in reaching an agreement with 
Israel. So has Lebanon, Syria, so far, has adopted a neutral 
stand on the accord as such by maintaining that the 
Palestinian must do what they think best for themselves. 
This can be interpreted either way. Syria's attitude assumes 
added importance because of its control over the Damascus 
based radical leftist groups which stoutly oppose the 
accord. It is alleged that the USA and Israel are trying to 
put pressure on Asad to silence the opposition from the 
radical groups.But the only way to achieve this will be to 
bring Syria into the peace process. That will happen only 
when Israel agrees to withdraw from the Golan Heights on 
which Syria seems to have a categorical position. 
The other radical Arab states like Iraq and Libya and 
non-Arab Iran also oppose the accord. They will continue to 
support the rejectionist groups though the impact would be 
less effective due to their geographical location. But Iran 
may cause severe damage to the implementation of the accord 
as it is the main supporter of the Hamas and the Islamic 
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Jihad. 
Mentioning the above mentioned realities does in no way 
imply that an effort is being made to belittle the 
importance of the accord. This is just to underline the 
challenges that both Arafat and Israeli leader face in the 
coming months. The PLO-Israeli accord is a major step 
forward in the ongoing search for peace in West Asia which 
started in all earnest in Madrid.But the accord should be a 
beginning towards the achievement of a comprehensive peace 
in the region. Mere granting of autonomy to the Palestinians 
will not result in a comprehensive peace. 
Further, the only way to defeat the rejectionist on both 
sides is to move along the course steadily. Israeli leader 
has to prove Israel's sincere desire for peace by adhering 
to the time schedule of the accord. Secondly, the Israeli 
Prime-Minister should also reach agreement with Syria, 
Jordan and Lebanon on the border disputes. For Arafat, the 
first task is to how to maintain law and order during the 
transition period. As the Palestinians change their 
guerrilla outfits and take on the job of policing the area, 
Arafat has to ensure that the Israeli soldiers and settlers 
are protected. Secondly, Arafat has repeatedly pointed out 
that the present accord is just the first step not the last 
one. There are dangers that the Israelis might be thinking 
in terms of making it the last step. Arafat has to ensure 
that this does not happen. 
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